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Abstract 
 
                          Police, Sudan, Community policing, Peacebuilding   
 
This study aims to examine the relation between Sudanese police and peacebuilding 
in the country following an exceptionally long period of varied and complex violent 
conflict Literature on peacebuilding acknowledges the increasing role of police in 
peacebuilding, but is more often focussed on international police forces than 
domestic police.  
 in order to investigate the roles of domestic forces in peacebuilding an analysis of 
the Sudan police is undertaken, which includes its history, organisation, 
management, training and the adoption of a policy of ‘community policing’.  The 
study evaluates community policing as relatively modern policing style that is 
espoused by international peace builders in post conflict settings. It also examines 
the placement of police in peace agreements.  
The study concludes that whilst international police efforts in peacebuilding are not 
without pitfalls, domestic police, such as the Sudanese, may also be unfit for 
peacebuilding roles without changes in certain aspects of their organisational, 
management, recruitment, training and policing approaches. The study proposes a 
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more combined approach that brings together domestic and international police for 
more effective role in peacebuilding. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 “No history of the Sudanese police exists in the English language and there are 
only occasional mentions of the police in the standard general histories of 
Sudan. The three published histories of the police in Arabic are all authored by 
Sudanese police officers and thus together represent something of an ‘official 
history” (Berridge, 2011:p2) 
 
Source: http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/sd.htm 
This research is to examine the relationship between the police and 
peacebuilding, taking Sudanese Police as a case study. It is evident that 
literature linking police to peacebuilding focuses on the role of international 
police with little focus and recognition of domestic police forces, whereas this 
research explicitly focuses on the role of domestic police in peacebuilding. This 
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chapter maps out the research through a brief overview of the research 
methodology and introduces the aim and objectives, research questions and 
genesis, as well as the overall structure of the thesis. I begin with defining the 
concept of police and policing in the next section.  
Definition of terms; police and policing 
The UK Association of Chief Police Officers in 1990 issued the Statement of 
Common Purpose for police in the UK.  “The purpose of the police service is to 
uphold the law fairly and firmly: to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice 
those who break the law; and to keep the Queens peace; to protect, help and 
reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, ‘common 
sense’ and sound judgment” (Rogers, 2011,p.633).  
There is however a debate about the definition of the police and in considering 
this it is necessary to differentiate between police as a concept and what the 
police actually do (policing). Both criminologists and sociologists have sought to 
clarify.  They conclude that the historical background of police, in particular their 
relation with the state and their policing jurisdiction, are central (Wright, 
2002,pp.5-6). Terpstra (2011) discusses Weber and Durkheim’s ideas on the 
police force as a state agency to use legitimate force and moral agency with 
moral symbolic meaning. He highlights the implications of the state’s role of 
maintaining the solidarity of citizens and protection from violence and its moral 
obligation, which gives the police their moral and social duties (Terpstra, 2011).  
Police in much academic literature is regarded as the department employed by 
the state especially to maintain order and control crime. Nevertheless in recent 
years, with the emergence of the private security companies, this definition is 
contested. Policing as it appears in the Dictionary of Policing by Newburn and 
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Neyroud (2008) is defined as follows: “Policing involves organised order 
maintenance, peace keeping, rule of law enforcement, crime investigation and 
prevention, and other forms of investigation and associated information 
brokering, which may involve conscious exercise of coercive power” (Newburn 
and Neyroud, 2008,p.217). In this sense policing is what the police force in any 
service does on behalf of the state which may include the use of coercive force 
and legal action. The Oxford Dictionary defines police as; “The civil force of a 
state, responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the 
maintenance of public order” (Oxford, 2014). Some researchers view policing as 
being both state and non-state business. In light of previous definitions I 
understand   policing can only be state apparatus legally empowered to use 
coercive force and concerned of maintaining public order and protection against 
crime for all. Other forces like the army and security forces might be 
empowered to use force but for different purposes in different contexts. Social 
control or private security agents or vigilantes groups may do work that 
resembles police work but not policing and they are not actually police as they 
are not empowered to use force for the purpose of maintaining public order and 
crime fight for all as Wright (2002) states that police force is distinguished from 
other state departments by their capacity, capacity to use force is a core 
function for police he asserts (Wright, 2002,p.27, Bittner, 1979). Baker (2010) 
argues that any organised activity that seeks to achieve communal order is form 
of policing (Baker, 2010). This seems to be too broad a definition which makes 
the concept of policing blurred. One feature that distinguishes police from what 
Baker is proposing is that they are for the public while other groups are 
concerned with their specific area of responsibility. Police remit can be very 
diverse embraces different service delivery as set out by some researchers 
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(Mulcahy, 2008, Francis, 2012b), they will in all cases include fighting crime for 
all, maintenance of public order as well as the legal use of force within defined 
legal and geographical boundaries (Francis, 2012c, Newburn, 2008, Hills, 
1996).  
Police in recent years have been leaving some of the jobs that were traditionally 
done by the police to now be the responsibility of other agencies, for example 
vehicle parking, report typing and control rooms, to focus more on core police 
functions (Waddington and Wright, 2010).   In conflict ridden contexts where the 
police may have collapsed, individuals, communities, business or others may 
form their own protection means but they do not meet the former criteria of 
police and policing whereby a state run apparatus is empowered to use force 
and provide policing service for the public. Moreover forms of non-state policing 
are seen to be weakening the state power; legitimacy and sovereignty as well 
as  facing resistance from state police officials (Francis, 2012b,p.18). Baker 
(2010) asserts that policing is wider and deeper than just security matters, and 
includes complex tasks ranging from crime prevention to crime detection 
besides other services like immigration management and traffic control. It is 
interesting to see many police definitions linking the police to peace which 
further consolidates the argument in this research about police and 
peacebuilding especially with the increasing recognition of the police role in 
peacebuilding by the UN and other actors.  In this research the focus is on the 
public police or state police as opposed to what has been termed non-state 
policing.  
Police organisations around the world differ in terms of their organisation as 
federal or decentralised police. The United States, for example, adopt an 
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extremely decentralised policing system that is scattered at small local levels. 
The United Kingdom has a less centralised country-county based system with 
three separate police at England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
then independent police force at county level in each of the four countries 
(Newburn, 2008). In contrast the police in continental Europe are more 
centralised  with military components in many countries. For example the 
French system is a federal one where the police are managed at the central 
level. Like Spain and Italy the French police include a national police section 
that is part of the Ministry of Defence, the Gendarmerie, the Guardia Civil and 
the Carabinieri are all military police extensively armed in France Spain, Italy 
and respectively. This is thought to have been adopted to avoid a situation 
where too much power is concentrated in one department (Mulcahy, 2008, Pino 
and Wiatrowski, 2006, Berridge, 2011, Wisler et al., 2009, Salim, 2005).   The 
Sudanese Police are closer to the French system with one police organisation 
managed at the national level, nevertheless they are like the UK police under 
the Ministry of Interior and have no affiliation with the Ministry of Defence. 
Police around the world have taken on responsibilities beyond law enforcement 
and crime fighting to include social work, policing morality, mediation and 
political surveillance (Leys, 1995,p.133).  Police in continental Europe have 
roles in  diverse issues such as passport, alimony supervision, tax collection, 
building regulation and milk inspection but at the same time there little evidence 
of consistency in policing functions in Europe (Mawby, 2008,p.23).   
Hills (2000) identifies six types of African policing systems in terms of how they 
are established and developed and their relationship with the state in the 
continent evolution where the system is developing in high institutional capacity 
that continued since independence as in Uganda; conversion as is the case in 
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Ethiopia where insurgency regime takes power then adopt and reform the 
existing police system; the  integration of insurgency rebels and existing police 
that took place in Namibia; establishing of new police from scratch is described 
in Alice’s model as  construction, example of which can be found in Eritrea: 
when the police are seeking to embrace new developments affecting the 
policing is what she termed as adaptation; and finally in fragile states when the 
state is not in full control of security issues that is the police in transition (Hills, 
2000,p.82). The model does provide a sense of understanding of how police 
forces in Africa have established and developed up to the 1990s which is 
relevant to what these forces look like today, nevertheless it does not explain 
how these forces are structured and managed. The Sudanese Police is akin to 
that model of Uganda described above which is also a common police model in 
other African countries. Such countries have their police systems built during 
the colonial times and continue to exist throughout different regimes (Hills, 
2000, Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008).  Two distinctive features of 
all these police models are that they are highly militarised and have restrained 
relation with their communities mostly because of rampant corruption and 
brutality especially against political opponents, and close ties with governing 
regimes (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011).  
Modern British police, with the exception of Northern Ireland, is known to be 
unarmed and adopting policing by consent. However there is a debate around 
how can this consent be practically obtained from the public. Adlam and Villiers 
(2003) pointed to the fact that police is often state department which in one way 
or another would carry out government policies and that they will, at some 
point, have to act without the consent of all citizens. Police in this capacity are 
not independent bodies even in operational terms. They cited the British police 
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interference with the miners’ strike in the during Margret Thatcher time as Prime 
Minister as an example of police being influenced by government policies 
(Adlam and Villiers, 2003,pp.223-227). 
Research overview 
This research is based on the Sudan, which has seen some of Africa’s most 
protracted and complicated conflicts. These conflicts started in the South Sudan 
in 1955, with other regions following later, and only approached an end in the 
first decade of the 21st century. The country has been undergoing a major 
peace process that started in 2005 and will continue for some time into the 
future. The focus of the research will be on Sudanese Police and their relation 
with and / or their role in the peacebuilding process. The peace process started 
when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South 
Sudan was signed in 2005, which has put an end to the two decades of civil war 
between the two parties. The implementation of this agreement throughout the 
six years interim period culminated in South Sudan becoming an independent 
state in July 2011. Following the CPA an agreement between the government of 
Sudan and one of the fighting rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Movement) in 
Darfur was signed in Abuja 2006, and then another peace deal was reached in 
the Eritrean capital city, Asmara, between the government and rebels (the 
Eastern Front) in Eastern Sudan in the same year. The Darfur conflict continued 
after the Abuja agreement (see Chapter Four) due to the fact that two of the 
main rebel factions refused to participate in the Abuja peace process. 
Nonetheless In July 2011 the Darfur Doha agreement which was mediated by 
Qatar, the United Nations and the African Union, was signed by the main 
fighting groups and the Sudan Government. Still some factions remained 
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outside the peace process and continued their insurgency war against the 
central government (Woodward, 1990, Barltrop, 2011). 
The police have also been deeply affected by the conflict either by being a 
target for the rebel groups fighting the government, or because they have to 
deal with fragile situations where firearms are widespread or providing security 
to areas engulfed by conflict and, in particular, providing security to the 
internally displaced people’s (IDPs) camps for people who fled their homes 
because of the escalating violence. In some of these agreements, as explained 
more in Chapter Four, former combatants joined the police service in Sudan as 
part of the power sharing arrangements, or the disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration process (DDR) (Barltrop, 2008, Movement, 2011).  
The international community was part of that major peace process in Sudan, 
first the United Nations Mission (UNMIS) in Sudan was deployed in 2005 to 
monitor and help implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between 
North and South. The mandate of this mission ended in July 2011 after the last 
phase of that agreement was achieved by conducting the referendum that led to 
the secession of South Sudan (Movement, 2005, Council, 2008a, Council, 
2011a, Robson, 2002, Curran, 2010). In the aftermath of the South Sudan 
secession new conflicts emerged in two areas of the new Sudan. The Blue Nile 
state and South Kordofan, both bordering South Sudan, witnessed violent 
conflict between rebels and government forces. Moreover the border disputed 
area of Abyei remained an unsolved issue between the two countries of Sudan 
and South Sudan. The African Union deployed a Mission upon the agreement 
of the two parties composed of troops from Ethiopia to keep the peace in the 
area (See Chapter Four). In Darfur the African Union mission was deployed in 
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2006 followed by the United Nations African Union hybrid Mission which was 
deployed in 2008, this mission is still operating to help the parties achieve the 
goals of the peace accord (Council, 2008a).  
Despite the emerging literature on policing and police science from both 
academics and practitioners in recent years, and the long history of the 
Sudanese Police force that extends over a century, very little has been written 
to explore and / or to investigate their role in the modern Sudan (Berridge, 
2011), and in particular during these periods of conflict and peacebuilding. The 
Sudanese Police force is therefore under researched as part of the overall 
under researched area of Africa police (Francis, 2012b, Hills, 2000, Marenin, 
1982, Berridge, 2011).  Abdullah Hassan Salem, a former Director General of 
Sudanese Police, wrote a PhD thesis at Khartoum University in 2005 titled, ’The 
Development of Sudanese Police Systems between1899 and 1999’, this was 
followed in 2011 by a PhD thesis at Durham University by James William  
Berridge titled ‘Under The Shadow of the Regime, the Contradictions of Policing 
in Sudan 1924-1989’. Apart from these two theses, and a small number of other 
non-academic contributions, the Sudanese police as an organisation or practice 
have neither attracted Sudanese police officers to reflect on their experiences, 
nor scholars from other disciplines to write about them (Salim, 2005, Berridge, 
2011). Nonetheless the growing debate on the role of police in liberal 
peacebuilding operations suggests that a police force like that of Sudan should 
come into focus because it inevitably has an impact on the peacebuilding 
process in the country. Assumptions are made in the peacebuilding literature 
about the potential of police forces in contexts of fragile peace (Francis, 2012b, 
Stedman et al., 2002, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Curran, 2010). This 
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research will investigate them further with particular emphasis on the role of 
domestic police in Sudan.  
To provide understanding of police in post conflict settings and the different 
features of policing in such settings I therefore begin with brief overview of the 
African context and in particular the post-Anglo colonial African due to the 
common police characteristics between former British colonies in Africa where 
the police was mainly shaped by  the interest of colonisers to provide security to 
the white settlers and their allies; to guard their commercial interests and to 
protect the colonial regime against any national resistance (Hills, 2000, 
Marenin, 1982). It will also make comparative observations from the British 
police due to the historic links between the British who colonised Sudan 1898-
1956 and the renowned reputation that British police have today across the 
globe as a fine police with deep democratic policing traditions (Berridge, 2011, 
Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Mulcahy, 2008, Sinclair, 2012). 
In this regard it is important to note that, contrary to what some writers 
mistakenly believe, the Sudanese Police was built along the same lines as the 
Northern Ireland paramilitary rather than the metropolitan civil service police of 
London famously known as unarmed and adopting the policing by consent 
method. Therefore it is no surprise that personnel of the colonial police in Sudan 
were either retired military personnel of Sudanese or Egyptian origins. Policing 
strangers by strangers was a common practice during the colonial times and in 
this way Egyptians were employed to serve in the newly established Sudanese 
Police. This is comparable with using Hausa Nigerians in Ghana and Indians in 
East Africa                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
or using the Hausa police from North Nigeria to police the Lagos area in the 
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South,                                                 moreover freed slaves were recruited into 
the police to police their former masters in Nigeria (Salim, 2005, Hills, 2011, 
Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Deflem, 1994, Killingray, 1986).  
The colonial administration of the Sudanese Police and the ruling regimes after 
independence were divided on whether to have a strong, professional and 
united police force that could serve the agenda of the ruling regime or to have 
divided police at regional and provincial level which did not represent any threat 
to the regimes. The latter was preferred by the political colonial service and the 
military regimes after independence (Berridge, 2011). They sought not to leave 
the local police with too much power at their disposal and therefore distributed 
some policing powers to between different departments as did President Nimeri 
when he dissolved the Ministry of Interior and police headquarters then divided 
the police between the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency to weaken it. At 
the same time different political regimes preferred to have strong, well 
equipped, police at the centre of power which can protect the regime’s interest, 
especially if challenged by civil protest (Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008). This 
divided police system has also reflected the centre versus periphery divide and 
the effect of equal development on the resources available to the police 
(Berridge, 2011). The concentration of resources in the centre of the State 
contributed to the centre periphery divide as we will see in Chapter Four. This 
divide was confirmed during the field work where it appears through 
respondents’ feedback that the national capital, where the political power is 
based, the police are better resourced and better equipped. So, political 
regimes sought to maintain police force that is not too strong to threaten the 
regime but strong enough to protect it when in threat of political opponents.  
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The combined ethos of the British policing by consent in mainland Britain and 
the paramilitary oppressive police of Ireland and later Northern Ireland were 
both applied in the British colonies. Colonial authorities who used to export 
British police officers to serve in the colonial police also tended to move police 
officers between the different colonies, this practice made possible the 
dissemination of blended colonial- British policing method across the British 
Empire. The shared colonial policing experience prevailed with similar pattern of 
policing that focused in two main aspects; the maintenance of order and 
taxation. To reduce cost and to appeal to local communities the colonial police 
adopted  two strands of policing; a formal one  and native police based on the 
traditional society structures as part of the indirect rule strategy, the two were 
operating in parallel or complementary manner (Deflem, 1994, Killingray, 1986). 
The Northern Ireland police maintained its paramilitary and oppressive 
character until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement when it was 
transformed to become a model for police reform in post conflict contexts 
(Marijan, 2014, Ellison and Smyth, 2000). At the end of the cold war and the 
surge of peacebuilding missions, the UK policing traditions of democratic 
policing developed since  1829 and the quasi-military policing in Ireland 
developed between 1921- 2001, especially in public order management, was 
found useful to provide robust policing in divided communities (Sinclair, 2012). 
During the 1990 and into the 21st century the British police used to train UN 
police commissioners at their police college in Bramshill as explained by retired 
British police officer and former staff of Bramshill.    
Throughout the colonial period in Sudan and other countries the police force 
was tasked with monitoring nationalist movements and political activist resisting 
the colonial rule. The international influence of the British police described   by 
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Newburn (2008)  as “fine” police service across the globe and specially in Africa 
cannot be ignored (Newburn, 2008). They proved that their policing system is 
valid for both democratic societies and societies emerging from conflict with 
adaptable models of harsh and soft policing. Later the national governments 
after independence continued to use the police for political aims against 
opposition groups (Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Musiime, 2012, Salim, 
2008). Sudanese Police today, like other police forces in Africa, still reflects the 
structure and identity of that colonial legacy of being a paramilitary police force 
in the way they are structured, trained, uniformed and administered, with 
military ranks, and military command and remained close and influenced by the 
ruling regimes (see Chapter Three) (Marenin, 2009, Berridge, 2011).  
  The Sudanese Police have little to do in the area of exercising their statutory 
power within the range of their relevant ranks and area of responsibility due to 
the rigid military command structure (see Chapter Three and six). Unlike the 
military police, they have to exercise discretionary powers in their day to day 
work as put by Villiers and Adlam, “Every street corner police is a leader” 
(Peter, 2003, Mulcahy, 2008). The tight military structure nurtures the culture of 
blame among the police where no one is prepared to accept mistakes and must 
find someone to blame (often a junior rank) this culture is impeding their ability 
to work independently as is evident from my respondents’ feedback and may 
ultimately culminate in limiting their potential role in peacebuilding, as I shall 
show. 
The Police force is a key institution to peacebuilding, development, liberalisation 
and democracy, and these principles of peacebuilding are usually accompanied 
by the adoption of community policing, upholding the rule of law and vindication 
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of human rights. The importance of police role is evident by the increasing 
number and roles of international policing in United Nations peace missions in 
recent years (see Chapter Two) (Francis, 2012b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 
2006a, Hills, 2006). This links the police to liberal peacebuilding processes in 
post conflict and war-torn contexts.  
In recognition of that police role, police reform is becoming part of peace deals 
that end conflicts around the world. This role however, as stated earlier, mostly 
focuses on the international police role with little recognition of the domestic 
police role. International actors often push for police reform as part of the overall 
post conflict reform programme, though sometimes motivated by their own 
security agenda especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in western 
countries like the US, UK and Spain and the attacks in East Africa and Yemen 
(Francis, 2012b, Charles, 2002, Hills, 2006).  This could be institutional reform, 
structural reform or capacity building programmes; however in all cases the 
international actors tend to take the leading role with less involvement of 
domestic police who would ultimately take the lead at the end of these 
programmes. These programmes often take the form of short-lived interventions 
without vision of how to sustain what has been achieved.  (Macualay, 
2012,p.185). Ironically when the police system collapses such as in East Timor, 
Panama, El Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo, Namibia, Guatemala, and a new police 
force had to be created from scratch, this provides a better chance for reform 
with special focus on training, selection criteria and human rights standards 
(Charles, 2002, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Paris and ebrary, 2004). In other 
cases like Rwanda, Croatia, the occupied territory of Palestine, Northern 
Ireland, South Africa and Angola, where issues of identity are more acute  and 
societies are divided mainly between religion and ethnicity, the approach for 
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reform is often to influence the doctrine and the conduct of the relevant police 
force (Call, 2002). The relationship between the police and development is 
asserted by many scholars for example Francis (2012) and  Hills (2000) where 
good policing is seen as a prerequisite for development where security is 
provided (Hills, 2000, Francis, 2012b). In some cases as put forward by Calls 
(2002) international investors would insist on the police reform to  provide a 
secure and safe environment for investment (Call, 2002). Interventions to 
ostensibly enforce liberal peace are sometimes seen as being inseparable from 
vested western interest as in Libya, when western powers intervened to defend 
their oil interests. Likewise in Sierra Leone when the United Kingdom intervened 
to secure favourable diamond contracts for British companies (Francis, 2012b, 
Hills, 2006, Mac Ginty, 2011). As described by Hills (2006) the targeted aid to 
Africa has always come with broader objectives as in the quote from USAID 
document;  
 What happens in Africa is of growing concern to the United States and our 
active engagement advances significant US interests. The overarching goals of 
US policy in Africa seek to enhance African capacity to fight terrorism and 
create favourable conditions for US and African trade and business 
opportunities, while developing the foundation for sustained growth, regional 
stability, good governance, a healthier population and responsible use of natural 
resources (USAID, 2005).(Hills, 2006,p.633) 
The police role in liberal peacebuilding is reflected in the literature on 
peacebuilding in different contexts (Call, 2007, Paris, 2006, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Greener, 2011b). This role, as 
stated earlier, is attributed mainly to the international actors, in specific, the 
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United Nations police, the European Union and individual donor countries 
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Durch, 2003). The international community 
is often hesitant to  trust the local police with an executive role due to the risk 
associated with that  since the police in such contexts are almost always corrupt 
and do not represent the society  therefore might favour one group over the 
other (Greener, 2011a). For this they tend to take advisory, monitoring or 
training roles to help with the development of the host police organisations 
(Charles, 2002).  
Even though it is common for the international police to play an important role in 
peace missions in post conflict contexts they often face many challenges, not 
least their limited understanding of the local contexts, which minimises their 
effectiveness and efficiency in peacebuilding role in the host country (Greener, 
2009b). There are also issues around their coherence and their professional 
backgrounds since they tend to be drawn from different policing systems within 
the contributing countries. There are as well issues surrounding their training 
and the hasty way they are often chosen by their contributing countries and the 
UN which does not allow for rigorous vetting system to be applied. Moreover the 
legitimacy of international police to operate in different contexts is also 
constantly questioned by some observers (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a).    
 This study examines first the main components of the Sudanese Police 
mandate, testing their relevance to peacebuilding. It will then explore three 
different pertinent aspects:  the leadership and management style of the 
Sudanese Police, in other words, how the Sudanese Police force is structured, 
managed, operated, and the relationship between its different administrative 
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levels. Second the training system, its institutions, regulations, challenges and 
the current practises and how suited they are to the current context. Third, I 
focus on the community policing approach adopted by Sudanese Police and its 
history, development and practice. Community policing is an internationally 
recognised approach which has arisen as police forces around the word have 
come to the realisation that they are not close enough to their communities and 
thus they are unable to gain their trust or the tremendous value of intelligence 
and support. Therefore they adopt this approach to bridge that community-
police gap. Furthermore police forces also come to understand that the 
resources available at their disposal are not sufficient to support their 
endeavour in the fight against internationally growing and newly emerging multi-
faceted crime (Verma et al., 2013, Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009).  .  
To further examine the Sudanese police role in the peace process we need to 
identify what are the key elements that are mostly related to or can affect police 
performance in such contexts. Two areas can be identified in this regard. First, 
the issues of police representation recruitment and training are constantly 
discussed in the literature examining police in the post conflict and war-torn 
contexts. In divided societies where one group dominates public affairs the 
police are most likely to be dominated by one ethnicity, religious or political 
group examples from Rwanda, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Latin America and 
indeed other countries, especially in Africa, support this assumption (Call, 2007, 
Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006b, Baker, 2006). To maintain equal representation of the 
society that the police serve, a fair and transparent selection and recruitment 
system is imperative. Once recruited police in these environments need 
adequate training tailored to address specific issues such as the rule of law and 
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vindication of human rights. This is particularly relevant as such police are 
almost always having a record of human rights violation and abuse of power.  
Second the police-community relation in conflict ridden countries like Sudan is 
always problematic. This raises the question of how relations between police 
and societies can be repaired and what would be the policing style that is likely 
to be suitable for that purpose.  Community policing, as literature shows, is 
modern policing approach that is sought to engage communities in the policing 
process. The relevance of community policing does not only come from the fact 
that it is the policing style proposed by peace builders in conflict zones but it is 
also the approach that most likely to engage the public in the policing process in 
a way that might win their support and trust, both key elements of successful 
policing particularly in peacebuilding environment (Greener, 2009b, Holm and 
Eide, 2000a, Palmer et al., 2012, Grabosky, 2009a, Verma et al., 2013, Wisler 
et al., 2009). To examine these matters within the Sudanese police we need to 
understand how they are structured, operate and administered, how they 
manage the selection, recruitment and training processes and whether they do 
community policing and how they do it compared to the international practice. 
These interrelated policing issues will be examined separately in chapter five, 
six and seven. This detailed local-insider knowledge of Sudanese police that I 
will present in these chapters might be helpful to avoid the mistakes highlighted 
by critics of peacebuilding as shown in chapter two.  This understanding which 
will reflect on the limitations of Sudanese police and how they emerged can 
provide opportunity for positive change. Such change may take the form of 
locally driven and internationally supported reform within the current legislative 
framework    
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Research genesis 
Studying policing and police science has not drawn the attention of either 
academics or practitioners until the last two decades during which there has 
been a surge of new literature . As argued by Peter Grabosky, when police 
officers write about their policing experiences they do that in a language not 
comprehensible 1 to people who are not familiar with police culture and at the 
same time when academics write about police they tend to do so in difficult 
language that is not easy for police and ordinary people to understand 
(Grabosky, 2009a) 
In identifying this research focus I acknowledge that I have been influenced by 
my career and experience of working in the Sudanese Police for over two 
decades; living in a country that was engulfed with protracted civil conflicts 
which affected all aspects of life; and also being from Darfur, one of the most 
conflict-torn regions in Sudan (See Chapter Four) (Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013, 
Johnson, 2011, Mamdani, 2009). Police are often affected by conflict by either 
being victims of or part of the conflict (see Chapter Two and Three) (Francis, 
2012b, Ellison and Smyth, 2000, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). My 
experiences inspired me to look at the relationship between the police as an 
organisation, and their potential role in peace processes. In this endeavour I try 
to identify potential links between the two. This ambition is also based on what 
literature has shown of the involvement of the police in civil conflicts and their 
increasing role in peacebuilding (Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011a). A further 
motivation was that the Sudanese Police force is an under researched area of 
police in Africa (Baker, 2008, Marenin, 1982, Berridge, 2011, Hills, 2000). The 
                                                          
1
 By conducting this research I am accepting the challenge and trying to break that mould where police 
officers tend to refrain from reflecting on their policing experience and present it to wider readers in 
simple readable manner. 
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Sudanese Police are not part of the UN police in that they do not have police 
personnel within the UN missions.  Being part of the UN police as asserted by 
Francis (2012) provides chances for training, experience and funding. 
Sudanese police do not seek to take part in the UN police and so they do not 
prepare their officers up to the UN required standards. I also have experience of 
participating in the training of South Sudanese Police, as a member of a team 
that was tasked to deliver training to the police in the South region of Sudan in 
2006/2007. The team was part of a UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) project to support the justice sector in Sudan.  During that 
experience I witnessed how war can affect police and also how challenging it 
can be to build a new police force to replace that which had totally collapsed 
during conflict.  
Aim and Objectives of the Research 
 The aim of the research is to evaluate the peace process in Sudan through the 
lens of examining the Sudanese police roles and capabilities with a view to 
evaluating their effectiveness in the peacebuilding process.  
It will also use Sudan as a case study to consider the role of the domestic police 
(and community policing in particular) in peacebuilding processes in fragile and 
post-war states, which is a much under-studied topic. 
Research questions  
Main research question:  
Has the adoption of community policing by the Sudanese Police force been 
successful? In particular, are the management and leadership style; training 
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and human resources management systems; and in particular community 
policing approaches suitable for this endeavour? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
1. What are the main components of the Sudanese Police mandates? 
2. To what extent are contemporary community policing approaches 
facilitating the peacebuilding roles of the Sudanese Police?  
   3. What does community policing mean within the context of the mandate of 
the Sudanese Police? 
   4. What are the main features of the community policing approaches adopted 
by Sudanese Police? 
    5. Did the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police help 
police in undertaking peacebuilding role? 
     6. What are the challenges faced these approaches which hinder the police 
in Sudan to undertake an effective role in peacebuilding? 
    Contribution to knowledge 
 
It is evident through the literature review that the Sudanese Police and policing 
are an under-researched topic within the overall under-researched area of 
African police and policing in fragile states. The peace process in Sudan has  
inevitably affecting the Sudanese Police force in peacebuilding activities since 
2004, with little research undertaken and so in this sense it will also make a 
contribution to original knowledge. Most peacebuilding literature examines the 
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police role in relation to the role of international police. I am taking an unusual 
approach which explores the domestic police force in particular. This will enable 
me also to make a judgement as to whether it has a potentially greater role than 
recognised at present. Moreover I seek to understand possible useful means to 
determine and manage international support to mitigate any negative impacts 
on the host police force and country. So my contribution is expected to enrich 
the literature on Sudanese Police and the role of local police in peacebuilding 
using the Sudanese Police as case study, but also to locate these findings 
within the wider topic of police and peacebuilding in Africa. A final note on this 
relates to Berridge’s (2011) conclusion quoted at the onset of this chapter 
describing the studies on Sudanese Police by former Sudanese police officers 
of being “something of an official history”.  I believe that being a member of an 
organisation does not undermine the prospect of conducting a valuable 
scientific research so long as research principles and ethics have been adhered 
to. Thus I hope this study would be an authentic contribution. 
 Limitations 
One of the limitations of this research in the methodology area is that the 
samples for research respondents had to be taken from members who belong 
to para-military type of organisation which is governed by military structure and 
that the members of it are not used to talking about their work to an outsider 
under any circumstances. Moreover there is a lack of access to police 
documents since these are regarded by the police as confidential documents. 
The second one is that I am a member of the organisation that is being 
researched. It was a point of concern as to how I will be perceived, especially 
with the power issues embedded in the rank structure, and therefore collecting 
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data for research in such environment was not without some implications, and I 
examine these issues further below. Finally I had originally considered that the 
most appropriate assessment of the community policing approach would be to 
seek the views of community members, but on reflection this idea was 
dispensed as impractical due to my identity and the potential ethical 
considerations arising of that.  It is to be hoped that at some point a scholar with 
a more appropriate identity may take up this investigation.  
Literature review 
 Bryman (2012) states that existing literature is essential part of any research 
and that further reading is indispensable to clarify some issues related to our 
chosen topic. These issues he writes related to how much is known about the 
topic; concepts and theories applied; methods used; evidence presented as well 
as those who significantly participated in researching the area (Bryman, 
2012,p.8). Literature review as Mathews and Ross (2010) put it is about getting 
to know how others have researched the same topic that you intend to 
research, this they point out should take place at early stage of the research to 
help develop and formulate your ideas (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.93). To 
establish understanding of the police and peacebuilding I examined existing 
literature on these topics. Modern trends on police and policing around the 
world are reviewed.  The development of peace keeping into peacebuilding and 
liberal peacebuilding is as well examined (see Chapter Two). The literature 
review on Sudan focused on the published studies, even though they are scant, 
beside laws and regulations that currently govern the role of the police, 
particularly in the areas of recruitment, selection, training and community 
policing. Analysis of Sudanese Police management and leadership systems   
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additionally, it examined academic literature on the peace process in the Sudan, 
beside reports, newspapers and any data that are available on the impact of 
policing on peacebuilding. 
Methodology 
In order to investigate the research problem in detail it was necessary to 
undertake some empirical research within the police force, keeping in mind the 
challenges mentioned above. 
“The debate between qualitative and quantitative researchers is based upon the 
differences in assumptions about what reality is and whether or not it is 
measurable. The debate further rests on differences of opinions about how we 
can best understand what we know, whether through objective or subjective 
methods” (Jha and ebrary Inc., 2008,p.6). 
   This study took place in specific contexts with specific agents and so it fulfils 
Robson’s definition of case study (Robson, 2002,p.185).  Data for this research 
has been collected at different stages through several data collection periods 
whilst in Sudan. Analysis followed each visit and more data were collected in 
the next visit. In this sense Grounded Theory is deemed to be applicable to the 
way I formulated my understanding and interpretation of data through the 
research journey (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.79-80). In Gounded Theory 
according to Robson (2002) different research methods are combined until 
research reaches saturation. It can be used for data analysis for both qualitative 
and quantitative research (Robson, 2002,pp.192-194). Developed by Strauss 
and Corbin grounded theory brings data collection and analysis in seemingly 
inseparable phases, and in this way the researcher is developing new theory 
stems from the data. In other words data collection goes in tandem with data 
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analysis and the latter does not have to be done at the end of data collection 
phase (Sarantakos, 2013,p.371).    
Matthews and Ross (2010) indicate that qualitative research takes place when a 
researcher interacts with people, interviewing and observing events as they 
happen within their natural contexts, and in this sense the researcher is using 
methods and data generated by research. Qualitative research differs from 
quantitative research in that quantitative is based on the fact that physical reality 
of the world is possibly measurable and the result would not change on 
repeating experiment. Despite the narrowing gap between the two in the late 
twentieth century one of them will still be known to dominate particular areas of 
research or discipline  (Matthews and Ross, 2010,p.141). As such, research on 
police behaviour and peacebuilding is dominated by qualitative research. Whilst 
this current research is mainly qualitative some limited quantitative data have 
been used where appropriate. Jha and Inc (2008) state that qualitative and 
quantitative can be combined in one research (Jha and ebrary Inc., 2008).  
  Secondary data from academic books, journal articles, media resources, 
reports and others were used, along with primary data. 
Primary data were generated through interviews and focus groups with full 
consideration of ethical issues regarding the confidentiality and encoding of 
participants throughout the research process. Samples for research 
respondents were drawn from different ranks and roles within Sudanese Police 
personnel with a diverse range of experience.  
All primary data was collected in Khartoum, the capital city of Sudan. Issues of 
experience and rank within the police, as well as gender issues were all 
26 
 
considered to ensure appropriate representation, using a purposive sampling 
approach.  With regard to safety of research subjects there had been no 
foreseen concerns of this type due to the nature of the research (see below).  
A hybrid method provided triangulation of the data corroborated by participant 
observation, to reduce errors or limitations to the research. Specific methods 
were tailored to suit particular groups or individuals to ensure that the methods 
used are the most appropriate ones to generate more relevant data in relation 
to the research question. For example interviews were used mostly with senior 
police officers who were expected to be confident and not intimidated by my 
rank, whereas focus groups were more suitable for middle and junior ranks, 
they were thought to be less intimidating and would not identify individuals. In 
both cases these judgements seemed to be borne out in that both groups were 
forthcoming. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews are the most common method used in research, it is distinguished 
with the researcher being directly engaged in the data collection process by 
asking questions and receiving answers. Among the different types of 
interviews semi-structured interviews with open ended questions are common in 
social research. They may take the form of one to one face to face interviews or 
group format  (Robson, 2002). Interviews as Robson (2002) indicated can be 
used as the only method or in combination with other methods in multi-method 
approach as is the case in this research (Robson, 2002,pp.269-270).   An 
important element of structured interviews is that interviewees have to be asked 
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exactly the same questions, preferably in the same order so that responses can 
be easily recorded and aggregated  (Bryman, 2008,p.193). 
Sampling 
Conducting research using interviews is expensive and time consuming 
therefore the need arose for choosing a sample that can adequately represent 
the large community of the study. Larger sample is recommended for better 
results; however practical matters should be taken into consideration when 
deciding size of sample. Many researchers take a minimum of 30 participants to 
secure a more normally distributed data (Beins, 2014,p.49-50).  If the research 
findings are to be generalised then the sample has to represent the whole 
research population in a meaningful way (Bryman, 2012,pp.186-187). All 
participants were chosen because they are expected to provide critical 
feedback, and thoughtful insights building on their policing experience and 
exposure to police culture. A purposive approach to sampling was taken 
whereby characteristics were chosen to establish stratified variables or stratified 
sampling (David and Sutton, 2004,p.151).  The selection process was designed 
to ensure that there was no accidental exclusion on the basis of rank, gender, 
age, tribe, class or ethnicity. A preliminary study in which I ran interviews and 
focus group for ten senior Sudanese officers during their visit to the UK in 2011, 
confirmed my impression that they would be open to such engagement, as was 
confirmed during field research in Sudan. 
Participant observation 
Often any research that involves people would include element of observation 
especially participant observation which stemmed from anthropologists’ work.  It 
helps corroborate data obtained by other research methods. Moreover 
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observation can be used as an alternative method to collect data and interpret 
what people say; they may act differently from that which they report (Robson, 
2002, pp.209-312). Sarantakos (2013) adds that participant observation takes 
place in natural setting in unstructured format.  He also put some ethical 
caveats regarding research participants being unaware of being observed and 
researcher hiding his identity while observing research participants (Sarantakos, 
2013,pp.240-243).  During the span of the research I used observation to collect 
data through interacting with and meeting members of the Sudanese Police on 
numerous occasions in informal contexts. Ethical issues, in particular 
researcher identity and research objective were considered throughout. 
Ethical issues 
 Research ethics have developed rapidly during the last few decades. 
Institutions, professional bodies and tertiary institutions established their own 
ethical standards that researchers have to adhere to, as well as ethical boards 
to review and approve  any research that involves people or animal 
(Sarantakos, 2013, Beins, 2014). I will outline below some of the perceived 
ethical matters related to this research. Issues of personal safety were 
perceived very unlikely as I am a Sudanese citizen with policing background 
and, consequently, have an excellent understanding of the ongoing safety and 
security issues in areas of my country.  I also recognize that such safety issues 
are limited to a few specific areas of Sudan and that most areas are completely 
secure and safe to visit. The field work was conducted in the capital Khartoum 
which is not a conflict region and it is not one of the areas that are identified by 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office ( FCO) as a risky area.  
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It was ethically appropriate to obtain consent from research participants, this in 
part gives them confidence that it is their own decision to take part on the 
research and in part, gives them the assurance that the researcher is seriously 
considering their participation. As for the researcher, the informed consent 
supports the validity and credibility of the obtained data.  Reasonably informed 
consent was offered early on when I was approaching the participants for the 
first time. It was properly elaborated for the participants in written or verbal form 
as appropriate. Some of them signed happily but most of them indicated that 
there was no need to do so. 
 Participants were told that they are free to withdraw from the research process 
at any time and there had been no need to revisit this in order not to affect the 
research participants’ desire in continuing as research respondents. 
 Ample time was given to the participants until it was certain that they 
understood the extent and the nature of the consent. I was aware that the time 
needed might vary from one participant to another. 
All Sudanese speak Arabic; fortunately Arabic is my first language, and this 
made it easy to overcome any potential problems, misunderstanding or 
misinterpretation.  
Reliability  
A reliable research method is equivalent to consistent research method; it is the 
method that will produce the same results, if repeated, regardless of who is 
conducting the research. It also means that the instrument used is not biased 
and is not influenced by the researcher, the research participants or the 
environment in which the research was conducted. Reliability of research 
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according to Sarantakos (2013) can be featured in three common types; the first 
one relates to time known as stability reliability meaning that results will stay the 
same through different times; the second is representative reliability, this one is 
about the group from which research participants were selected; and third is the 
what  has been termed equivalence reliability across indicators used in the 
research (Sarantakos, 2013,p.104). By attending to research principles and 
considering ethical issues I sought to give the utmost reliability. I do 
acknowledge, however, that my status as a member of the researched group 
may have given me a much higher level of trust than other researchers would 
obtain if they were to seek to replicate the research. 
Reflexivity 
I explained my role, as a researcher as well as an officer, to the research 
participants, the research scope and objectives were made clear moreover 
research participants were assured that there would be no harm as a result of 
their contribution, and confidentiality and anonymity would be secured. As the 
participants are all from the police force I was aware of the problems concerning 
researching one’s own organisation and how the participants would perceive 
the researcher. From my own experience I expected that majority of participants 
from all ranks would contribute without reservation and that they would not 
withhold any significant information. However it makes sense to expect that 
some might be suspicious of researcher motivation or feel uncomfortable talking 
about specific issues, nevertheless it was noticeable how all respondents 
welcomed being part of the research. Again the researcher stressed the point 
that no harm would be inflicted on any participant as a result of his or her 
participation and that issues of anonymity and confidentiality are strictly 
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considered which would make their identity and the content of what they say 
accessible only to the researcher and his supervisor. In all cases objectives of 
the research were made very clear and protection of the participants’ identities 
would be emphasised.  I anticipated that research participants would be 
enthusiastic to take part in the process once they were assured that they would 
be protected and that the research aimed to improve the police service in the 
future. This was realised during the field work. 
Another matter of concern was the power differential between my own rank and 
that of more junior colleagues, which may have inhibited the latter in what they 
may say. Therefore it was important that I convince them that I will abide by 
research ethics pertaining confidentiality and anonymity and reassured them 
that no harm will result to them arising from anything that they will say. As such 
I would have to earn their trust and demonstrate that for these purposes I will be 
putting aside my hat as a superior officer. I endeavoured to illustrate this by 
insisting also that if they say anything which constitutes a breach to any existing 
law and/or regulation, I gave an undertaking not to reveal or use any of what 
they say as evidence against any of them at any point in the future. I think I 
managed to achieve this because of the openness with which they responded. 
Furthermore I stressed that participation was absolutely voluntary and no one 
would be forced to participate and that withdrawal was permitted at any stage of 
the research. 
I used my policing experience and knowledge of police related subjects to direct 
the research inquiry and to probe the questions to generate the most useful and 
relevant data. 
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Risks and challenges 
It was challenging to research one’s own organisation especially as police work 
is still considered to be secretive in Sudanese society, where any data that are 
related to police are regarded as confidential even the number of police 
personnel and figures of police budget are not known to most police officers let 
alone the public. Beside the fact there is little published work on the subject this 
is compound by the difficulty in accessing police documents. At the onset of this 
research I was hoping that the Sudanese Police would help fund it either fully or 
partially however this was not achieved. I therefore encountered numerous 
difficulties in funding my studies in particular how to get funds through to the 
United Kingdom with Sudan being subject to economic sanctions that prevent 
money transactions outside the country. Furthermore the sanctions have led to 
my UK bank account being closed and was not allowed to have any one at any 
UK based bank because of my nationality. With support of sincere friends and 
dedicated family members I was able to overcome these difficulties. Also a big 
challenge for me was not to allow my own views and judgements to supersede 
the research finding  and how finding a way to suppress them. A further concern 
of mine was what would be the consequences if the Sudanese Police force was 
not happy with the research findings; luckily first indications seem to suggest 
that they are.  
 Reflection on Data from Field Work 
Introduction 
This section presents the summary of analysis of the fieldwork data collected 
from Khartoum through asking questions of a research sample population of 
forty-five police officers of different ranks through semi-structured personal and 
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focus group interviews, supplemented by the author’s observations.  All 
interviews and focus groups took place at departments where participants work. 
In the cases where I ran focus groups the head of department was notified of 
the date and place of the activity. For interviews I informed the head of 
departments about the research and potential participants. In all cases the 
names of research respondents were not disclosed to their superiors.  
Participants were willing to speak despite my reservation that they may not be 
comfortable speaking to researcher belonging to the same organisation. At all 
ranks participants were ready to speak; sometimes with noticeable zeal. It was 
however the middle and junior ranks, and women alone, focus groups which 
were the more open compared to senior ranks. Because all field work was 
carried out in Khartoum there was ease in reaching research participants. 
During this time I only provided snacks and drinks for one focus group. All other 
participants were happy to host me in their work space and provided me with 
drinks. Of note is that the women alone focus group proved especially 
productive as they had the chance to focus on their own issues within the 
overall police issues which was unusual because of their unique status in the 
Sudan police and also because of the nature of their responses which is 
considered to be unique to this group alone. 
Background to respondents and common responses   
In addition to the three levels of rank represented, the respondents came from a 
variety of personal backgrounds in relation to geographical regions, tribes, 
gender, work experience, years of services, family economic background, role 
and age groups.   Additionally, although they were based in Khartoum at the 
time of the interviews and focus groups, they had diverse work experience and 
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had served in many other states of Sudan.  Examples of departments and roles 
include: Headquarters; State Command Team; Criminal Investigation; Wildlife 
Protection; Traffic and Road Policing; General Patrol; Administration; Police 
Station Command; International Relations; Reformatory for Child Offenders; 
Popular and Community Policing (PCPD); Training Authority; Police Hospital; 
and Control Room (CCTV observations).   Moreover, the respondents’ length of 
police service was varied and ranged from 5 to 34 years. 
Most of the senior officer and middle ranking officers had worked in conflict 
zones, but none of the junior ranking officers or the female respondents had 
conflict area experience.  This is due to conditions of service i.e. it the norm in 
Sudan police that female officers do not work in operational posts or away from 
family residence unless they chose otherwise and NCOs from the rank of 
warrant officer down to private are recruited and deployed in the same state (in 
this case, Khartoum), but they can be transferred to different area or 
department within that state whereas officers from the rank of lieutenant up to 
major general can be posted anywhere according to the state or  department 
they working in. 
The vast majority of respondents welcomed the opportunity to discuss the 
research issues and, consequently was very open and candid in most areas.   A 
few were reluctant to discuss issues of corruption or the misconduct of 
managers.  Additionally, one of the potential female respondents agreed to be 
interviewed but when the time arrived she seemed reluctant and postponed 
twice. Researcher understanding of this is part of the conservative culture of the 
Sudanese society therefore the potential female police respondent felt shy to be 
interviewed in private.  Despite reassurances regarding confidentiality and 
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informed consent, she still seemed hesitant resulting in the researcher 
cancelling the interview in line with ethical considerations. 
Research outline 
Chapter one has outlined the thesis by providing research overview, research 
questions and the justification of research and outlined the methodology 
followed along with its challenges.  Chapter two seeks to lay out the wider 
concepts of peace studies and liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts, its 
features, agendas and critics, including the specific components that aim to 
achieve peace through building liberal institutions adopting democracy and 
upholding the rule of law and vindication of human rights. It will then examine 
the centrality of the police to liberal peacebuilding and development which is 
advocated by peace builders, donor countries and the United Nations and how 
police reform is becoming a more integral part of peace accords across the 
globe and explore this further within peace missions analysing the roles of both 
international and the domestic police and to what extent are these roles 
complement and/or contradict each other. It will also provide analysis on how 
community policing is introduced within the framework of the liberal peace and 
how it has been conceived by the different actors.  
Chapter three provides an overview of Sudan’s history, politics and the 
relationship between the Sudanese Police and the ruling regimes, exploring the 
doctrinal and operational philosophy of the Sudanese Police through its 
composition, mandate, management and practice. To achieve this it will seek to 
explain its colonial legacy as a paramilitary oppressive state apparatus that was 
tasked with maintaining order and repressing political opponents of the state. 
Then finally it assesses the consequent challenges facing the Sudanese Police.   
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Chapter four introduces the conflicts in Sudan which started in 1955 and its 
ramifications since then. Using secondary sources it presents the consensus 
view on its root causes as well as its development from local conflicts into one 
that attracted the attention of the international community.  It will also assess 
the peace process in the country after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 between the Sudan government and the rebels of South 
Sudan and other peace accords in the different parts of the country that ensued. 
It will offer an overview of the roles of the Sudanese police in the peace process 
and how that role was shaped by, and reflected in, the different peace 
agreements.    
Chapter five evaluates the extremely diverse legal mandate of the Sudanese 
Police which extends far beyond the traditional police duty of maintaining order 
and fighting of crime. Then it presents an analysis of the leadership and 
management style of the Sudanese Police and their effect on the management,   
shaping and influencing of the performance of the police and finally testing the 
mechanisms in place for Sudanese Police to observe human rights, uphold the 
rule of law and maintain accountability and transparency. These are then 
calibrated against the international trends in leadership and management and 
police practice in some parts of the world and finally examining the impact of 
these systems in the Sudanese police role in peacebuilding. 
Chapter six maps out the role of the Sudanese Police training system and its 
complexity. It seeks to provide understanding of the method of the training 
which tends to be militarised, suitable for a paramilitary police force. It then 
focuses  on the training resources and how they are managed to deliver training 
for the different levels of the police personnel at the basic training stage as well 
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as the on the job training. Finally it will evaluate the recruitment approach in this 
diverse society.  This will be contrasted with multi-national training partnerships 
with other countries and peacebuilding roles. 
In chapter seven, community policing as a comparatively new emerging policing 
approach will be examined. It provides an analysis of the origins and 
development of this policing concept as well as the different perspectives of 
community policing in different contexts. The Sudan community policing is 
evaluated against internationally recognised practise. Then the relationship 
between the Sudanese policing approaches and community policing finally are 
examined to identify possible links between community policing in Sudan and 
peacebuilding efforts in the country.   
And finally chapter eight will build on the analysis and research results to draw 
conclusions and identify knowledge gaps to establish reasonable grounds for 
further research in the area. It will also offer some relevant lessons for policy 
that could be used for future reform. 
The next chapter provides account of literature review which represents the 
conceptual frame work that underpins this study.  
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Chapter Two 
Police Forces in International Context 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores existing literature on police and policing at international 
level and their relation to peacebuilding process. A critical assessment of police 
operating in post-war contexts, in particular the United Nations Police, and 
domestic forces in conflict settings is also offered. In particular I investigate the 
extent to which existing research presents an effective evaluation of the roles of 
international and domestic police forces in peacebuilding. Literature on liberal 
peacebuilding, the development, the challenges and the critique of liberal 
peacebuilding forms part of the broad context of the discussion in this chapter. I 
first explore the expectations and critical evaluations of peacebuilding itself. 
Lastly community policing per se is emerging as the key policing method 
endorsed by the United Nations and adopted by most of donor countries in post 
conflict settings, and there is also an emerging literature on this specifically as 
will be seen in this chapter.   
Liberal Peace and its Critics 
The ‘liberal peace debate’ relates, broadly speaking, to a discussion 
 of the theory and practice of intervention in poor post-war countries by 
international institutions, supported by or alongside wealthy Western 
governments and NGOs, in order to stabilise, develop and generally free them 
from the scourge of war.”(Sabaratnam, 2011,p.9) 
During the Cold War there were two conflicting ideologies were dominating the 
world politics and influencing  the United Nations  interventions in conflict areas 
under the umbrella of ‘peace keeping missions’ : capitalism and communism.  
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At the end of the Cold War, and the corresponding collapse of the Soviet Union, 
international peace actors – led by the western powers – started to launch 
‘peacebuilding’ missions.  This implied that peace would be built on the basis of 
liberal principles of democracy, role of law and free market (Pino and 
Wiatrowski, 2006, Heathershaw, 2008). In this context, technical assistance 
was provided to war-torn countries to achieve stable peace and a democratic 
system.  In comparison, the traditional peacekeeping missions (before the end 
of the Cold War) more or less abided by their mandate of not interfering with 
internal issues of the host countries.  The major shift in UN peace operations 
took place when the peace missions were mandated to interfere with internal 
issues of the host states. In his 1992 policy statement known as An Agenda for 
Peace, the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Ghali outlined the three 
categories of peace operations: peacekeeping; peace enforcement, in which 
missions are authorised to use force in circumstances other than self-defence; 
and post-conflict peacebuilding. He defined peacebuilding as “to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace” (Paris, 2006, 
Boutros-Ghali, 1992b).  In post conflict peacebuilding missions peace builders 
interfere with diverse sets of activities: from drafting laws, reforming the security 
and justice sector, monitoring elections and enforcing peace-terms between the 
former combatants (Paris, 2006, Boutros-Ghali, 1992b). The diversity of tasks 
in peacebuilding missions led to the involvement of a variety of organizations.  
Some were within the UN, such as the United Nations’ Development 
Programme (UNDP), whilst others included: regional organisations such as the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSEC), individual states 
such as the United States of America and  NGOs from the western world all 
coming to help in the peacebuilding efforts. Between 1989 to 1999 thirty three   
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missions of this type were launched (Paris, 2006,p17).  In some cases the UN 
missions themselves conducted police functions, as in Namibia, and in other 
countries the UN took responsibility for running the affairs of the country, as in 
Cambodia, and in others they were authorised to use fire not only for self-
defence but to enforce peace, such as in Somalia and Bosnia (Pino and 
Wiatrowski, 2006 , Barash, 2000). 
 
 In his theoretical argument to conceptualise peace, Richmond (2006) identifies 
four strands of peace; victor peace where peace can sustain after the 
domination of one party over the other; institutional peace that brings states 
together to agree on possible ways of maintaining peace, an example of which 
is the Westphalia Treaty and the formation of the United Nations; and 
constitutional peace, which stems from the liberal values of democracy and the 
free market. He also includes the peace that emanates from civil society 
campaigns, especially to protect human rights, as happened when the 
international slave trade was abolished in the nineteenth century 
(Richmond,2006). 
Building peace is, however, an enormously challenging task that goes far 
beyond the mere absence of war, to include the improvement of life and values. 
As war issues are so complex and difficult to understand, so the international 
community has found them difficult to respond to. It may well require social 
transformation, economic reform and beyond to achieve social justice in deeply 
divided societies (Barash and Webel, 2009, Rogers, 2010) although the views 
about what precisely is needed, and where, is often contested. 
The history of the United Nations peace keeping missions can be traced back to 
June 1948 when the United Nations’ Truce Supervision Organisation was sent 
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to Palestine to supervise the truce between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
(Barash, 2000). Peace keeping efforts by the United Nations then evolved 
rapidly. The first major peace keeping operation in Africa was the Congo peace 
mission operation (1960-1964). It was the first peace mission to be deployed in 
a country where the institutions of the host country were collapsing. It was also 
the first one to include substantial civilian elements (Barash, 2000). Furthermore 
it was the first operation to move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement 
when the Security Council authorised it to use force to end the secession of the 
Katanga region (Barash, 2010). According to Barash the peace keeping 
operation often has five pillars which are; it should be authorised by the United 
Nations legislative body, it has to be impartial, it should be deployed with the 
consent of the host country, troops have to be provided by member states 
contributing their military or police personnel to serve as members of a UN 
mission and finally the UN troops are often authorised to use force to defend 
themselves or in rare occasions to fulfil their mandates. Through the 
development of the peacebuilding operations six types of peacekeeping 
operations were identified and each applies to certain conflict situation and 
designed to address specific phase in the development of the conflict. Type one 
aims to prevent the eruption of a conflict by deploying UN troops upon request 
by one of parties to the conflict as was the case in Macedonia. The second type 
of peace keeping operations is that of deploying troops to help in fostering 
peace negotiations example of this type is Cyprus, Syria and Kashmir. A third 
type of peace keeping operations is often deployed after a peace accord is 
reached so the mission main objective would be to assist the parties in 
implementing the peace agreement, this is the most known type of peace 
keeping operations. It involves various activities all of which aim at consolidating 
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the peace conditions. Examples of this in Africa include Namibia, Angola and 
Mozambique. Operations conducted to secure delivery of humanitarian aid for 
the needy in conflict zones are the fourth type of the operations which was 
exemplified by the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. The fifth type of peace 
operations involve enforcement of peace, as happened in Congo when its 
institutions collapsed or were collapsing, and the UN intervened to  attempt a 
solution. The sixth type of peace operations is enforcement where UN troops 
are deployed with a mandate to use force to compel all parties to comply with 
the peace accord requirements (Barash, 2000).  
 Peacebuilding operations developed rapidly from short-term, quick-fix 
operations to long–term complex ones. Where the mission mandate  extends 
for many years it will include a variety of tasks all aiming at building peace in 
states devastated by wars (Sabaratnam, 2011, Opongo, 2011, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a). 
  Ghali’s statement recognised the failure of the previous methods of 
peacebuilding and sets new perspectives of collective human security in which 
the international community is more committed to the peace. Peace that is less 
connected with individual powerful states’ interests and goes beyond state 
sovereignty. In his report Ghali emphasised the UN commitment to protect 
human rights, especially in areas of ethnicity, religion and cultural values of 
ethnic minorities (Boutros-Ghali, 1992b). Furthermore an Agenda for Peace 
advocates for liberal peace based on democracy but with less intrusive and 
more dependent on preventive diplomacy and calls for using force to enforce 
humanitarian interventions (Peou, 2010, Boutros-Ghali, 1992a). 
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Intrastate conflicts present particular concerns to the international community 
because they affect regional and international stability and may become safe 
havens for criminals to operate freely, homes for terrorist groups and markets 
for the drug trade (Paris, 2006, Francis, 2012b). Moreover conflicts can spill 
over the border of neighbouring countries, as happened when the Rwandan 
conflict moved into Zaire (Paris, 2006). Great numbers of Sudanese refugees 
were reported in Chad after the escalation of violence in the western region of 
Darfur (Johnson, 2011). The international community may, driven by the UN 
charter, intervene in such situations to maintain the stability and try to eliminate 
any threat to the international peace (Johnson, 2011, Paris, 2006). 
Paris (2006) strongly argues that the peacebuilding approach that depends on 
introducing the democratic principles, market economy and liberalisation, 
without establishing strong state institutions in post conflict countries, will have 
negative side effects and will not lead to stability and long lasting peace (Paris, 
2006). From Angola to Mozambique to Sierra Leone to Liberia international 
community interventions have shown that pushing the democratic process too 
much and too quickly, without preparing the relevant community and drafting of 
necessary laws, may not improve the stability and does not necessarily lead to 
self-sustained peace in the country (Paris, 2006).  An example of this is Angola 
when the election process was introduced before achieving the necessary 
requirements of the peace settlement the parties who are not happy with the 
election results resisted the process. A similar example was seen in the 
Balkans (Paris, 2006, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). Paris (2006) defines 
peacebuilding as international military and/or civilian interventions in states 
aimed at creating the conditions for stable and lasting peace in the wake of civil 
strife while Merlingen describes peacebuilding as the “international action within 
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states either to prevent civil war or to rebuild peace in the after math of violence” 
(Merlingen et al 2006.p1). While both definitions recognise international 
interventions in states at the end of the conflict, Paris’ definition emphasises the 
creation of conditions for long lasting peace and this implies that the 
international interveners are directing their engagement with the internal context 
to guarantee sustainable peace.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Driven by liberal values, ethical beliefs, concern for international security, 
humanitarian crises, plus political and economic interests of the west, the liberal 
peace agenda is usually imposed in post war contexts with few or no 
consultations with local actors (Francis, 2012c, Tadjbakhsh, 2011).  Economic 
interests represent key drivers for international peace builders to intervene in 
post-conflict contexts. For example Britain acted to secure access for British 
companies to invest in diamonds and other minerals  in Sierra Leone and 
likewise   led participated in a military campaign to remove Colonel Gadhafi 
from power which, some have argued, was motivated by their interests in 
Libyan oil (Francis, 2012c). The idea of transferring liberal peace principles  
exemplified in the form of human rights, rule of law, free market and open 
democracy, without building the necessary institutions or creating suitable 
conditions for the new ideas to grow with ample time, has gradually led the 
international interveners  to realise that it is necessary to include internal actors 
in  policies and actions and to be realistic about what can be achieved in the 
given time and  circumstances (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, Richmond, Sabaratnam, 
2011, Paris, 2006). Tadjbakhs (2011) highlights the lack of evidence to support 
the proposition that launching a peacebuilding mission necessarily produces 
positive results. Richmond criticises liberal peace that includes coercion to 
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introduce democratic values, suggesting that this itself means it is not 
compatible with  liberal values (Richmond). 
A further critique to liberal peace is that set forth by Paris, who recognises the 
failure of liberal peace to achieve its stated objectives, but rather than 
abandoning the practice he suggests that it be reformed. He criticises those 
who claim that liberal peace is illegitimate and suggests that they are going too 
far (Tadjbakhsh, 2011, Paris and ebrary, 2004). Another critique of the 
implementation of liberal peace is that it tends to adopt top-down approaches 
and in so doing the intervener undermines or even destroys the local capacity 
and institutions (Richmond, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b). Being wary 
about bypassing the local actors and the resultant issue of local ownership, the 
international intervener came to recognise the need to communicate with the 
local civil society, NGOs and the state in a more bottom-up approach. This 
approach also needs to involve the state in what has become known as the 
‘hybrid approach’ between international and local approaches (Richmond, 
Sabaratnam and Meera, 2013, Mac Ginty, 2011). 
In a further critique to liberal peace Tadjbakhsh (2011) highlights Paris’ 
assessment of some cases where it has been imposed successfully in a 
coercive manner, pointing out that  there is not sufficient evidence to support 
the view that this approach could be successfully transferred to other situations. 
To correct the mistakes of past liberal peace approaches which bypassed local 
actors including the state, contemporary peace builders tend to see that  state 
building should be part of the liberal peace projects in the belief that this will 
lead to building effective institutions that can support the process (Tadjbakhsh, 
2011, Francis, 2012c, Paris, 2006). Doyle (2012) argues, as an advocate of 
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liberal peace, that despite criticism of the liberal peacebuilding it proved that 
states with liberal values are more capable of maintaining peace among them 
and with other countries. Even so the liberal states themselves have histories of 
invading other countries and the former expansionist colonial policy adopted by 
especially Britain and France during the nineteenth century, Doyle still believes 
that the liberal world composed now of around seventy states has an 
outstanding record of peace compared to the illiberal world (Doyle, 2012). 
Richmond contests this assumption and wonders if the end of 56 civil wars in 
the last decade of the twentieth century actually led to durable peace. 
Richmond is particularly cautious of using military intervention to make peace 
(Richmond, 2005). Peacebuilding, as MacGinty (2011) puts it, is after all failing 
to address the root causes of conflict, in particular development and equity and 
it rather offers problem-solving approach for complex issues (Mac Ginty, 
2011,p.24). 
The debate continues between those who believe in the liberal peace agenda 
as a solution to problems of war torn societies and others who think that models 
of liberal peace do not often lead to sustainable peace, and are rather a 
western agenda which is not appropriate in all settings and is often 
implemented inappropriately.  The need for reform at least is increasingly 
recognised, particularly in the way that they are designed and implemented. In 
particular there is a growing consensus on the need to involve the local 
recipients in determining what they need, and in building effective institutions 
and recognising the need for a phased approach to achieve lasting peace. The 
literature also refers to some of the negative impacts of imposing a 
peacebuilding model that undermines state sovereignty, introduces alien 
cultures, and raises issues of power and dominance, although some authors 
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suggest that all of these issues can in theory be mitigated by effective means of 
communication and co-ordination with local actors (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 
2006b). 
The western powers which have dominated liberal peace interventions are said 
by critics to have often acted out of political and economic motivations (Mac 
Ginty, 2011). They now face a major challenge from emerging donor countries 
(Tellidis, 2013).  The BRICS group composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa are heavily investing in peacebuilding and development by 
establishing their own intervention agenda that does not necessarily comply 
with the western ones and by-passes the UN and other international 
organisations. Some of these countries are keener on development as a means 
of peacebuilding and tend to engage more with states and societies. Oil rich 
countries like Iran and the Gulf Arab countries are also investing in this arena, 
transferring their understanding of aid, development and peacebuilding. In this 
regard the role of Qatar in fostering the Darfur peace process in Sudan and 
pumping huge amounts of money to rebuild the region is but one example 
(Richmond, Tellidis, 2013, Barakat and Sultan, 2012, Movement, 2011).  
The following section will explore the development and the role of police in 
peacebuilding operations.   
 Police and Peacebuilding  
Deploying police personnel to operate in post war contexts outside their 
homeland is an old practice. Police from the United States were deployed in 
both Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War to serve in a 
Peacebuilding role. Following that the UN police took part in peace keeping 
missions since the 1960s (Greener, 2011a, Brodgen, 2005).  Later the UN 
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police, first named CIVPOL, and changed to UNPOL in 2005, witnessed a rapid 
growth in numbers from 35 in 1988 to 14000 in 2010 (Greener, 2011a). This 
reflects the growing need for police to serve in post-conflict zones in recent 
times. However, the police role in Peacebuilding was not recognised by the 
United Nations until relatively late. According to Merlingen et al, (2006) that 
delay was due to the connection of police with violent oppression in some parts 
of the world (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). By the mid-1990s the UN 
recognised the importance of the police in peacebuilding and started to 
consider police as key component of Peacebuilding missions. Following this 
development a mission of UN police was deployed in Haiti and Eastern 
Slavonia. Then a major shift in police role was cited when UN police personnel 
were deployed in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999 to undertake executive 
policing functions (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a)   
Moreover many observers agree that properly delivered policing functions and 
services are crucial to achieving social justice and thus contributing to the issue 
of peace and security among communities (Call, 2007, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a).  A representative police organisation that is bound by a 
robust code of conduct; which communicates and collaborates with the 
communities it serves; and has reasonable measures of accountability 
(including acceptable standards of transparency) will put that agency in a 
leading position to enhance the social cohesion of the communities it serves, 
which is a key element of Peacebuilding. The role of the police in maintaining 
internal security in post-conflict countries is vital to moving forward from 
‘negative peace’ to ‘positive peace’. This role has progressively grown in recent 
decades as police forces become more and more involved in peace keeping 
operations to the extent that the term police peacekeeping is becoming familiar 
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among the officials of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO)  
(Francis, 2012b, Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011b).   
It is often mentioned by the UN that the United Nations Police play multiple 
roles in Peacebuilding within UN missions in post conflict contexts to help keep 
the order and build the peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).  It is now increasingly 
recognised that domestic police forces must also be recognised in 
Peacebuilding or there will be a diminished prospect of long lasting peace and 
ownership (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). 
Kemp and Fry (2004) pointed out the importance of police involvement at the 
very beginning of each conflict as government’s responses tend to use the 
police to either oppress or contain the conflict through legal measures that 
could be specially designed to control the leaders of the conflict (Smith, 2011). 
According to Smith (2011), when internal conflict erupts in any part of the 
country governments usually have two options, to make political concessions 
by entering into negotiations or adopt coercive policy to crush the conflict and in 
this regard police is often used by governments to conduct surveillance, face 
demonstrations or pursue members of the rebel groups (William, 2011, Byman, 
2002, Smith, 2011).  
Citizens generally tend to accept police involvement in conflict management 
even when the composition of the police as diverse and representative 
organisation of the whole society is under question (Smith, 2011). Perhaps 
where this is the case it can be attributed to the law enforcement role with 
which the police are entrusted. The imbalanced composition of police 
organisations in deeply divided societies is sometimes seen as a form of 
injustice within particular societies, that could itself lead to conflict, and 
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therefore any political deal that usually involves power sharing will have an 
impact on the police, as experienced in contexts like Northern Ireland, Kosovo, 
and Rwanda (Gorani, 2005, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Paris, 2006). Peace 
agreements which end conflicts are also likely to include provisions to reform 
the police as is the case in Sudan, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, 
Croatia, Haiti, Mozambique and Northern Ireland (Movement, 2005, Johnson, 
2011, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Stedman et al., 2002, Hall and McClintock, 
1999). Enshrining police reform in peace accords may indicate the parties’ 
genuine commitment to fully implement the peace agreement provisions as well 
as recognition of the important role of the police in the era that follows the 
peace deal. In cases where police reform is not covered in the peace 
settlement parties more often renege on their commitments to achieve lasting 
peace, as exemplified by  Sri Lanka, Western Sahara, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone’s Conakry Agreement (Stedman et al., 2002). It is thus understandable 
as stated by Francis (2012) that the police force is crucial to stabilization and 
investment in transitional societies (Francis, 2012a). Also the police role is said 
to be equally crucial in securing the safe transition from war to peace (Oakley et 
al., 1998).   
Police as defined in chapter one  are more likely  state department where 
government would enact the laws, set the budget and appoint the police 
leadership. Therefore history suggests that  police are  almost always political 
due to their connections with governments and can on t occasions exert 
leverage to influence the internal politics or get influenced by the ruling regime 
(Hills, 2000, Stedman et al., 2002).  It is in light of police affiliation with 
governments that Hills (2000) asserts that when the independence of a police 
institution is questioned the police will inevitably be affected during civil conflicts. 
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This autonomy of the police is derived from the separation of powers within the 
democratic state system where the legislative, the judiciary and the executive 
are constitutionally separated (Hills, 2000). That can help protect them from 
political influence and enhance the role they play in Peacebuilding (Hills, 2000). 
This situation sometimes leads to the police becoming a target for rebel groups 
in conflict zones because of their affiliation with the political system. This may 
become even more acute when the police force is mainly composed of one 
ethnic group. The greatest losses occur in the police force when their stations 
are targeted  the police officers attacked and official records of crime and 
criminals are damaged (Willoughby, 2002, Jackson, 2010). This is true in the 
context of Sudan, especially the Darfur region where police and police stations 
were constantly targeted by insurgence group. 
“Demand for civilian police operations dealing with intra-State conflict is likely to 
remain high on any list of requirements for helping a war-torn society restore 
conditions for social, economic and political stability”. (Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations 2000 P. 20) 
 Recognising the crucial role of the police in Peacebuilding, the panel on United 
Nations peace operations headed by Lakhdar Brahimi reported in August 2000 
that United Nations police which come only second to military component in 
each UN mission, should be given more resources, training and support to 
undertake the policing functions usually required by UN police, which include, 
but is not limited to, monitoring, training and advising the local police in war-torn 
countries. The panel presented a set of recommendations to enhance the 
efficiency of the UN police in post-conflict and conflict-prone zones. It pointed 
out that rapid deployment requires readily prepared units within the contributing 
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states to be deployed within a short time of the UN Security Council’s mandate. 
For this the panel urged the contributing countries to establish pools of well-
trained police officers ready to be deployed at short notice. The panel also 
recommended that for the purpose of achieving common policing perceptions, 
contributing countries should enter into joint training programmes at the 
regional level. Furthermore the panel recommended a single point of contact to 
be designated within the contributing government’s structure as a body 
responsible for managing the process of training, selecting and assigning the 
local police to serve as UN police. Moreover the panel acknowledged the 
difficulties experienced by contributing countries to send the right police 
numbers without compromising their local policing needs (Peou, 2010, Durch, 
2003).  
Some of the issues undermining UN police efficiency highlighted by the panel 
are  related to the conflicting policing background of the UN police members; 
the short term of six months rotating period; and misplacing police officers by 
asking them to carry out tasks beyond their policing experience for example 
assigning police officer from training background to do operational tasks or vice 
versa (Durch, 2003, Peou, 2010). Finally it has been pointed out by the panel 
that member states often face less political pressure from their own 
constituencies authorising their police to work with the UN compared to the 
pressure when the military is involved. Perhaps because the military is usually 
tasked with operational duties where the risk of human casualty is high while 
the police are mainly tasked with less risky law enforcement duties. To 
overcome the issue of police officers serving with the UN for only two years, 
and the restricting condition of UN recruiting system that only allows the 
organisation to take active serving police officers, the panel extended its 
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recommendation to permit the recruitment of retired police officers with previous 
UN experience (Durch, 2003). Despite the UN understanding of the importance 
of the police role in peacebuilding it seems to take a top down approach that 
does not place enough focus on the role of the domestic police in the country 
concerned as the seen in the panel recommendation the role of the domestic 
police seems to be overlooked as the recommendations were solely for the UN 
personnel. 
Following the UN as the leading organisation in the field of Peacebuilding is the 
European Union (EU) the effort of which is mapped out in Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite (2006),  who noted that, since the 1990s greater attention has 
been given to the police in peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). 
This fact, according to them, has been underpinned by two factors. First, is the 
important role of the police in the Peacebuilding process and second, the role of 
police in the conflict as the police have often been part of the civil conflicts by 
either being composed mainly of one ethnicity or being used by the government 
to repress opponents (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Recognising the 
role of the police in Peacebuilding the EU launched police missions to help 
restore order, reform or build police services in Bosnia, Macedonia, DRC, Iraq 
and Palestine. These missions also aimed at disseminating best European 
policing practice (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). The authors examined 
the power relation embedded in the police aid programmes and the fact that 
these programmes introduce norms and systems of the donor countries without 
allowing the local communities in war-torn countries to develop their own. 
Ignoring the role of the domestic police in the peacebuilding process they assert, 
may lead to making things worse (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b). 
Peacebuilding through EU policing missions, the authors articulate, is not only 
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about improving the life of target communities. It contains some elements of 
dominance and authority over others. In summary they denote the potential 
negative impact of these missions on local structures. The authors identified 
two main pitfalls connected to police missions on the ground. These are the 
way they engage with local police and how they address the host communities. 
They then suggested that local police to be subjected to reform to come up to 
international standards and that community policing be introduced to engage 
local communities in drawing up policing plans and determining policing 
priorities in their areas (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006b).   
Police reform in peacebuilding setting according to Holm et el (2000) is often 
approached through international support provided through 1) international and 
regional organizations 2) UN organizations and 3) bilateral support (Holm and 
Eide, 2000c).  The role of police in Peacebuilding has grown since the first UN 
police mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1964 until the UN Sudan 
mission in 2005. Greener (2009)  provides a full overview of international 
policing from the first major international police-led peace mission in the 
Solomon Islands and up to the executive policing missions in both East Timor 
and Kosovo where the police mission has actually carried out police tasks in 
these countries (Greener, 2009a). Holm and Eide (2000) emphasise the need 
for a clearly defined police role within all relevant peace operation mandates, 
besides strong and competent political backing and adequate personnel, 
supplemented by sufficient logistical and administrative support.  The authors 
stress the significance of political will in bilateral support which is essential but 
not sufficient for the success. In addition, there should not be any opposition to 
police reform in both the donor and the recipient country (Holm and Eide, 
2000b). In relation to what the police do in peacebuilding missions Oakley et al., 
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(Oakley et al 1998) identified three types of international policing: First; 
monitoring and supervision of local law enforcement organizations: second; 
training and mentoring local police force: and third; on rare occasions actually 
performing law enforcement functions. They then turn to evaluate the 
international police missions which they describe as being established for 
relatively short periods of time, whereas effective police work needs long 
periods of stability, in contrast to the military missions which need less time to 
achieve their targets. They conclude that the only option left is to ensure that 
the local police are either reformed or recreated. Finally the authors decisively 
state that providing security and stability is never a short term task and good 
coordination between the different actors is important for the success in 
achieving long term peace(Oakley et al., 1998). Some authors further argue 
that the renowned community policing approach, which is now internationally 
recognised as the most effective policing approach, cannot be performed by 
international police. Local police are required, who understand the context and 
speak the language, and refer to the example of translators who are locally 
hired but are not trusted by the local community, especially if they come from 
different backgrounds or political parties. They go on to state that  on some 
occasions the international police train local police for a very short time, which 
is not sufficient to produce competent and effective police officers. The authors 
highlight the crucial role of the police in securing the transfer from war to peace, 
as the trust that the police gain during that sensitive period will assist in building 
durable peace (Greener, 2009b, Greener, 2011a, Holm and Eide, 2000b, Call, 
2007).  
Greener (2009) stresses a similar point and highlights it with a description of the 
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have further served to demonstrate 
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the significance of police in international missions, particularly because the 
military forces do not give much attention to maintaining public order and crime 
control. 
 Whilst advocating the need for international police support to peace keeping 
and Peacebuilding, literature highlights some of the problems that may be 
encountered when international policing missions operate in a peacekeeping or 
Peacebuilding role.  Holm and Eide (2000) further stress that police 
organizations are difficult to change as such change is connected with 
individual and organizational interests, as witnessed in Salvador and 
Guatemala police reform programmes, where police have made great efforts to 
impede the reform process.  They also state that plans, which are designed to 
serve political purposes, are often difficult for police organizations to implement 
if any reform agendas are to be achieved.  Greener (2009) also argues that the 
use of police professionals from one country to police another has become a 
very sensitive issue raising the questions of sovereignty, authority and 
transferring of an alien culture to another country.   
Holm and Eide (2000) add that because international policing personnel are 
recruited from many countries they may not have the same training background 
or views about operational procedure.  In many countries there are a huge 
number of police organizations; each of them adopting different policing 
methods.  Therefore it can even be challenging for police individuals to fit into 
another local force within the same country, let alone fit into a national or 
federal policing system, .  For example, the US has no general federal police; 
rather it has 17,400 different police forces.  Greener (2009) further asserts that 
many international policing institutions simply introduce political agendas or 
57 
 
values that are alien to the country or region in question. Some international 
policing is even done by contractors and/or consultants recruited by 
international organizations or governments  adding further difficulties for them 
to work in harmony with each other (Holm and Eide, 2000a, Greener, 2011a). 
Within the broader context of liberal Peacebuilding international donor bodies 
introduce police reform to improve security in post-conflict and war-torn 
countries. In this context Francis (2012) links the Peacebuilding process to 
development with the police playing a central role in that endeavour.  He raises 
the concern of deploying the police in fragile security situations in the aftermath 
of conflict, when the security context is still more military in nature, and far from 
being within the ability of local police forces to manage.  He also warned 
against  the consequences of using the military to police such situations, or 
deploying the police to deal with them, which may lead to the police becoming 
more militarised (Francis, 2012b).   
  Greener (2011) provides a detailed analysis of the growing demand for police 
to take part in peacekeeping roles, and he examines the challenge to maintain 
standardization alongside the numbers required to fulfil the increasing demand 
for policing, and how police who are traditionally trained to undertake domestic 
roles have to cope with expeditionary role abroad. Greener (2011) underlined 
the contribution of international policing to liberal Peacebuilding as being of 
great significance because of the set skills and ethos that police  possess   
compared with other agencies. She also noticed that the status of police has 
risen compared to the military as national institutions that can have external 
missions within the peacebuilding efforts around the world. Greener also 
pointed out that the full potential of police in peacebuilding zones cannot be 
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achieved without realizing the right balance between international and local 
police needs (Greener, 2011b, Greener, 2011a). 
Despite the critique to police interventions in external Peacebuilding 
interventions, which is part of the broader critique to liberal Peacebuilding it 
represents strong support to fill a security gap that national governments in 
violence-prone context are usually unable to bridge due to either lack of funding 
or incapacity. Police in fragile and post-conflict contexts could be totally 
collapsed, corrupt, brutal or incompetent so the need will raise for external 
assistance usually through peace missions (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, 
Grabosky, 2009). 
Oakley et al., (1998) examined the two different cultures and roles of both the 
police and the military. Stating that the military think that police work is less 
prestigious, even within the military the military police are considered to be of 
lower status than, for example, the airborne and the combat soldier. Soldiers 
are trained to be tough and police are trained to be flexible, is the stereotype. 
Soldiers also fear to lose their fighting capabilities and spirit by engaging in 
peace operations. They conclude that there seems to be an existing 
contradiction between peace keeping operations and military professionalism 
(Oakley et al., 1998). It is also noticeable throughout the literature that the 
difference in role and mentality between the police and the military is defining 
their roles in peacebuilding and that the police are well placed to better 
participate in building long lasting and durable peace (Bayley, 2011, Merlingen 
and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Equally (Francis 2012) warns against using the two 
organisations interchangeably because the two were trained for different tasks 
and any of them is not adequate to do the other’s job (Francis, 2012a). 
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Lutterbeck (2004) observed that the dividing line between the police and military 
in post- cold war era  has become blurred as police are becoming more 
militarised (Lutterbeck, 2004b,p.46). This, he explains, is due to the increasing 
Paramilitary and Gendarmerie units in many countries with heavy weaponry. In 
reality police would not be able to operate in fragile peace environment unless 
they are able to protect themselves, as stated earlier in this section and later in 
chapter three. As previously mentioned in this section international actors are 
also faced with some contentious issues when doing policing in post conflict 
contexts. One of the most challenging issues is that dealing with the police and 
doing policing is a sensitive matter closely related to the sovereignty of the 
state. Therefore international police missions need the legal framework that 
gives them legitimacy. This often stems from three consecutive processes; 
mission mandate, which is passed by the security council, the agreement of 
force status  which is concluded between the host country and the mission, and 
the memorandum of understanding that international police representatives had 
to reach with the local police to ensure access and cooperation (Hansen, 
2002,p.80).  
The Relevance of Police Recruitment and Training to Peacebuilding 
  As Call (2008) points out, state building is often crucial to Peacebuilding. State 
building entails building of state institutions especially throughout the public 
finance, security and justice sector (Call and Wyeth, 2008,p.61). It is within the 
security and justice sectors that police will fit into the state building project. The 
suitability of police for Peacebuilding contexts was reflected in a study by 
Galtung conducted on Norwegian members of the Lebanon and Congo UN 
missions. When he asked the members of the missions who were soldiers on 
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what is needed to better prepare them for doing their job, they asked for better 
police training (Galtung, 1976, Curran, 2010, Anderson and Killingray, 1992). In 
their report the international panel on the United Nations peace operations 
headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, the panel after highlighting the increase need for 
UN police then emphasised the importance of training as the key element to 
prepare them for future roles. For that purpose the panel urged countries to 
establish regional centres to conduct the training. Peacebuilding according to 
the panel, includes inter alia integrating of former combatants and training of the 
police (Durch, 2003). Police training to some extent is not viewed by 
international actors as a matter of importance for the development of police in 
post war conflict (Gorani, 2005).  Police training is often connected with 
Peacebuilding efforts driven by the international community, especially when 
the entire police organisation is disbanded at the end of civil conflict as is the 
case in Liberia in 2003 or dissolved as in Rwanda in 1994 (Francis, 
2012b,p.20). In such cases a complete process of recruitment, selection and 
training for the new police will be required with new laws and regulations to be 
introduced. In other cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Northern 
Ireland the rules governing the selection and training had to be reviewed to suit 
the proposed Peacebuilding process (Paris, 2006, Call, 2007, Pino and 
Wiatrowski, 2006). Police reform is also becoming increasingly an integral part 
of the Peacebuilding process, which means that behaviour and practice of 
policing has to be changed (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Francis, 
2012b). That change can only be achieved through delivery of effective, tailored 
and relevant training. An imperative aspect of Peacebuilding and training is that 
in most cases the international community have the upper-hand and the leading 
role in the process with limited or no involvement of the local actors thus the 
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programmes produced are most likely to suffer two shortcomings; first they may 
lack the relevance and the suitability for the local context and second, these 
programmes will be difficult to sustain since they by-passed the local actors 
throughout the different stages as they are neither involved nor empowered 
through a vision of local ownership right at the start of the Peacebuilding 
process (Donais and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces., 2008, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Paris, 2004).  
 To prepare police for peacebuilding roles, adequate training that covers the 
most relevant Peacebuilding issues that often emerge at the end of civil conflict 
is indispensable. In post conflict settings issues of human rights, accountability 
and community policing are of especially necessary for the police to aware of 
through quality training.  The United Nations through the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is developing standardized training for all 
member states to use, moreover the UN is also developing a training curriculum 
for pre-deployment training for UN Police (Haberfeld et al., 2012).  
Defining community policing: the international concept 
The Kenya police service act define community policing in article 2(1) as; “the 
approach to policing that recognises the voluntary participation of the local 
community in the maintenance of peace and which recognises that the police 
need to be responsive to the communities and their needs, its key element 
being joint problem identification and problem solving while respecting the 
different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime 
prevention and maintaining order” (Government, 2011).   
Community policing, as stated earlier in chapter one, is a relatively new policing 
concept that has not yet taken the shape of a defined model, but it is accepted 
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as a paradigm shift from one professional form of reactive policing to a 
proactive community oriented one (Wisler et al., 2009, 2009, Francis, 2012b).  It 
is worth reiterating that when Sir Robert Peel established the London 
Metropolitan Police in 1829, he set forth a number of principles, one of which 
could be considered the seed of community policing: “the police are the public 
and the public are the police”.   But, for a number of reasons, the police in the 
UK and other countries did not regard relationship with community as the 
central concept for police service (Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009, Verma et 
al., 2013). Literature on community policing shows that there still no common 
definition of the concept and seems like it is being understood differently in 
different contexts (Chávez, 2012a, Grabosky, 2009b). Nevertheless two 
definitions seem to come close to what community policing is perceived today. 
Skolnick and Bayley cited by Palmer (2012) define community policing as 
“community policing should be said to be exist only when new programs are 
undertaken that raise the level of public participation in maintenance of public 
order”. (Palmer et al., 2012,p.30)  Stipak (1994) also cited by Palmer defines 
community policing as follows ”management strategy that promotes the joint 
responsibility of citizens and police for community safety through working 
partnership and interpersonal contacts (Palmer et al., 2012,p.32)” Community 
policing is also defined in terms of the thematic aspects that it covers 
philosophical, strategic, tactical and organizational dimension. The philosophical 
dimension which other researchers call ideological refers to the core ideas 
behind the community policing approach. The strategic dimension means 
translating community policing method into practical programmes that can be 
implemented; this dimension is also called programmatic; Detailed plans to 
address the practice and behaviors of police that are based on the community 
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policing methods is what has been termed as tactical dimension or pragmatic 
approach. And finally the organizational dimension or what others term as 
organizational structure is about transforming the structural, management and 
information to suit the community policing philosophy (Palmer et al., 2012,p.33). 
Dictionary of Policing define community policing as “centralized system of 
strong two-way communication between the police and the local community 
who identify priority and have leading role in determining the relevant and 
acceptable solutions for their problems” (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.40)  
The move toward communities through partnerships has resulted in 
contemporary community policing being introduced by many countries, 
especially in the developed world, and it has been advocated by nearly all 
international Peacebuilding and United Nations missions in the recent years as 
the right approach to policing for post-conflict countries (Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a).  Consequently, it has been implemented in a variety of 
different forms in many different countries, resulting in many academics and 
practitioners defining the concept of community policing from different angles, 
such as the institutional approach and the philosophical approach.  For 
example, according to the USA Office of Community Oriented Policing Service 
(COPS) (2007), reducing crime and social disorder is the focus of community 
policing.  This is achieved through service delivery, which includes aspects of 
regular law enforcement, prevention, crime problem solving, as well as 
community engagement and partnership.  In the view of the COPS community 
policing strikes a balance between traditional reactive responses and 
preventative, proactive-problem solving, specifically targeted on the causes of 
crime and disorder.  COPS also stress   that community policing is essentially 
about partnerships between the police and the citizens and that partnership 
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should include organizational change at the police side. They view the 
organizational change as “The alignment of organizational management, 
structure, personnel and information systems to support community partnership 
and proactive problem solving” according to COP organizational transformation 
represents one of three key components of community policing beside 
community partnership and problem solving (Justice, 2007,p.1). 
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1998) take a philosophical approach and stress 
that community policing represents an aspiration to establish partnerships 
between the people and the police to overcome contemporary challenges to 
security, such as social and physical disorder, crime and the fear of crime and 
promoting racial harmony in order to enhance the overall quality of life 
(Trojanowicz, 1991).  Tilley (2008) add that Community Policing in a way is 
about the importance of policing being related more to the people and their 
communities, rather than purely the policing of the community. It aspires to 
improve the quality of life, aiming to solve community problems alongside the 
community and by the community (Mulcahy, 2008, Tilley, 2008).  
Manning (2003) bases his definition on the application of community policing, 
stating that visibility and locally-based interventions become the operational role 
of the police personnel, to ensure that disorder and crime are managed properly 
(Manning, 2003).  The community supports this operational policing role with 
information, feedback and, when appropriate, with actions such as joint 
patrolling.  Additionally, the police should respond to all community concerns 
(Manning, 2003).   
In 1994, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice (1994) 
observed that community policing embodies two major components, which 
include community partnerships and problem solving. Problem solving, in this 
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context, involves diagnosing effective and applicable antidotes to glaring 
community ills. The Bureau stressed that the involvement of local authorities, 
schools, churches/mosques, social agencies and business groups in crime 
prevention partnerships with the police was necessary for the success of 
community policing.  This does not mean taking away the power of the police 
but rather a relief to some of the most difficult challenges of security the police 
have been battling with. Community partnerships, in essence, must begin with 
proper communication, which facilitates the building of trust between the people 
and the police, making the use of force unnecessary and useless in most cases 
(Justice, 2007).  
Kratcoski et al., (1995) explain that in addition to the techniques that are 
employed to identify community problems and deal with them, community 
policing is also a philosophy.  It also involves listening to, and responding to, 
the concerns of community members.  The term may vary from one context to 
another depending on the technique and method employed but it all focuses on 
getting members of police personnel to interact with community members in 
order to address the safety issues of that community (Kratcoski and Dukes, 
1995). In a later analysis on the concept of community policing, Allendar (2004) 
agreed with Kratcoski and Dukes by stating that community policing represents 
a philosophy of full time service, and personalized policing in which a particular 
police officer patrols and works in an area on a permanent basis from a 
decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify 
and solve problems.  Driven by the growing policing needs of their communities 
and the rising cost of the police work in a world that is suffering financial 
difficulties, police organisations around the world realised that they cannot do 
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the police job alone, found a practical and effective solution in the community 
policing method (Greener, 2009b, Verma et al., 2013, Wisler et al., 2009).   
Community Policing is the method of moving away from the traditional reactive 
policing to the proactive method. Community policing, problem-oriented policing 
and intelligence-led policing are all elements of the same policing approach, 
which the British police tried to adopt in the mid-eighties to improve  the police-
community relations which was thought to be unsatisfactory, as the next 
paragraphs describe in more detail (Newburn, 2008, Wisler et al., 2009). 
Researchers have suggested that the reform era in government in the UK, 
which began in the early 1990’s, coupled with a nationwide move toward 
professionalization, resulted in the separation of the police from the community 
(Wisler et al., 2009).  For example, police managers assigned officers to 
rotating shifts and moved them frequently from one geographical location to 
another to eliminate corruption.  Police management in the UK until the 1990s 
also instituted a policy of centralized control, designed to ensure compliance 
with standard operating procedures and to encourage a professional aura of 
impartiality (Wisler et al., 2009).  This and the failure of traditional policing 
method to police the increasing ethnically diverse communities especially in 
London has led to the introduction of community policing (Wisler et al., 2009). 
The great numbers of black and Asian people who started to arrive and settle in 
the UK led to confrontations between them and the local indigenous 
communities in the middle of the twentieth century.  In some areas of the UK, 
particularly the larger cities, the police failed to adopt a fair handling of the 
these events and adopted a discriminating policing style against the black 
communities and, at times, they resorted to fabricating and planting evidence, 
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as well as being brutal to citizens (Wisler et al., 2009,p.151). In other areas, the 
police had little or no training about black and Asian cultures, resulting in the 
use of ‘institutional racism’. This disharmony reached the peak in the riots of 
1981 when violent confrontations between the police and black youth took 
place in several cities in the UK.  Lord Scarman conducted a review into the 
police behaviour during the Brixton events in London and highlighted the need 
for the police to develop relationship with the communities they were serving.  A 
key part of his recommendations were the need for police personnel to undergo 
training on community relations. Lord Scarman’s recommendations were 
adopted and thus laid the foundation of British community policing (Wisler et al., 
2009).  Community policing was first piloted in the UK by the Kent police whose 
officers and staff shifted their focus from the crime to focusing on the criminals 
and their activities.  This method was then officially introduced and adopted by 
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
Constabulary (HMIC) and the Home Office in the UK (Wisler et al., 2009, 
Newburn and Neyroud, 2008). Community policing was then formally 
introduced as policing approach to be adopted by the police in Britain when 
enshrined into the crime and disorder act of 1998 (Chávez, 2012a,p.6).  
Whilst community policing is not precisely defined all researchers and 
practitioners agree that it embraces the basic idea of involving the community in 
policing issues to build better relations between the police and the communities 
and establish partnership for better police service delivery.   
Community policing; ambitious policing approach   
As stated previously, community policing is a product of political reform 
connected to democratic values, it is as well a result of police reform in 
particular fixing police community relations and making the police more 
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transparent, accountable and less corrupt. But what are the objectives that 
community policing is meant to achieve? .  Tilley (2008) quoted John Alderson 
when he laid out the objectives of community policing as follows: to contribute to 
liberty, equality and fraternity; to help reconcile freedom with security and to 
uphold the law; to uphold and protect human rights and thus help to achieve 
human dignity; to dispel criminogenic social conditions through co-operative 
social action; to help create trust in communities; to strengthen security and 
feelings of security; to investigate, detect and active the prosecution of  crimes; 
to facilitate free movement along public thoroughfares; to curb public disorder 
and deal with crises and help those in distress involving other agencies where 
needed (Tilley, 2008,p.376). This seems to be a comprehensive list of objective 
which almost resembles common police objectives. Its ambitious and far 
reaching goals reflect the hope put on community policing to achieve and solve 
the ever challenging tasks that police across the globe are struggling with. In 
their attempt to explain why community policing is necessary to introduce in the 
form of community problem solving and what it is hoped to achieve, Peak and 
Glensor (1999) came up with a set of different list of reasons on which reads as 
follows: the narrowing of police mission to crime fighting; increased cultural 
diversity in our society; the detachment of patrol officers in patrol vehicles; 
increased violence in our society; a scientific view of management, stressing 
efficiency more that effectiveness, quantitative policing more than qualitative; a 
downturn in the economy and, subsequently, a “ do more with less” philosophy 
toward the police; increased dependence on high technology equipment, rather 
than contact with the public; the emphasis on organisational change including 
decentralisation and greater officer discretion;  isolation of police administration 
from community and officer input; concern with police violation of minority rights; 
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a yearning  of personalisation of government services and burgeoning attempts 
by the police to adequately reach the community through crime prevention team 
(Peak and Glensor, 2012,pp.21-22). Grabosky (2009) links the police through 
community policing to peacebuilding. He identified two reasons as to why the 
two themes are relevant to the contemporary policing, the ever increasing 
demand of policing service that exceeds the resources available to public 
policing, evidence of that is the growing industry of private security. This means 
that private security services benefited and flourished as a result of the police 
failure to provide security in areas that would have been otherwise covered by 
the police. The key difference here is that police is funded by limited budget to 
provide free policing and security service while the private security services sell 
their services to businesses and private companies.  Second is the failure of 
many countries around the globe to provide basic security to their citizens which 
paved the way to international intervention by all means and in diverse 
capacities and forms to bridge the policing gap mainly in the form of community 
policing. This often take place within the context of state failure or state collapse 
(Grabosky, 2009b). 
 Wisler et al. (2009) make an important contribution to the debate on community 
policing when they assert that it is more likely to succeed in countries that are 
adopting non-central methods of governance, than in other countries.  They 
highlighted France as an example stating that the country’s top-down and 
centralized system proved not to be appropriate for community policing, since 
the central system does not encourage contacts with local public and 
maintained direct contacts between the central government and the regional 
departments.  It is for this reason that the community policing is not widely 
known in France as in other countries of the Western democracies (Wisler et 
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al., 2009). So in contexts such as France where the police is more centrally 
governed and are far from their communities that community policing is needed.  
 
Community policing came at time when police organisation shifted away from 
the beat patrol and replaced that by car patrol with officers placed in air-
conditioned police vehicles fitted with radios to communicate with their 
controllers. Officers would not leave their cars to interact with the community 
thus they have little knowledge of what is actually going on at street level. By 
being stationed in police cars they also miss the opportunity of obtaining 
valuable intelligence through talking to community members and be able to 
closely observe their activities (Verma et al., 2013). 
The role of domestic community policing in Peacebuilding 
In recent years domestic police services are becoming more centred in playing 
a crucial role in the development of transitional societies, especially in Africa.  
Within that role there is an increasing focus being placed on the model of 
community policing, with the belief that the police can help societies in war-torn 
contexts to develop, adopt democracy and maintain durable peace (Francis, 
2012b).  Francis explains how donor countries pushed for policing reform in 
war-torn countries with the underlying objective of achieving liberal 
Peacebuilding. In doing this they are aiming at creating police organisations that 
are accountable to the public within the overall democratic structure of the state.  
Contemporary discourse suggests that police personnel were involved in 
human rights violations and becoming part of the conflict, isolated from the 
societies they were supposed to serve, as was shown in the cases of Rwanda, 
Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Pino and Wiatrowski, 
2006, Willoughby, 2002). 
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Community policing is becoming more and more the common theme within the 
international peace-building missions around the world.  That is because this 
approach of policing is believed to be capable of, among other things, bringing 
members of divided societies to work together in the aftermath of civil war.  The 
link between police and Peacebuilding is clear when we recognise the fact that 
domestic police are necessary to maintain order, stability and guard the 
democratic process in post war countries. Moreover, when the police are 
completely destroyed by the conflict, the international police will move in to fill 
the vacuum – clear examples of which are, as stated earlier, Timor East and 
Cambodia interventions with both having a strong focus on community policing. 
As we will see later in this chapter international police come with a number of 
problems which hinder them from having effective role in host countries making 
it necessary for domestic police to be more involved in peace process mainly 
through Community Policing.  The international actors champion community 
policing in conflict contexts to lessen the tension between warring parties and 
make them have trust in the police.  Nevertheless community policing that is 
proposed by international actors do come accompanied by some flaws, which 
some researcher  alluded to as we will see later in this chapter (Greener, 
2009b, Grabosky, 2009a, Holm and Eide, 2000b). Despite the greater hope that 
have been placed on community policing as a suitable policing approach in post 
conflict contexts, there are however some caveats around introducing the 
approach. Francis (2012) claims that “Community policing, the concept is still 
”alien” to the traditional policing culture and institutional philosophy. The 
practice itself is challenged by several limitations and it is far from being the 
panacea or magic wane for peaceful civil-police relations that its proponents 
claim” (Francis, 2012b,p.31).  
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Verma (2013) asserts that adopting community policing at organisational level 
need to be supported by good training for all police personnel in key areas that 
are related to working with communities these might include, communication 
skills, problem solving, intervention techniques collaborative skills and public 
relations. Moreover adequate knowledge of the local context and continuous 
on-site monitoring, assessment and briefing of staff is as well necessary to 
maximise odds of success. Verma further articulates that the centralised model 
of police is unsupportive of community policing approach as it hinders individual 
police at street level from making decisions and they would rather wait for 
directions to come from the top command. Another essential matter that Verma 
alluded to is the recruitment which he thought must be tailored to target the 
recruits with suitable qualities to undertake community policing responsibilities 
(Verma et al., 2013,pp.8-11). Recruitment is particularly essential to 
Peacebuilding, in that it should be directed to make the police more inclusive at 
the same time attract the best individuals who can better understand policing in 
the aftermath of conflict. This make the domestic police organisation crystallises 
peace by being inclusive and being prepared for the challenging policing role 
within Peacebuilding context.  
The Increased Interest in Community Policing and its critics  
Much writing on policing in recent years has been devoted to community 
policing as an emerging policing approach that aims at working closely with 
communities to gain their trust and secure their support (Verma et al., 2013, 
Peak and Glensor, 2012, Palmer et al., 2012, García Chávez and University of, 
2012, Chávez, 2012a). Ranging from international to regional, national and 
local policing, literature on police science covers every aspect of policing, 
however specific types of policing have captured more attention than others, 
73 
 
and community policing is the clearest example in this regard (Grabosky, 2009). 
As stated earlier in this chapter this relatively new policing concept of 
Community Policing  has not yet taken the shape of a defined model, but it is 
accepted as a paradigm shift from one professional form of reactive policing to 
a community oriented one (Chávez, 2012b, Wisler et al., 2009).   Verma (2013) 
asserts that this emerging method of policing does not solve all policing 
problems but can come very close to it if it is properly delivered (Verma et al., 
2013).  Police officers are not always in favour of this approach as, from their 
point of view, there are concerns about working closely with the community as 
this demands a higher level of probity as corruption is more easily identified, 
plus there is an anxiety about pressure or what Verma called the “everyone’s is 
out there to get us” syndrome, as police officers fear that their corruption and 
misconduct will be exposed to the public (Verma et al., 2013). Grabosky (2009) 
further points out that  it is hard for many police officers to treat civilians as 
equal citizens to themselves, as police personnel tend to exercise their powers 
in an aggressive manner; something that they inherited as part of traditional 
police culture. He also makes the point that like peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, community policing need to carefully observe the requirements 
of the local context and the local culture (Grabosky, 2009a). 
  There can be negative side of actively engaging with the community in the 
process of community policing as this may deprive the vulnerable segments in 
the society and give advantage to those who are able to engage and speak 
loudly.  It is imaginable how difficult it is for some disadvantaged segments of 
society to engage with the police as a result of the lack of confidence and skills.  
It would be essential that this point is addressed carefully, as this engagement 
is an essential element of community policing, without which the whole process 
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does not operate (Grabosky, 2009b). The mixed response that Community 
Policing has received in critical literature is perhaps due to the fact that it is a 
very widely interpreted term, including many different tactics, and it is applied 
with varying levels of commitment and enthusiasm to vastly different contexts. 
Therefore community policing has different meanings for different people and 
argues that different states adopt various types of community policing 
(Grabosky, 2009b).  
International fund bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) now ask for 
police reform in the direction of community policing as a precondition of their 
support (Brodgen, 2005). Thus policing in some countries is shaped by the 
donor   perception of policing rather than being national choice. One of the 
critiques against community policing is that it has been imported from 
democratic countries where police is more accountable and transparent  to 
countries where the police  are not so (Brodgen, 2005). Francis supports the 
same argument, asserting that community policing is imposed by western 
countries as part of the liberal Peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict war-torn 
Africa in particular Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda (Francis, 2012b). He 
argues that the concept of community policing is nonetheless relevant to Africa 
because of the history and the social ties among the African societies. 
According to Francis community policing in Africa is highly dependent on 
external funding and can hardly be sustained without that fund (Francis, 2012b). 
There are however some positive aspects of embracing community policing in 
some transitional societies which led to better crime detection and maintenance 
of law and order. The level of involvement of the community to police 
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themselves also helped change the perception of police as a quasi-military 
authoritative organisation to a community friendly service (Francis, 2012b).  
   
Cities have more diverse societies who know little or nothing about each other, 
such societies were described by some researchers as societies of strangers 
without traditional mechanisms of social control. In such urban societies 
neighbours would barley know their next door neighbours, they lack common 
customs and traditions (Ellison and Smyth, 20001, Francis, 2012b). In a way 
one can claim that community policing exists in the non-urban of Sudan 
societies as a natural life style, it does not have to take the form of police 
working with community to achieve common policing goals. This links to the 
point raised by Francis (2012) earlier in this chapter about African communities 
being more prepared to embrace community policing methods because African 
cultures are more open and rely more on oral communication (Francis, 2012b). 
My own experience shows that these African societies especially in Sudan are 
changing, especially the urban communities, and that Francis’ argument may 
still be valid in rural areas but not the urban ones, as these are changing now in 
the direction of “cities of strangers” alluded to earlier in this chapter.  By 
implementing community policing the international actors champion this policing 
approach in conflict contexts to lessen the tension between warring parties and 
fixing the broken community-police relation and bestow trust in the police.  
Nevertheless their version of community policing does come accompanied by 
some flaws. These include critical issues such as the fact that the international 
police personnel are often not experienced or trained, there is a culture and 
language barrier between them and the local community and the short term 
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deployment of international police (Grabosky, 2009a, Greener, 2009b, Holm 
and Eide, 2000b, Greener, 2011b, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a).  It 
could be true that community policing has been successful in some areas 
where it was introduced. However mechanism to test that can be problematic 
since the management of the overall police performance is not clear cut (Adlam 
and Villiers, 2003, Newburn, 2008). Even if community policing is proved 
successful in one area does that really guarantee success in another. 
Police  in  Africa; State Agents 
“One thing can be stated categorically. Very little is known about the police in 
Africa” (Marenin, 1982,p.385). 
Policing in Africa is very much understudied area of research as put forward by 
the pioneering researcher the African police in 1982. Marenin (1982) attributed 
the dearth of information about the African police partially to African 
Governments’ tendency to consider anything in relation to the police as 
confidential government information that should not be allowed out (Marenin, 
1982). He recognised the need of conducting an empirical study to explore the 
African police as any theorizing on the topic would not provide the analysis for 
deep understanding in its absence. He noted the historical link between African 
police forces and the colonial powers and how the police was established in the 
former colonies to serve specific colonial agendas. He also questioned the 
sociological background of the police and how that affects their relation with 
public and how the public perceive them (Marenin, 1982). He also raised 
questions about the nature of the police work asking specifically about the 
extent to which this is undertaken with integrity, especially in exercising 
discretionary power before shedding light on the state’s role in organizing, 
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controlling and setting the standards to measure performance and enact laws 
for the police force and using it to achieve political ends against political 
opponents (Marenin, 1982). Police in Africa were often recruited as retired 
soldiers by the colonial state, and drawn from ethnicities with the right 
characteristics to serve the colonial powers. Even after the departure of the 
coloniser they tended to maintain a close non-autonomous role with the 
national governments. This relation between political regimes and police also 
featured by Call (2002) in his study of the police in post-Apartheid South Africa 
argues that political change in a country can seriously affect police performance. 
He asserts that the South African Police Service (SAPS) was once classified as 
one of the best police organizations in Africa during the Apartheid era, 
particularly in terms of crime fighting and crime detection despite the biased 
manner in policing and behaviour during the Apartheid period (Baker, 2010, 
Shaw, 2002).   However Shaw (2002) argues that this reputation dropped 
dramatically when the Apartheid regime was abolished in 1994, which reflects 
how the relation between the political system and the police can affect the 
efficiency of the police.  The example of South Africa is relevant as a country 
that has witnessed a relatively peaceful transition from authoritarian to 
democratic regime.  However, at the same time it could be irrelevant because it 
is now argued to be an example of policing in one of the most oppressive 
regimes in modern times, which tended to use brutal methods to fight crime 
mainly for political ends (Shaw, 2002).   
 Police forces continued to serve different authoritarian regimes led by national 
governments and continued to adapt to different political situations and keep 
close contacts with the different regimes. According to Hills, the police 
institution in most African countries remained dysfunctional which also 
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crystallised the poor capacity of the state in relation to governance and 
economic development. Hill’s study covers the last decade of the twentieth 
century but a lot of developments have ensued since that time especially with 
regard to change of regimes and the move by many African countries towards 
more democratic governance. Furthermore police reform has been instigated 
by many individual donor countries, UN organisations and peace agreements 
that ended conflicts in many African countries, and it has become more 
common for police reform to be highlighted in peace accords. It is noticeable 
that major studies of African police in English literature have focused on 
Anglophone Sub-Sahara Africa rather than Francophone Africa or North Africa 
even though literature on Africa police as a whole, researchers acknowledge is 
still scant (Hills, 2000, Marenin, 1982, Marenin, 2009, Berridge, 2011)  
As stated earlier Francis (2012) also Marenin (2009) and Hills (2000), all agree 
that police in Africa being an under-researched topic. Francis took a new 
approach in which he recognised the important role of the police in achieving 
stability, development and economic growth in the African context especially the 
war-torn countries. Francis pointed to the constrained relation between police 
and societies in Africa saying that “Societies across Africa have an historic and 
justified mistrust of the police for, in the majority of these societies the police 
have been separate from the people”(Francis, 2012a,p.8).   Chukwuma ((1999) , 
observed that the relationship between the Nigeria Police Force and the 
Nigerian public is characterised by mutual suspicion, hostility and violence that 
have brought a disconnection between the two, which has affected the ability of 
the police to effectively prevent crime and serve the community(Chukwuma, 
1999).  In 2000 Alemika et. Al,.   stated that the police could not change the 
hostile character of its relationship with the public at independence because it 
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was only ‘a change in the colour of the rulers…’ theye also stressed that the 
unequal socio-political and economic structures of the Nigerian society have not 
undergone any radical change since independence(Alemika and Chukwuma, 
2000).  Alemika, (1993) stressed that these structures foster antagonism 
between the government and the citizens, which requires the police to suppress 
the oppositions of the citizens against the government as the police continued 
to be accountable to the political leaders hence the lingering hostile police-
community relationship(Alemika, 1993, Alemika, 2009) Perhaps that is partly 
because of historic links between the police and the political regimes as stated 
earlier.  
In recent years African police in general, according to Francis 2012, are 
becoming more and more interested in engaging in Peacebuilding process in 
Africa and around the world. Motivation for African police, he conclude, is hope 
of getting more resources, experiences and training (Francis, 2012b). 
Most African police forces in British colonies were modelled on the semi-military 
structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary Police established in 1834 rather than 
the unarmed, civil London Metropolitan police established in 1829. This includes 
for instance, Ghana police, Malawi police and the Kenyan Police (Deflem, 1994) 
examples of militarised police exists within many police organisations around 
the world. The Gendarmerie nationale police in France, the Italian Carabinieri 
police, and Guardia di Finanza police in Italy, The German Federal Border 
Police and The US Border Patrol police, all have got military characteristics and 
some affiliation with both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence 
(Lutterbeck, 2004b, Lutterbeck, 2004a). Like most African policing institutions, 
the Sudanese Police was built in line with these para-military types of police, a 
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system that is maintained to the current day, as we will see in chapter three, five, 
and six.  This system, which as Lutterbeck (2004) puts it, is considered to be a 
paramilitary-Gendarme type of police (Lutterbeck, 2004a). This type of policing 
is characterised by their training methods, uniforms, military ranks moreover, all 
police are trained to carry fire arms.  The military identity and the long chain of 
ranks may lead to poor communication between the different levels in the 
hierarchy and make them less likely to interact with, and build relations with, 
their community which are both relevant to peacebuilding.  Baker (2010) noticed 
that there are huge variations in African communities in relation to culture, 
religion and education, and consequently their perceptions and policing needs 
are sometimes very different (Baker 2008, 2010). Efforts of the international 
community in Africa  often  aim to “provide security to citizens in a manner 
consistent with human rights and the rule of law and an effective system of 
democratic regulation and oversight of policing providers (Baker, 2010) 
Baker (2008) asserts that police reform programmes in most post-conflict 
countries in Africa, with the exception of Mali, South Africa, Eritrea and Ethiopia 
are forced into these countries. Baker pointed out to the role of the UN police in 
supporting the African police through the peace keeping missions and the 
United Nations Development Programme by providing capacity building 
programmes and in some cases equipment. Baker argues that international 
efforts to build African police forces have bypassed the local policing agencies 
and focused on building state police, which has proved to be inadequate. Baker 
(2008) questions the ability of African states in post conflict zones to provide 
basic policing for its citizens and that in practice they are not the most important 
provider of policing services (Baker, 2008). In my view the problem with Baker’s 
assumptions is that he does not draw clear lines between the formal police 
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force that is linked to the justice system and operates within legal frameworks, 
and the traditional or commercial forces who may serve tribal,  commercial or 
personal interest, that might even be classified as unlawful because they do not 
operate as part of the overall state law enforcement system and therefore 
cannot handle legal cases by reporting crimes, detecting them or  presenting 
them before the courts. Francis (2012)  observed the increasing participation of 
African police in peace keeping operations and police reform (Francis, 2012b). 
This, he explains, is driven by different motivations. Some of these relate to 
acquiring further training and interaction with international and UN police and 
the possible funding opportunities that might come with that. 
 
Conclusion 
The main components of liberal peace identified throughout the literature are 
democracy, liberal market and the rule of law. The majority of literature reflects 
a major critique of liberal Peacebuilding. Most of that critique is pointed towards 
the interventionist method of liberal Peacebuilding, but it also focuses on certain 
aspects of liberal peace. One is that liberal peace builders do not engage with 
recipient communities to identify their needs and what type of peace they prefer 
and how it should be achieved. Second is that the peace builders deploy 
policies and structures that may not be suitable for post-war environments. 
Thirdly peace builders adopt a hasty pace in quick-fix exit strategies. Fourth is 
those Peacebuilding actors pursue their political or economic interests through 
Peacebuilding interventions. And finally they do not seek local ownership by 
empowering local actors and establishing means of sustainability at the end of 
their peacebuilding mission. Believers in liberal peace defend the approach and 
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argue that it is the only model that is capable of being introduced and there is 
no convincing alternative to it. The literature on Peacebuilding shows new 
emerging powers like the BRICS group and the Gulf countries that are 
constantly intervening in conflict situation providing aid and building peace in 
their own terms which are different to the traditional Peacebuilding practices. 
It is notable that most of this literature mentions the growing role and 
importance of the police in Peacebuilding, There is much less recognition of the 
importance of the domestic police with regard to Peacebuilding, however  most 
researchers link Peacebuilding to international policing led mainly by the UN, 
EU and supported by multi-national donors. Nonetheless observers increasingly 
comment that domestic police forces have the potential to play positive roles in 
the Peacebuilding process.   In spite of this it is also noted that domestic police 
forces are often involved in the conflicts themselves, and are often partial, 
corrupt, incompetent, under-resourced and have antagonistic relationships with 
their communities. 
With regards to the international role for police in Peacebuilding, community 
policing is recommended as suitable policing approach that can address 
community concerns and may represent them in a process that brings 
members of the community and the police to think collectively about policing 
plans. The literature however also reveals some of the problems encountered 
when this policing approach has been attempted, not least that by definition 
international forces are not part of the communities that they serve and bring a 
range of different policing cultures with them even in the one mission. The 
literature also shows the lack of clarity or consensus about what community 
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policing should be and the difficulty with identifying specific styles that are most 
appropriate for war-torn societies. 
Literature on Africa police shows the colonial legacy of policing in Africa 
persists long after the departure of the colonial powers, this is featured mainly 
on the restrained relation between police and the communities in Africa and the 
close relations between the police and political regimes. It is as well evident that 
literature on Africa police is focused on Sub-Sahara English speaking countries 
with hardly any mention of the police the Arabic or French speaking parts of 
Africa. Literature on both liberal peace and community policing highlights the 
need to work closely with the local community to solidify peace. Furthermore 
the literature reflects the growing consensus on the need to involve local 
organisations in a hybrid model to jointly identify local needs and formulate 
peacebuilding strategies to achieve long lasting peace. In this context it is the 
domestic police organisations that are needed to be involved in peacebuilding 
process and policing their war divided communities. When we put this into the 
Sudan context as a conflict-zone area, coupled with the fact that Sudan police 
force is not immune from the illness of other African police in relation to close 
ties with political regimes, restrained relationship with their communities, the 
militaristic identity and scant literature on Sudanese Police the importance of 
this study is clear. 
The next chapter is devoted to introduce Sudan as a country and Sudan police 
as an organisation with its historical background and contextual analysis.  
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Chapter Three 
The Policing Context in Contemporary Sudan 
 
Introduction 
 As stated in the previous chapter literature on the police in Africa is restricted to 
Sub-Sahara Africa and, as Sudan falls on the dividing line between North Africa 
and Sub-Sahara Africa, it is not usually covered. In addition to that not much is 
written on the Sudanese police as shown in chapter one.  
Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 9 January 
2005  Sudan has experienced many troubles, among the most serious of which 
are the sporadic conflicts in the five Darfur states, South Kordofan, and Blue 
Nile States, (see Chapter Four) which impact on the country’s police and the 
service they provide.   The aftermath of the war and the current conflicts inflict 
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various consequences that impede the development of the Sudanese Police 
primarily because officers and NCOs are redeployed to manage conflict areas 
which takes them away from core policing tasks.  However, the Sudanese 
police have also taken up opportunities provided by the on-going peace process, 
including new legislation and relationships with international partners, to 
develop both their systems and personnel.  These developments include: 
improved community-police relationships through community committees; 
improved support to children who live and work in the streets and improved 
transparency, oversight and accountability.  In the light of this dichotomous 
environment, this chapter presents a view of the Sudanese police organisation 
particularly the structure, mandate, approaches and methods of policing 
adopted and their relation with the country’s ongoing peace processes.   
The first part of this chapter provides a brief overview of the Sudan, followed by 
a description of the history and the structure of the Sudanese Police, with 
particular emphasis on how the police force works in the face of many 
challenges within an ever-changing political and security environment. 
Moreover different actors have different roles in supporting and/or undermining 
police efforts in Peacebuilding.  The state plays a critical role as both employer 
and legislator: the employer sets out conditions of service and determines the 
police budget, which includes payments and salaries, whilst the legislator 
enacts laws and regulations that direct police work.  In this context, the second 
part will also outline state policies towards the police during the period that 
followed the independence of Sudan in 1956. In summary, the huge task 
required of the Sudanese Police force is considerably complex as responding to 
the sensitive issues of Peacebuilding necessitates a tolerant, acumen and even 
cosmopolitan policing style, requiring police personnel to be carefully selected, 
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trained and developed. Consequently, the third part explores aspects of policing 
in the Sudan and examines their contributions, or otherwise, to the 
Peacebuilding process. This chapter will also explore how the Sudanese police 
have developed as part of Sudan’s political history. 
Overview of the Sudan and the Sudanese Police 
Figure 3.1: map of Sudan 
 
The Sudan is a large and geographically diverse state, located at the North East 
of the African Continent, bordered by Libya and Egypt in the north; the Red Sea, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east; South Sudan and the Central African Republic 
in the south; and Chad to the west.   
Formerly the largest country in Africa, Sudan was officially divided into two 
countries in July 2011, after the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese 
voted in a referendum for separation, rather than a united Sudan (Copnall, 
2014).  The South Sudan people chose to name their new country ‘The 
Republic of South Sudan’ and became the 192nd member of the United Nations, 
with its capital being the city of Juba (Copnall, 2014).   The remaining part of the 
country retained the name ‘The Republic of Sudan’ and the same capital city, 
Khartoum.    This research focuses on the Republic of Sudan.  The majority of 
the ethnically diverse 30 million population of the Republic of Sudan are 
Muslims, with Arabic as their main and official language.  Khartoum is one of 
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the most populated capital cities in Africa, with more than five million, most of 
them driven to live there by drought, conflict and unequal development policies.  
Surrounded by poor communities from all over Sudan, Khartoum contains 
representatives from almost all Sudanese communities.  After the separation of 
the country, when most of the oil revenues went to South Sudan, the country 
faced economic difficulties exacerbated by the conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and 
South Kordofan (Alraouf, 2011, Natsios, 2012).  Despite all that, Sudan is still 
one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Bennett et al., 2010). 
However Sudan also ranked seventh amongst the most corrupted states 
(International, 2011).   
History of Sudan  
“An incident which easily might have convulsed Europe, and from which far 
reaching consequences have arisen. It is unlikely that the world will ever learn 
the details of the subtle scheme of which the Marchand mission was famous 
part, we may say with some certainty that the French government did not intend 
a small expedition at great peril to itself, to seize and hold an obscure swamp 
on the upper Nile (Churchill, 1902,p.187)” 
The history of Sudan extends from antiquity, and is intertwined with the history 
of Egypt, with which it was united politically over several periods.  
Anthropological and archaeological research indicates that during the fifth 
millennium BC migrations from the drying Sahara brought Neolithic people into 
the Nile Valley.  The population that resulted from this cultural and genetic 
mixing developed a social hierarchy over the next centuries to become the 
Kingdom of Kush.  Northern Sudan's earliest historical record (2007 years BC) 
comes from Egyptian sources, which described the land upstream from the First 
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Cataract, called Kush (Metz, 1992).  Egypt established political control over 
Kush and officials, priests, merchants and artisans settled in the region (Hasan, 
2010).  By the 11th century BC, the authority of the New Kingdom dynasties 
had diminished ending Egyptian control of Kush.  Although there is no 
information about the region's activities over the next three hundred years, in 
the 8th century BC, Kush emerged as an independent kingdom ruled by an 
aggressive line of monarchs who slowly extended their influence into Egypt 
(Hasan, 2010). 
The modern State of Sudan started to formulate as a united entity after the 
Turkish-Egyptian invasion in 1821 that ended the rule of kingdoms and tribes 
and then established an administration in almost the current borders of Sudan 
and South Sudan.  Supported by European officers, the new administration 
continued to rule Sudan until 1885 when the Mohamed Ahmed Al Mahadi led a 
revolution to end the regime and established the first Sudanese rule in the 
modern Sudan (Woodward, 1990, Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, Moorehead, 
1972).  After a brief period of national governance that continued until 
September 1998 Sudan became one of the British colonies during the scramble 
for Africa that sprung up among the European powers in late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century (Woodward, 1990, Pakenham, 2013). The 
involvement of the British in Sudan began with their advice to the Egyptians, 
who were themselves occupied by the British, to evacuate Sudan after the 
Mahadist revolution that threatened the Egyptian rule in the country. This advice 
developed into proposing General Charles Gordon to carry out the evacuation 
mission. The evacuation mission failed and General Gordon was killed in 
January 1885 (Woodward, 1990, Natsios, 2012, Churchill, 1902). Pakenham 
(2013) described the political atmosphere in London when the news of Gordon’s 
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death was received quoting Queen Victoria’s famous open telegram to her 
government blaming it for the fiasco; ”These news from Khartoum are frightful, 
and to think that all this might have been prevented and many precious lives 
saved by earlier action is too frightful” (Pakenham, 2013,p.260). Gordon’s death 
was considered in Britain as a matter of national humiliation, which therefore 
provoked a British led invasion, occupation and colonisation of Sudan with the 
Egyptians symbolically being part of what become to be known as the 
Condominium Rule from 1898-1956 (Pakenham, 2013, Churchill, 1902, 
Woodward, 1990 (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990)). The Egyptians were later 
expelled from Sudan in 1924 after the Sudanese revolt against colonial rule 
(Woodward, 1990,p.230).  
Despite the stated goals of restoring order to Sudan and securing the Nile 
sources, the colonial story was also an outcome of the competition between 
colonial powers in Africa. As pointed out by Moorehead (1972), on arriving in 
Khartoum, Kitchener opened sealed order to proceed south to obstruct the 
French mission advancing up the White Nile led by Marchand (Moorehead, 
1972). The incident represented the climax of the colonial expansionist race; as 
in the quote at the beginning of this section. Military confrontation between 
Britain and France was narrowly avoided when the crisis was diplomatically 
solved (Churchill, 1902, Moorehead, 1972). The Mahadi era ended when the 
Anglo-Egyptians defeated the Mahadi’s army in a decisive victory in the battle of 
Omdurman on 2 September 1898 (Collins, 2008, Churchill, 1902). Nevertheless, 
Sudan never became a truly united country, due to the deep cultural differences 
between the south and north, aggravated by the British-imposed policy that the 
south was a restricted area.  This policy was based on forbidding Sudanese 
citizens from free movement between the two parts of the country (Collins, 2008, 
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Woodward, 1990).  Moreover, this colonial policy ran the south as an 
independent administrative entity with few links  with the northern part of the 
country (Thomas, 1990).  When this policy was abolished just before 
independence in 1956, the various efforts of the different successive 
governments to bring the two parts of the country together did not succeed as 
the recent separation starkly demonstrates.  It is worth mentioning that western 
region of Darfur did not become part of the British colonial Sudan until 
1916.This resulted in the region’s development, including education and health 
services, becoming less developed compared to other parts of northern Sudan 
(Mamdani, 2009).  
Since Sudan’s independence there has always been political instability, as 
illustrated when the first democratically elected government was overthrown by 
a military coup led by Lt. General Ibrahim Aboud on 17 November 1958.  His 
regime continued in power until October 1964 when a public uprising forced the 
regime to give up power.  Following this, a transitional government of one year 
was established to prepare for a general election. Democracy was then restored 
by a newly elected government, which continued until 1969.  Another military 
coup led by Colonel Jaafer Nimeiri took power on the 25th May 1969 to be in 
office until April 1985, when again another public uprising overthrew the regime 
and democracy was restored, only to be aborted once again in June 1989, 
when a group of officers led by Brigadier Omer Albasheir instated themselves 
as the new government, which continues up to the present day (Thomas, 1990, 
Woodward, 1990).  As a result of this political instability, Sudan has been 
operating with an interim constitution since its independence in 1956 
(Government, 2005).  
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Political analysis of the country 
The democratic national regime which followed after independence was 
disrupted by a military coup in November 1958. Cycles of civil rule and military 
coups ensued with all failing to end the civil war started in the south of the 
country in August 1955 followed by other conflicts in other parts of the country 
as shown later in chapter four. The dual identity of the country of Arab and 
African links puts Sudan as a member of the African Union and Arab League 
with close ties to both (Barltrop, 2011). Political instability in the country that has 
fluctuated between democratic, transition and military rule since independence 
has affected Sudan’s relations with external world. Among the Arab world 
Sudan was historically close to Egypt, especially the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) who formed the first national government after the elections of 1953.   
Unity of Nile Valley was the slogan of DUP in which they called for unity with 
Egypt; the slogan was however dropped at a later stage (Thomas and Jenkins, 
1990, Woodward, 1990). The smooth governance of the Sudan by the British 
after expulsion of the Egyptians in 1924 without officially abrogating the 1899 
condominium agreement ended in fierce competition between the two parties to 
shape the allegiance of independent Sudan. Both parties sought to prevent the 
independent Sudan falling under the influence of the other. As cabinet 
documents show in a letter dated 18th April 1953, Britain sent a special agent 
disguised as a trade commissioner but his mission included political 
propaganda work to minimise Egyptian influence. Following his visit to Sudan 
the minister of state  stated that the purpose of his visit was to “ encourage the 
British officials not lose heart and to stiffen the pro-independent Sudanese to 
stand up to Egyptians” (Minsiter, 1953). At independence, the British were 
concerned about Sudan’s membership of the Commonwealth, which they 
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considered incompatible with South Africa being a member since the Sudanese 
openly criticises the apartheid regime and support the South African national 
resistance movement. The official position of the British government was 
explained in a letter by both the Secretary of the Foreign Office and Colonial 
Secretary to the cabinet dated 23th December 1952 in which they stated that 
British government would not encourage nor would explicitly address an 
application by Sudan government to join the Commonwealth concluding that  
Britain would adopt a non-committal attitude toward Sudan’s membership to the 
Commonwealth (Office, 1952). Sudan remained a controversial country with 
strained relation with the west throughout the different regimes (Natsios, 2012). 
During the military regime of Nimeri in the 1970s and 1980s Sudan signed 
agreements of collaboration and defence with Egypt and Libya (Thomas and 
Jenkins, 1990, Woodward, 1990). With economic deterioration under the 
pressure of war Sudan continued to receive economic support from the Gulf 
countries (Barltrop, 2011). The United States became a close ally of Sudan in 
the 1980s supporting it to stand against the communist regime in Ethiopia and 
Gadhafi in Libya. In this period the US provided military aid to assist fighting the 
pressing rebellion in the south of the country hosted and support by Ethiopia. 
Other countries in the Middle-East also provided military aid to Sudan, 
especially when the war in the south started to move north, such as Iraq, Iran 
and Jordon. (,p.212, Barltrop, 2011). However relations with the US weakened 
in the mid-eighties when the interim government suspended the joint military 
drills between the two countries run for many countries followed by the 
democratic government of Sadiq Almahadi terminating the US privileges in Port 
Sudan (the sea port at the Red Sea (Barltrop, 2011)).  Relations with the West 
have remained tense since 1990 when Sudan hosted Osama Bin Laden and 
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other Islamist groups. This was compounded with ICC allegations of war crime 
and crime against humanity (Barltrop, 2011, Hoile, 2010). For the last three 
decades, Sudan attracted significant international attention which Natsios 
(2012) attributes to violent conflicts, the discovery of oil, potential valuable 
minerals and the Islamist orientation of the government (Natsios, 2012).  In 
1964 and 1985 military governments were overthrown, due to civil protest akin 
to what was recently termed the Arab spring/awakening and transitional 
governments took over to arrange for elections that were run as timed within 
one year. But the democratically elected governments were too weak to solve 
the complex issues of economic development and conflict (Copnall, 2014). 
Therefore the violent conflict that started in 1955 continued in the country up to 
this date as I will chart in chapter four. 
Sudan’s Police History 
The Sudanese Police force, as were most African police forces (see chapter 
two), was established by the British Colonial Authorities in 1899. The way it is 
structured and managed indicates that it was built in line with the Irish Police 
and not the British police system initiated by Sir Robert Peel in 1829. The 
method of policing adopted by the Metropolitan Police Service in London was 
based on policing by consent and not considered suitable to be exported to the 
former British colonies because it was not considered useful for the colonial 
political agendas (William, 2011).  For this reason the Sudanese Police, as 
many other police forces in former British colonies, was built as paramilitary 
police closer to the Ulster Constabulary of Northern Ireland (William, 2011, 
Newburn, 2008).  
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Despite the emerging literature on policing and police science from both 
academics and practitioners in recent years, and the long history of Sudanese 
Police that extends over one century, very little has been written on its 
contribution in the development of the country and their actual and potential role 
in the modern Sudan. As previously said in chapter one, Abdullah Hassan 
Salim, a former Director General of Sudanese Police explored the historical 
development of the police during and after the independence of the country in 
1956 and the police law which has evolved during the colonial era and the 
national governments up to 1999. He stressed that  there had been many 
changes in the police laws and roles pointing out that these changes have 
prevented the Sudanese Police from becoming a more professional and 
efficient police force (Salim, 2005). Salim’s pioneering study was to be followed 
in 2011 by  Berridge (2011). Berridge’s study is more analytical, and includes 
empirical research, which included a wide range of interviews with diverse 
individuals, resulting in useful data which provided a broader understanding of 
Sudanese Police and their relation with the state. Moreover it analysed the 
relation between the centre of the country and its peripheries, and how that 
affected the police. Most importantly it sheds light on the dominance of some 
particular ethnicities over the police since independence (Berridge, 2011). It is 
worth noting in this regard that the two studies of Salim and Berridge on 
Sudanese Police both outlined the historical links between the British police and 
the Sudanese police drawing the link between the two police forces. I believe 
that this is relevant because it first provides an understanding the historic links 
between the Sudanese Police and the UK police and also because of the 
formidable reputation of the British police, which is setting the international 
policing model that is being disseminated in so many countries and is being 
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viewed as best practise of policing all over the world as stated by Newburn 
(2008)  (Salim, 2005, Berridge, 2011, Newburn, 2008). In Sudan, the police 
have to operate in conflict-prone areas, inhabited by diverse people with 
diverse religious, social and political values and against the background of a 
long history of armed conflict and civil war. This conflict puts additional pressure 
on the Sudanese Police, on the one hand they are involved in counter-
insurgency operations, on the other hand they are also affected by the 
Peacebuilding process in terms of reform, policing the peace accord 
requirements and hosting some of the former rebels who were integrated into 
the police. Even though the civil war ended in the southern part of the country 
when the peace settlement was reached in 2005, there are still violent conflicts 
in the South East of Blue Nile State, the South Kordofan State and the West 
Region of Darfur (Johnson, 2011 , Berridge, 2011 , Movement, 2011) .  
The nature of policing cannot be detached from the political system and cultural 
context in which it operates, therefore the Sudanese Police which was 
historically coercive and non-democratic police during the colonial times and 
beyond. It used to oppress political opponents when the Sudanese nationals 
who were educated by the British started to push for political reform (Salim, 
2008). As was the case in all British colonies the Sudanese Police force was 
close to the political colonial authority (Hills, 2000)  This situation continued  
through the post independent era where the police was used for political aims 
and there used to be special units within the police to monitor political activities 
(Salim, 2008). 
After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan at the end of 1898, the two parties 
began to lay down the systems of governance with an agreement being 
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reached on  19 January 1899,  known as the ‘Condominium Treaty between the 
British Government and the Khedive Government of Egypt’ to establish 
administrative and legal systems in the Sudan including prisons, police and 
judiciary (Collins, 2008).  A small number of soldiers were assembled in 1899 
headed by a British army officer to work as a police force. Later in the same 
year an Egyptian Captain, Abdaljaleel Afendi Esmat, was appointed to be 
responsible for the police and another thirty officers were also appointed, thus 
establishing the Sudanese Police force under the new administration as a 
federal force with Head Quarters in Khartoum (Idrees, 2011). Police personnel 
were drawn mainly from Sudanese who completed their term of service in the 
army and the warders previously working in Halfa Guard Company, who were 
mainly Egyptians. The then Governor General of Sudan, Sir Reginald Wingate 
Pasha, decided in 1905 that controlling the police from the centre in Khartoum 
was not efficient in a vast country with poor roads.  Therefore, he made 
governors of the provinces responsible for police within their provinces. Wingate, 
as Governor of Sudan (1899-1916), issued the first police law in 1908 to 
regulate police work (Sudan, 1906).   
The Sudanese Police continued to develop with British army officers and 
Egyptians serving on secondments, and by 1906 commissioners of the 
provinces started to recruit local Sudanese to serve as police non-
commissioned officers, commonly referred to as ‘NCOs’.   At that time policing 
was not an attractive job to local people as many viewed working in the police 
as an inappropriate association with the colonial administration (Salim, 2008). 
The practice of recruiting soldiers into the police was not successful, according 
to the Governor General’s report of 1906; likewise the central system of 
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administering the police, primarily because the soldiers had been trained for a 
different role and many found it difficult to adapt to policing.  Additionally 
communications and transport were limited at the time, making central 
administration a difficult task in such a vast country. Therefore that policy was 
relinquished and police matters were all made provincial including recruiting, 
training and administrative issues as seen in the following quote (Wingate, 
1945). The following paragraph from the Governor General of Sudan report in 
1906 shows how they perceived the Sudanese Police administration at that time.  
     
 
 
“One of the most administrative faults against which it is essential in the Sudan 
is over-centralization. The risk of over centralisation is obviously liable to 
increase as telegraphic telecommunication is extended. Sir Reginald Wingate , 
therefore, has very wisely decided that the system of endeavouring to 
administer the Sudanese Police from a central department at Khartoum is to be 
abolished. Since the 1st January, 1905 the Governors of Provinces have been 
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made wholly responsible for the enlistment, training, discipline, clothing and 
payoff the police. That the new system will lead to increased efficiency, I do not 
doubt. It should also prove economical”. 
“Whatever be the general system of administration, the difficulties in the way of 
forming an efficient police force are very considerable. Heretofore the force has 
for the most part consisted of soldiers who had completed military service. The 
results obtained by the adoption of this system have not been altogether 
satisfactory, but it is not possible to abolish it altogether. It will still continue to 
exist to a certain extent in the large towns, such as Khartoum, Halfa, and 
Dongola, where a certain number of Europeans reside. But elsewhere an 
attempt is being made to raise a police force locally” (Sudan, 1906)In 1925, the 
first Police College was established with the objective of training newly recruited 
officers and better qualified NCOs.  The police continued to grow in number 
under the supervision of the office of the Civil Secretary of Sudan Government, 
which later became the Ministry of Interior.  By 1945 there were 85 officers and 
7,100 other ranks.   A fingerprint system was introduced in the same year to 
enhance police investigations and police training schools were reopened after 
being closed during the Second World War(Wingate, 1945)   
Some Sudanese police NCOs joined the National Sudanese Resistance against 
colonial rule; this was reflected in the mutiny in Khartoum in 1951, when a group 
of Sudanese NCOs went on strike demanding some changes to their working 
conditions.  It then spread to other cities of the country including Port Sudan 
and Atbara.   As a consequence, the situation deteriorated and the Sudan 
Defence Force was ordered to intervene to manage the resulting threat to 
security.  A wide investigation followed and a special court was established, 
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which punished the leaders of the strike with different sentences ranging from 
dismissal to imprisonment (Salim, 2005).  In October 1954, General Amin 
Ahmed Hussein became the first Sudanese Director General of the Sudanese 
Police, in line with the “Sudanization” of Sudan governance that was 
implemented towards the end of British rule.  
The political instability of Sudan seems to have affected the development of 
Sudanese Police laws which is clear when we examine the rapid change of 
laws since the first police legislation was enacted in 1908. There have been 
fourteen new police acts. For example, since independence new acts were 
created in 1970, 1971, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1999 and 2008.  This 
shows that police laws had been changed five times during the colonial era from 
1899 to 1956 whilst successive National Sudanese governments made nine 
changes after independence. This rapid change indicates instability moreover it 
would have probably have made it difficult to establish best practice and also 
minimised the potential for ‘lesson learning’. Moreover, this rapid change 
reflects the extent of government interference with police matters, perhaps in 
their attempts to dominate the police, and thus secure their political interest in 
using police as political organ for political ends. 
When President Nimeri dissolved the Ministry of Interior in 1979, police 
departments were scattered between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, with police HQs attached to the Presidency.  This situation did 
not continue for long and the Ministry of Interior was reinstated again in 1981; it 
continues to be the political body that supervises the police until the present day. 
This is common practice in several countries where the police are under the 
Ministry of Interior. It is easier to administer and can help improve oversight and 
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efficiency in policing. (Salim, 2005). As with any other department or institution 
in the country, the Sudanese Police force is affected by the long-term civil war 
in the country and, as a consequence, has to cope with poor budgets whilst 
carrying out an essential, challenging and demanding job.  
Table 3.1: The Development of Police Acts since 1899 
Date  Type of 
government 
Act / Amendment Remarks 
1899 Colonial 
administration 
Establishment of 
police in Sudan 
 
1908 Colonial 
administration 
Sudan police Act 
1908 
The First Police Act 
1912  Colonial 
administration 
Amendment 1912   
1925 Colonial 
administration 
Amendment 1925  
1928 Colonial 
administration 
Sudan Police Act 
1928 
 
1970 Military Regime Sudan Police Act First act after independence 
1971 Military Regime Amendment 1971  
1975 Military Regime Amendment 1975  
1977 Military Regime Sudan Police Act 
1977 
 
1979 Military Regime Sudan Police Act 
1979 
The ministry of interior was 
dissolved and police was 
scattered between the 
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Presidency, the Ministry of 
Justice and Police 
Headquarters  
1984 Military 
Government 
Sudan Police Act 
1984 
 
1986 Democratic 
Government 
Sudan Police Act 
1986 
The only change during 
democratic governance 
1992 Military Regime Sudan Police Act 
1992 
Integrated the civil defence, 
the protection of wild life, the 
prisons and the customs into 
the police 
1999  Military Regime Sudan Police Act 
1999 
 
2008 Transitional 
Government 
Sudan Police Act 
2008 
Created three levels of police 
(National, South Sudan and 
state) 
Table 1 
It worth noting that all changes but one took place during military governments. 
This may indicate military regimes worried about dominating the police. Even 
with the much shorter period of democratic governance of fourteen years since 
independence compared with forty five years of military regimes the data still 
clearly shows that military regimes were comparatively more concerned about 
police than democratic governments (Department, 2011) . 
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The current situation of the Sudanese Police 
When interviewed by Al Rayaam Newspaper on the 9th of July 2011, the State 
Minister of Sudan Kong Danair Golwak, stressed the ability of police to 
safeguard the referendum process and added that “The Sudanese Police is one 
the best and most competent police forces in the region” (Alkhair, 2011).These 
comments have even more significance since the State minister was 
representing South Sudan with all the political rivalries between the two parties.   
 The Sudanese Police are currently operating as a federal force with a mandate 
to cover all of the Republic of Sudan.  The Headquarters is based in Khartoum 
and has responsibility for setting country–wide standards, managing the transfer 
and welfare of the entire human resources strength and dealing with national 
issues, such as the on-going conflict. Nevertheless the Major Generals of police 
in charge of the States have a degree of autonomy, for example they manage 
budgets, human resources and day to day policing activities within their States. 
However they are required to report to Headquarters and are regularly 
inspected by teams from Headquarters. The total force strength stands at 
approximately 190,000 of which 11,113 are officers and the remaining are 
NCOs.  Approximately 11,000 of the total number are females, and in this 
respect it is worth mentioning that the Interim Constitution of 2005 gave equal 
chances for women in public posts. Moreover the election act of 2009 allocated 
25 per cent of all parliamentary seats in the country to women (Government, 
2005, Government, 2009). Whilst this percentage has been achieved in the 
current parliament, it is still far from that in the police, which is predominantly 
due to cultural beliefs of many Sudanese that the police force is not a suitable 
employer for women.  Consequently, young females are generally not 
encouraged by their families and the larger community to join the police.           
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The Sudanese Police now operate under the 2008 Sudanese Police Forces Act, 
which gives the police their statutory functions, sets goals and objectives and 
explains the organisation of the force.  The overall command in the Sudanese 
Police force is the Director General of the rank of First Lieutenant General, 
appointed by the President according to Article 20 of Sudanese Police Force 
Act of 2008 which reads:  ‘The President will appoint the Director General of the 
police and his deputy from among the commissioned officers who are in the 
rank of Major General or above’.  Article 21/1/A specifies that the Director 
General is responsible to the Minister of Interior for the performance of the 
police in particular: issuing orders and directions regarding the organisation and 
the development of the force; managing police performance in administrative, 
finance,  technical and professional aspects;  identifying police needs and 
making recommendations to the Minister with regard to that; the nomination of 
policing delegations participating in activities abroad; appointing the Directors of 
the General Directorates; appointing of Directors of national departments, in 
consultation with heads of these departments.   Moreover, Article 20/2 
stipulates that the Deputy Director General is accountable to the Director 
General for the performance of the departments under his responsibility, as well 
as acting as Inspector General to conduct regular inspection on police 
performance (Government, 2008). 
According to the government, the current formation of the police as a federal 
force, with a remit all over Sudan, is appropriate in a country still suffering 
conflict in many areas, but also with some autonomy granted to the state police 
in managing day-to-day policing work.   The Sudanese Police consist of 
departments that appear to be heterogeneous and include a range of activities 
outside that normally considered police work, such as: prisons, wild life, civil 
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defence, customs, emigration and passports. As previously explained in chapter 
one police work can be diverse but the Sudanese model seems to be unique in 
this sense.  These departments were historically independent from the police 
until 1992 when police law was changed to bring them all under the umbrella of 
the police, which  was proposed by the former vice-president and minister of 
interior Alzubair Mohamed Salih who called for a unified police force (Salim, 
2005). Other departments like hospitals, forensic, finance, and engineering are 
also part of the police. They are uniformed and trained to the same level of 
training and are subject to the police act just like other police personnel.   The 
current (2012) structure of the Sudanese Police is provided in the following 
flowchart (Sudanese Police Planning Department, 2011) 
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Figure 3.2: The Organisation Structure of Sudanese Police 
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 Sudanese police adopt two categories of officers and Non-Commissioned Officer  
each is completely different to the other, for instance while officers are subject to a 
three years training course in the central police college located in Khartoum, NCOs 
only undergo three to six months of training in any of the training centres scattered 
throughout the states (See Chapter Five and Six). 
The Mandates of the Sudanese Police 
The Republican Decree No. 34 of 2005: This Decree was issued by President of 
Sudan, Omer Albasheir, following the adoption of the Sudan National Interim 
Constitution of 2005 and reinforces the mandate of the Sudanese National Police 
within the Ministry of Interior (Sudan, 2005).  It specifies the mandates of all 
Ministries and constitutional bodies so that they are clear about their remits and to 
prevent areas of overlap.  This Decree gives the Ministry of the Interior the following 
responsibilities:  
 
Set out regulations, controls and systems and take procedures and 
measures to protect lives, property, public utilities and public institutions 
from danger and disaster. 
Increase public awareness through adequate information and the means 
to help fight crimes and support the Police in exercising their duties. 
Organise and manage the Civil Roll, Passports, Nationalisation and 
Identity Cards and Immigration Affairs. 
In close coordination with other concerned authorities, demarcate and re-
demarcate boundaries with neighbouring countries in accordance with the 
agreements entered into with those countries. 
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Set out controls and systems necessary to maintain good behaviour, 
conduct and public order. 
Conduct criminal investigations or procedures in accordance with the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedures Act of 1991 and execute judicial 
judgements and decisions of the competent authorities. 
Set up standards and controls for organising the traffic, determining the 
terms and conditions for granting driving licenses and licensing of vehicles 
and organising traffic on national roads. 
Undertake technical supervision of customs work in accordance with the 
provisions of law. 
Set up standards and controls for granting licenses for weapons and 
ammunition and regulation of their trade 
Manage and maintain the security of federal prisons and the welfare and 
rehabilitation of prisoners. 
        Look after the welfare of refugees, in accordance with international treaties 
and encourage their voluntary return to their country of origin. 
Set up standards and arrangements for the training, upgrading and 
rehabilitation of the Police at the National and State levels 
 
This list contains the main responsibilities of Sudanese Police force set out in the 
Police Act of 2008. The only exception is the responsibility of looking after the 
welfare of the refugees this is because the refugees Commission is part of the 
Ministry of interior which but its separate from the police (Sudan, 2005).  
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The Sudanese Police Forces Act 2008: This Act was passed in the light of the 
National Interim Constitution  and consists of 11 sections (Government, 2008). The 
CPA stipulated that there should be new constitution which was passed in 2005. This 
resulted in the change of several laws including the police to cope with the new 
constitution.  It details the objectives, duties and responsibilities of the Police Forces. 
In this Act article 11 introduced three important concepts for the first time,  the first of 
these is the respect of the rule of  law; second is vindication and respect of human 
rights in accordance with the constitution and finally the adhering to the acceptable 
national and international standards of policing to include professional, technical and 
conduct issues. These concepts are relevant to peacebuilding process and for the 
police to be able to contribute to it they need to change their conduct and behaviour 
and to abide by the law.  
 
 Sudanese Police objectives as in Article 12 of the police act 2008: 
Keeping the security and safety of the country and citizens. 
Enforcement of law and maintaining peace and security. 
Protection of the country's internal security and contributing in realising its national 
security in close coordination with competent authorities. 
The achievement of international, regional and bilateral cooperation in the combating 
of crimes 
 
 Police duties, powers and obligations as detailed in Article 13 of the police act 2008: 
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Keeping the security and safety of the country and citizens. 
Safeguarding the safety of persons, their property and chastity. 
Prevention and detection of crime.  
The consolidation of the rule of law. 
Safeguarding neglected, lost, seized or acquired possessions; and disposing of the 
same; according to the provisions of the law. 
Making the public aware of the information and means, which assist in the protection 
against crime and exercising the police duties, in a way that enhances the 
participation of the public in supporting the police. 
Preserving morals, discipline and public order. 
Take appropriate measures and arrangements to protect property, public utilities and 
private establishments. 
The execution of judicial judgements or any legal rules or decisions which may be 
issued by competent authority. 
Any other tasks or duties assigned to the Police, in accordance with the law. 
 
 
 
Article 14 sets out the obligations of a police officer, which include the requirement to 
bear responsibility for the execution of orders issued by him/her and to obey lawful 
orders issued to him/her.  Assigned duties must be performed precisely and honestly 
whilst preserving the dignity of citizens.  Paragraph 15 then defines the powers of the 
individual police officers as shown below: 
110 
 
Detention, pursuit and arrest. 
Blocking roads, places and public utilities. 
Seizure of weapons and dangerous materials. 
Interrogation and surveillance. 
Conducting criminal investigations. 
Inspection, seizure and safeguarding of evidence. 
Issue of warrants for attendance. 
Asking any person to provide help, to detect any crime. 
Taking undertakings and guarantees.  
Using of reasonable force in accordance with the controls to be determined by 
the Law Criminal Procedures.  
Any other powers provided for by any valid law. 
 
 
 
 The functions of Police at the national level are set out in article 16 of the Act 
as shown below. 
 
Setting the standards and national norms of policing at National and State 
levels, including the standards of training at the National Capital; 
Planning, organising, monitoring and inspecting the administrations and 
technical work at the national level; 
Dealing with issues of nationality and citizenship; 
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Issuing passports and visas; 
Dealing with issues of immigration and aliens affairs; 
Dealing with issues of the National Identity Card; 
Dealing with issues of Legal Affairs; 
Management, organisation and coordination of police regional, 
international and bilateral relations; 
Setting the norms and standards of civil defence duties and standards of 
safety and fire and rescue procedures; 
Control of the Central Reserve Force; 
National training; 
Setting the national standards of light arms sales and combating the 
illegal trade in them; 
Management, organization and coordination of criminal investigation and 
the technical criminal work of the crime laboratories and forensic science 
institutes; 
Combating terrorism, organised and trans-national crime; 
Raising awareness of crime prevention; 
Combating of drugs; 
Protection of national utilities and establishments including national 
natural resources; 
Monitoring borders to combat human trafficking and illegal immigration 
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and cross-border crimes; 
Setting the norms and principles of the civil roll; 
Setting out systems, regulations and policies for the national traffic; 
Establishment and administration of the federal prisons, setting the 
standards for prisons work and approving the penal policy, on all levels; 
Combating smuggling; 
Protecting the national museums, heritage and tourism sites; 
Setting the standards and regulations of wildlife and environmental 
preservation; 
Any other functions or work of a Federal nature; 
Any other duties authorized by the law. 
 
 
The Act of Criminal Procedures of 1991: 
 This Act details the functions pertaining to the role of the Police in enforcing the law 
in the following areas: pursuit, capture and detention; closure of roads, public places 
and locations; examination, investigation and surveillance; inspection, arrest and 
holding in custody; control of weapons and dangerous materials; processing of 
undertakings; bails and issue of warrants for attendance; requesting assistance from 
any person to avoid or detect any crime; and implementing of judicial decisions 
(Government, 1991).  Article 4 of this law sets some principles to be observed.The 
following four important principles shown below are quite relevant to police work: 
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Prevention of crime is a duty of everybody 
       No one is to be accused of any crime unless under an existing law 
that was    in effect at the time of the criminal act. 
Any suspect is considered innocent until convicted. 
Prevention of violation against any suspect or his property. 
 
 
This law is important for the police as it organises the relations between the police, 
the attorneys and the judges, with each having specific remits.  It is mainly 
concerned with applying the Criminal Act of 1991.  Investigations are widely carried 
out by the police, however, in a few cases the attorneys will conduct investigations, 
but in all cases the police investigations are fully supervised by the attorneys, as 
mandated for in Article 19 of Criminal Procedures Code which reads: ‘Attorney has 
the authority of  supervising the course of the criminal case, investigations, charge 
and prosecution before courts as well as all authorities pertaining to investigation 
and arrest except those in relation to taking of confessions, remands in custody for 
more than three days and general search’2. The last three authorities are usually 
exercised by judges as its stated in Article 7 of the same code (Government, 1991). 
 In summary, these mandates are considered to be contemporary and wide-ranging 
as shown in the DFID funded programme report particularly in relation to community 
relations and the observance of human rights.  However, the report also recognised  
that the Sudanese Police are still in the process of institutionalising these laws and 
making them part of day-to-day policing (Programme, 2011). 
                                                          
2
 This is when the search is not confined to specific place or area for example search of a house, office or a 
shop. Its when the search is to include a larger area or neighbourhood that a judge must authorise it. 
114 
 
 
As a result of the peace process that started in 2005, the government is becoming 
more dependent on the police for the purpose of safeguarding the democratic 
transformation process in the country, as one of the requirements of the 2005 peace 
agreement. It has been clearly stated in the interim constitution of 2005 that police 
will be responsible for internal security.   This resulted in an increase in police 
personnel numbers just before the elections of January 2001 by nearly a third.   
Despite the hasty manner of recruiting and training these new recruits, and the poor 
training environment they were trained in, there was an expectation that the recruits 
would undergo further specialised training. The expansion was considered a great 
boost for the police force which is now seeking to strengthen its partnership with 
many countries and organizations for training and capacity building programmes.   
Sudanese Police, as many other African police forces, are poorly paid (Hills, 2000). 
This fact was highlighted during a parliamentary debate on the performance of police 
on the 22th of November 2011. In that debate it was stated that the police is the 
worst paid department within the civil services in Sudan, (Alzaki, 2011). Poor wages 
are damaging to the force by either motivating corruption or lowering the morale of 
the force. In both of these cases, reputation integrity and performance of the police 
would all be at risk. The military training and uniform of police within a semi military 
structure gave them little space to use discretionary powers and take independent 
operational decisions. It rather makes them almost always wait for further 
instructions to come from the top of the hierarchy, and therefore as Adlam and 
Villiers put it, makes it difficult for police independence to develop (Adlam and Villiers, 
2003, Hills, 2000). The widespread availability of illegal firearms throughout the 
country, coupled with the prevalence of armed robbery, has also made the 
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Sudanese Police closer to a paramilitary organisation, to enable its personnel to 
protect themselves and provide protection and reassurance for their communities  
In many African countries there has always been a concern of the police being too 
militarised especially when police began to take part in some coups that took place 
in some African Countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia, etc. (Hills, 2000). In Sudan the 
Police have always been seen to have a lower profile and to be inferior to the military 
perhaps because of the military involvement in the South Sudan conflict, which has 
reinforced this tendency to under resource them..  Even though in the 1971 coup led 
by Major Hashim Alata it has been thought that Brigadier Abd Alkhaliq Gism Allah 
was aligned with the coup organiser who appointed him as Police Director General 
for three days before the regime managed to take power back and dismiss him. This 
did not however prevent him from claiming a pension as a Director General of Police 
(Salim, 2005). This may indicate that police and politics cannot be easily 
disconnected.  
The weak post independent democratic governments and military regimes both 
seem to be reluctant to have effective, independent police service that are popular 
among their communities. It might be perceived as undesired power which might 
challenge the government or hold some of its members accountable especially in 
corruption related matters (Hills, 2000).Therefore the issue of supporting police 
capability and independence is not simply a matter of scarcity of resources within the 
state.  
 
 Challenges facing the Sudanese Police  
Characterized by vast porous borders, involving seven neighbouring countries and 
the Red Sea, one of Sudan’s greatest policing challenges is the management and 
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control of both lawful and unlawful mass-movement and migration over a vast 
territory.  Moreover, in this age of globalization and mobility all police services are 
expected to contribute to global security.  Most of these borders witness insecurity 
issues such as regional and international cross border crime, including the trafficking 
of drugs terrorism and firearms – even of human beings and spill over of 
insurgencies.  It is difficult, if not impossible, for Sudan to police all of these 
phenomena, especially given budget restrictions and the current weakened 
capabilities of the Sudanese Police, primarily caused by the need to divert both 
funds and workforce strength to conflict and/or potential conflict areas, as described 
below.  
 The long conflicts in Sudan, which have at some point in recent history affected all 
parts of the country - the west, east, south and north,  have had a negative impact on 
the police.   For example, I am aware that during the war between the south and 
north of the country police budgets were reduced considerably, even though there 
are no accessible data on this, requiring the police to operate with poor funds and, 
consequently, insufficient material resources and human development. In many 
cases the police would ask complainants to provide vehicles or other material to 
launch investigations. In other cases, especially armed robbery of livestock, the 
police would not be able to chase the armed robbers due to poor armoury compared 
to the robbers’ arms; moreover they lack the sufficient personnel, vehicles and fuel. 
This usually results in the complainants organising their own force to chase the 
criminal culminating in violent confrontations in which many could be killed or injured.   
Moreover, as in other countries, the conflict represented a direct threat for the police 
where rebel forces were targeting its members, as they believed the police were 
representing government authority (Baker, 2006).   
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To take Darfur as an example: many police stations were attacked there, and many 
police officers were killed as a result and their firearms were taken.   In an attack 
launched at Shearea village of South Darfur state in January 2004, a senior police 
officer of the rank of colonel was killed along with other police NCOs (Police, 2004).  
More tragic incidents were reported in the following years requiring Police Head 
Quarters to try to cope with the new reality by taking appropriate measures to 
provide adequate protection for the police, such as upgrading weaponry and tailoring 
training programmes to suit the new situation.  In Darfur the police were heavily 
involved in guarding IDP camps and convoys of humanitarian aid, as well as the 
protection of roads that link the major cities with the capital city of Khartoum.  To 
date there are still regular attacks by rebel groups on the roads, to seize fuel and 
food for themselves and many police officers have lost their lives in these attacks.  
Armed robbery has been widespread in Darfur since the early 1980s and has always 
been an enormous threat to security in this remote western region of the country.  
During the period between 1990-1997 there were 2,824 reported armed robbery 
related crimes (Mohamed, 2009) which is close to an armed robbery incident 
happening every day.  Between1992-1993, 206 people were killed and 268 were 
wounded as a direct result of armed robbery in Darfur (Mohamed, 2009).   Armed 
gangs which, in most cases, are better armed than the police, conduct persistent 
attacks on roads, markets, and villages as well as cattle herds.  The crimes vary 
from individuals being murdered for a mobile ‘phone, to some cases where banks 
were robbed in the two capital cities of North Darfur and South Darfur, threatening 
the bank’s staff and taking all the money available.    These armed gangs usually 
flee to the mountains and deserts through bumpy roads and frequently ambush the 
police when they try to pursue them.  The more poorly equipped police in relation to 
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transportation, communication and weaponry find themselves in an increasingly 
difficult situation.  
The robbery challenge has been aggravated by the widespread availability and use 
of firearms as a result of both the internal conflict and conflicts in some neighbouring 
countries during the last three decades.   For example, Sudan sheltered the Eritrean 
opposition fighting the Ethiopian government for three decades; and it was a key 
battlefield for the armed conflict in Chad that continued throughout the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s , as well as the Ugandan rebel group of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
operating in South of Sudan.  All these and other incidences – one of the most 
notable being the 1976 invasion of Khartoum supported by the Libyan regime to 
overthrow the Nimeri Government (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990)  made firearms 
available for whoever wanted to purchase them. The weak capacity of the authorities 
in Khartoum and the poorly equipped police failed in containing the problem of 
firearms and, consequently, armed robberies continue to disturb the stability and the 
growth of the Darfur region. 
Competition over resources is one of the key global security threats (Brock, 2011) 
and Sudan is no exception as armed tribal conflicts usually occur over pasture or 
water resources, which represents a further challenge to the police. Resources are a 
major cause of conflict in Darfur and have been highlighted in a study of the causes 
of tribal conflict between 1924 and 2003, which included 39 conflicts – 29 of them 
were over resources (Mohamed, 2009, Bashar, 2013, Musa, 2011).   On other 
occasions tribal conflicts occur over tribal boundaries or deeply rooted disputes 
between farmers and nomads where farmers claim that nomads take their cattle into 
the farms and the nomads complain about the tendency of farmers to cultivate areas 
traditionally known as grazing areas (Mohamed, 2009).  The police would in most 
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cases try to intervene and carry out mediation processes by talking to tribal leaders 
and chieftains, but these disputes are usually complex and far beyond police ability 
to contain.  In this regard the Darfur Doha Agreement signed in the capital city of 
Qatar in July 2011 to put an end to the on-going conflict in Darfur, devoted a full 
section to tenure and land use in Articles 33-38  which might, if implemented,  help in 
tackling the problems arising from land use, which in recent history usually lead to 
violent conflicts between tribes (Movement, 2011).  
The improvement of communications and oil exploration during the nineteen nineties  
led to the influx of international business investing in the country especially after the 
signing of the CPA in 2005 which allowed the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNIMIS) to come into Sudan drawing in individuals from all over the world.   This 
culminated in new cultures and traditions which influenced the pattern of crime; 
therefore new types of crimes emerged in particular: cybercrime; money laundering; 
transnational crimes; and drug trafficking to mention only a few.  The Sudanese 
Police was not prepared for detecting and investigating some of these crimes and is 
currently seeking training in many of these areas (Police, 2012). 
In the aftermath of the separation from South Sudan, the economic situation in 
Sudan reached a crisis point, causing the cost of living to rise dramatically (Alraouf, 
2011).  Spurred on by the Arab Spring many people were inspired around the region 
to protest against their governments. These financial hardships drove some of the 
Sudanese population to demonstrate on a few occasions in Khartoum, which is 
highly unusual. The majority of the demonstrators were acting lawfully under the right 
of assembly. Articles 124-128 of the criminal procedure code regulate this process 
(Government, 1991).   The events represented a great challenge for the police as 
they also attracted criminals and gangs who carried out unlawful activities, such as 
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looting, criminal damage to buildings and cars.   Consequently, the police needed to 
act in a way which secured the right of the people to lawfully protest, whilst at the 
same time provide protection for properties against vandalism and looting in these 
tense and fragile situations (Terpstra, 2011). This new phenomenon rendered the 
police confused on how much legal force was needed to protect people and 
properties, especially the use of fire arms which is difficult to manage without the 
endangering innocent people.  In this regard the Sudanese Police implemented 
training for the relevant units in non-lethal techniques to improve their skills in 
dealing with peaceful protests.         
Internal challenges as I see them from my own experience include the issue of 
indiscriminate postings of officers which continuously causes instability and 
undermines officer’s commitment to long term strategic planning and/or programmes 
(see chapter five).  Officers often get posted to the states on the assumption that 
they will spend only a limited period there (normally two years) but they actually 
remain for far longer than that.  In the states most officers are mainly concerned 
about spending as little time there as possible and getting back to the capital, where 
their families are usually based for the purpose of better education, health services 
and security. Officers do this even if they are originally from the states where they 
are posted. This is the result of recruiting and posting systems combined with poor 
development which made the capital the only attracting urban centre for services 
such as education and health. This applies to almost all senior officers from the 
ranks of colonel and above who prefer to live in the capital.  In some Darfur, Blue 
Nile, and South Kordofan states it is not considered safe enough for officers to bring 
their families.  The posting issue is one of the most frequently raised issues to the 
different Director Generals of police visits to the states.  Additionally, whenever 
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delegations from Head Quarters in Khartoum visit the states the issue is always 
raised with them. This is one of the sensitive issues that is not easily approached or 
openly discussed among personnel, because it is considered to be connected to 
criticising the top command policy, and therefore police personnel avoid talking 
about it openly so that they do not get themselves into disciplinary complications. 
Nonetheless to maximise the benefits of a posting policy and to mitigate any side 
effects, it needs to be addressed with some degree of transparency. 
 Until recently police NCOs were recruited at the regional level and were then 
assigned to work all over the region regardless of the location of their home towns or 
villages.  That has been changed and NCOs are allowed to work within their own 
states or localities.  It seems to me that this method was adopted due to the growing 
cost of transportation for NCOs, their luggage and their families each time they get 
posted.    Another factor that contributed to the adoption of this policy is the lack of 
police houses to accommodate the NCOs, whereas in the past there were enough 
houses to accommodate them wherever they were posted but the increasing number 
of NCOs and the shrinking budgets all contributed to NCOs being locally recruited 
and locally assigned.  This new system is internally viewed as effective in relation to 
NCOs working among their local communities where they have good understanding 
of the context.  However, I also believe locally recruited and locally operating NCOs 
are considered to be affecting the performance in relation to tribal influence and / or 
involving in local politics. For this reason NCOs may find it difficult to keep their 
impartiality away from the influences of kinship and political affiliation. 
  The training programmes at the regional centres are important in bringing together 
police recruits from different tribes to live in the same training environment and share 
their experiences.  Additionally this mixing of cultures/tribes provides a good 
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opportunity in a mainly illiterate society with poor communication and transportation 
means who would not have had the opportunity to engage in cross-cultural learning 
without the training event.  For instance, in the vast region of Darfur, there used to be 
one training centre at the regional capital city of Alfashir until the end of the 1970s.   
Two more centres were built during the 1980s in both Nyala (the capital city of South 
Darfur State) and Elginena (the capital city of West Darfur State).  Unfortunately, 
they were not built to acceptable standards and were not equipped with appropriate 
training facilities for NCOs.   
Malpractice and corruption also represents one of the great challenges facing police 
in Sudan.  This is closely linked to the issue of community trust of the police. Even 
though the police leadership did not explicitly address the problem of power misuse, 
nonetheless it is self-evident that the establishment of a committee, followed by a 
court, to look into police misconduct suggests that there is a problem that needs to 
be addressed. Despite this tacit recognition of corruption Sudanese police in seen by 
many international police consultants who worked in Africa that I interviewed as less 
corrupt compared to other police force in Africa (see Chapter Six). 
Either for considering police matters as sensitive issues related to the national 
security or police officers being discouraged to reflect on their experiences, few 
opportunities are provided for police to learn lessons even from major incidents in 
the past. Such major policing incidents like the one in March 1953 when the then 
Egyptian president Mohamed Najeep was visiting Sudan to attend the first session of 
the Sudanese parliament, many people died including police officers in clashes 
between supporter of the Oma party opposing the visit and the police.   Another 
incident in 1964 when the minister of interior who was visiting South Sudan did not 
arrive into Khartoum at the expected time (Berridge, 2011, Salim, 2008). Violence 
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erupted in Khartoum and hundreds people were killed. Both incidents are not known 
about or taught to police officers. Thus lessons have not been learned to police 
future similar events. The clear example of this is the riots followed the death of First 
Vice President of Sudan John Garang, who died in a plane crash in July 2005. If 
lessons had been learned from previously mentioned incidents, the police would 
have been better able to predict and tackle the situation. 
One of the weaknesses of Sudanese Police training system at the police college is 
the lack of practical training. The current programme includes only four weeks field 
training out of the three years training programme designed for police officers.  It 
might be useful for officers to acquire good legal knowledge but they need the 
practical aspect of training that allows them to put that knowledge into practice. 
Partnerships 
In an increasingly interdependent world, police forces around the globe cannot 
operate in isolation of the outside world prompted by modern travel means and easy 
communication, the Sudanese Police force is working in collaboration with many 
other police forces and organisations to promote partnerships.  Beside their internal 
partners which include the wider community, civil society organisations, and 
government departments and being a member of the international police criminal 
organisation Interpol, Sudanese Police also have long established relations with 
many police forces around the world.  
Soon after independence, the Sudanese Police built a strong relationship with the 
Western German police force which provided excellent training opportunities for 
many officers and provided printing press, communication system and help in 
building the Sudanese Police laboratories.  The Sudanese Police gradually 
124 
 
continued to expand their partnership with other police forces, with which they 
exchange formal visits between high ranking officials, conduct study tours or run 
training programmes both in the Sudan and in the partner country.  This exposure to 
the outside world gave chance to Sudanese Police to interact with diverse methods 
of policing approaches and identify common themes as well as learn lessons from 
other’s experience.  The international partners now include Nayif Academy for 
Security Studies, Egypt; Turkey; UK; India and Russia as major partners, with which 
Sudanese Police has signed a training protocol or a memorandum of understanding.  
Another important partner for the Sudanese Police since 2005 was the UN police 
operating within the United Nation Mission in Sudan.  The mission started at the 
beginning of the implementation of the CPA and formally ended in 2011. The 
UNAMIS police mandate was to monitor and train Sudanese Police. Many short term 
training programmes were conducted across the country the focus of most of them 
was community policing, human rights and forensic evidence courses. 
Sudan is also a member of the Arab Council Minsters of Interior’s Councils, 
headquartered in Tunisia.  As a regional organisation this council is concerned about 
policing matters and policies of common interest among the members states mainly 
crime fighting, security and cooperation.  This includes coordination of the extradition 
of criminals and terrorists, monitoring of borders, transnational crime and drug 
trafficking (Sulyman, 2007).  
These partnerships are however not all without difficulties, as the policing styles in 
these countries differ, which can lead to confusion (See Chapter Five). It is also 
essential to note that almost all these partnerships were in the areas of consultation 
and training and did not include provision of equipment, which is significant for any 
police service operating with poor budget. The UK government, for instance, 
125 
 
supported the police in Sierra Leone with a great deal of equipment including fire 
arms and vehicles at the end of the civil war in the country. In Somalia, the US 
government provided the police with substantial amount of vehicles, clothing and 
other items.  Despite the significance of partnership and aid, it must however be 
underpinned by strong commitment and genuine willingness to achieve the desired 
outcome for both partners. In part, it is organisational change that usually meets 
some resistance from groups and individuals who feel that their interests are being 
threatened if new systems are introduced. 
     Efforts Towards Reform 
The Sudanese Police faced allegations of corruption and misconduct of some of its 
members and the lack of trust from local communities. The  Sudanese police is 
engaged in a process of reform to improve its image and gain trust among the 
community .  
These efforts include the following: 
1/  The Sudanese Police is part of the justice system in which police personnel are 
held accountable according to Sudan laws (Abdalhag, 2005).  On 2nd November 
2006, the then Director General of police, Mahgoub Hassan Saad, issued Order No 
81/2006 to all state police commissioners to set up a committee to gather, 
investigate and deal with the information regarding police personnel misconduct and 
behaviour in their states.  He also ordered a central committee at the national level to 
be established; the Order stated that the purpose of the establishment of these 
committees was to maintain discipline and good conduct among the force to prepare 
them for better performance.  Following that, there was the establishment of a 
discipline court at Khartoum State Police Head Quarters in 2007, when the 
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Commissioner of Khartoum police issued order No 2/2007 setting up a committee  to 
look at all misconduct and crimes committed by police personnel in Khartoum State.  
The purpose was to have a swift and efficient mechanism to immediately deal with 
cases that involve police corruption and misconduct. Although there was no public 
statement about the extent of the problem, one can deduce that it must have been 
quite serious for such measures to be taken.  Officers from legal backgrounds were 
assigned to serve as judges applying law from police acts and criminal acts and 
following the provisions of act of criminal procedure acts.  This court has played a 
significant role in two areas; first is that it encouraged citizens to come forward and 
report police corruption as well as reassuring them that their complaints would be 
seriously considered.  Second, it contributed to better police conduct and behaviour 
as a result of the many cases in which police personnel were dismissed, fined or 
sent to prison – all that has helped in enhancing building a culture of accountability 
among the force.  It is actually being feared, especially by NCOs who think that these 
courts has been established only to find them guilty, according to one NCO who the 
author interviewed at West Greif police station in Khartoum in March 2010.  Since 
this Court was established 113 officers have been convicted and 495 NCOs were 
convicted, the big difference between the numbers reflects the combination of the 
force in which officers are far less than NCOs (Jackson, 2010).    
2/ The second initiative has been the establishment of the community committees, to 
work closely with police at the police station level. These committees, which are 
usually selected by the local community in a non-formal selection process, are 
designed to represent the local community by interacting with the police in regular 
meetings to raise community policing concerns and in some cases, provide support 
to the police in different forms.  The members of the committees volunteer and are 
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from a variety of professions and backgrounds. Community policing has been 
introduced as the key policing approach that is been pushed forward by UN 
organisations and International donors, as described above. One of the main 
purposes of introducing this type of policing is to involve the community in policing 
aspects, thus providing some transparency in police work, which might in the end 
lead to building community trust in the police.  Once the police have achieved this 
goal to a reasonable degree, they would expect to have access to valuable 
intelligence in return which can then be used for proactive policing rather than 
reactive policing which will serve the main strategy of preventing crime as stated in 
Article 13 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008.  The first point of contact with the 
these community committees is the community safety centres established in 
neighbourhoods, the committees usually contribute or build these centres as well as 
providing free meals to the police NCOs working there. These centres conduct joint 
night patrols with volunteers from the area to deter criminals.  These have so far only 
been partially successful. It may be the case that the quasi-military police uniforms 
contribute to slow progress in getting closer to their communities.  
3/ the Code of Conduct for the Sudanese Police were introduced in 2009, drawn 
widely from the ethos of the UN Police Code of Conduct and Sudanese Police Act.   
This code was aimed at strengthening accountability for police officers and drawing 
their attention to their core duties as law enforcement agents as well as the rights 
citizens are entitled to in accordance with Police Act, act of criminal procedure, and 
other laws and regulations pertinent to police and human rights.  These include: 
respect for human rights, care of victims of accidents, refraining from torture plus the 
protection of the health of detainees, and refraining from corruption.  It also urges 
police personnel to build good relations with communities.  Moreover the code 
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prompts members of the police to maintain discipline and respect subordinates in 
accordance with the law.  Police Head Quarters carried out a wide campaign to 
distribute the Code of Conduct and explain its contents to police personnel in the 
different departments and states. Printed in pocket-size, Head Quarters required 
every police officer and NCO to have a copy of the code at all times to show it to 
citizens they meet and explain it to them. 
         
Conclusion 
Enforcing the law is always a sensitive matter that needs good use of discretionary 
powers, whilst observing human rights and having a deep understanding of the 
context (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). With this in mind, police forces are often 
assessed on how they respond to demands and whether they act proportionately, 
swiftly and appropriately. This assessment becomes even more complicated when 
the police have to operate in post-war contexts. The Sudanese police themselves 
suffered severely by attacked by the rebels and have lost their relatives who were 
also killed by the rebels, the situation gets further complicated when the police find it 
difficult to be impartial.  As in other countries emerging from conflict, the Sudanese 
Police have also been highly affected by the conflict ranging from the fact that it has 
to cope with ever shrinking budgets to embracing new policing philosophies to meet 
emerging policing realities prompted by conflicts.  However, as pointed out by Call 
(2007) post-conflict situations have some advantages for police as they often 
constitute a good chance for reform to be introduced within the overall state building 
process. In this regard the police Act of 2008 is a product of the peace process 
started in 2005 even though the Sudanese police did not change much as a result of 
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that Act. Moreover in the aftermath of conflict police can also get improved resources 
through international donors (Call, 2007). 
This chapter presented the history, the status quo, the challenges and how they are 
affected by the conflict in Sudan.  It is important to note that police cannot be judged 
in isolation from the state system to which it is tied very closely and the society within 
which it is operating.  Police practice and performance may be drawn from state 
attitude and behaviour. Society is a teaching source and police can hardly behave in 
a way that is far from the morals and beliefs of that society (Terpstra, 2011). Even 
though this assessment appears to be inaccurate in a shrinking global world it is also 
fair to say that every context needs to be judged independently from other contexts 
however similar (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). I therefore conclude that the Sudanese 
police have the colonial legacy which can still be seen in the constrained relations 
with society as a result of the society seeing the police as state agent that can at 
times act to serve political agenda. This represents a great challenge for the police 
as they cannot develop or undertake any reform without government support.  
Despite the great challenges, especially those arising from the conflict and political 
instability, Sudanese police are seen as much competent and less corrupt than other 
forces in the region (see chapter five). Moreover the success in providing security to 
the elections of 2010 in an extremely politically tense situation was a great success 
with international praise for the Sudanese police. Corruption allegations have 
prompted the anti-corruption measures to improve police image, however these 
measures as we will see in more details in chapter five, produced discontent among 
police personnel as being too harsh and unfair. In an attempt to overcome come of 
these challenges the Sudanese police sought support through partnerships with 
many countries.  
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Complex and perpetual conflicts in Sudan as stated earlier have impinged on the 
police in various ways. I will therefore provide an understanding of the nature of 
conflict and peace process as well as their relation with the Sudanese police in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The impact of Conflict on Sudanese Police and Their Roles in Peacebuilding                      
Processes in Sudan 
Introduction 
This chapter does not seek to present an exhaustive account of the complexity of 
conflict in Sudan. It rather provides a brief background for the conflict in one of the 
African countries that was debilitated by bitter internal conflicts since independence 
in 1955. Conflict continued for nearly half a century despite efforts to bring peace to 
the country that, on occasion, brought short-lived peace. In this background, I will be 
presenting the main features of that conflict which spread from the south of the 
country to both the east and west with catastrophic cost in human lives and suffering. 
Moreover, these will shed light on the peace efforts by outlining the peace deals 
reached, the challenges encountered, and the contentious issues faced when 
implementing those peace deals. I will then seek to draw the link between the 
conflict, Peacebuilding process, and the Sudanese Police locating the police in the 
peace agreements and explain to what extent these agreements impinge on the 
Sudanese Police role in the peacebuilding process.  
Conflicts in Africa 
During the Cold War, there were many active conflicts in Africa (Baker, 2010, 
Barash, 2000). In part, these conflicts came as a result of the colonial legacy of the 
artificial borders and the divide and rule policy but also because of the 
mismanagement of resources and abuse of power from national regimes that took 
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power in Africa at the  end of the colonial period (Thomson, 2010, Mamdani, 2009). 
The arbitrary borders drawn to mark the interests of the colonial powers, without 
consideration of the economic, ethnic, social, or cultural consideration of inhabitants 
of the regions, later became major sources of conflict in the continent; moreover, 
many ethnic groups found themselves divided between more than one country. The 
Somali people, for instance, were divided between more than three countries. Such 
ethnic divides culminated in conflicts between states to unite ethnic groups and 
triggered conflicts among the heterogeneous groups who found themselves 
squashed into one state (Thomson, 2010.pp.4-15).  Post-colonial Africa witnessed 
numerous military coups, especially during the 1960s. Between 1963 and 1985, 61 
such coups took place (Furley and May, 2006,p.19). As previously stated in Chapter 
Three, Sudan has had a fair share of such coups with three successful coups in 
1958, 1969, and 1989. Also, the military ruled the country for various periods whilst 
several other unsuccessful coups were thwarted (Thomas and Jenkins, 1990, 
Woodward, 1990). 
Conflicts in Modern Sudan since 1955 
Sudan has constantly been destabilised by interconnected octopus-like conflicts with 
many peace talks and peace agreements. Peace agreements led to UN and AU 
peacekeeping missions being deployed -- all failed to achieve durable peace in the 
country. Conflict in one part of the country affects another, as pointed out in the 
preamble of UNSC resolution 2003/2011, “ . . . the negative effect of the ongoing 
violence in Darfur on the stability of Sudan as a whole as well as the region”.  The 
next section will set out the root causes and triggers of these conflicts, and then 
briefly outline the anatomy of conflicts in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Darfur, East 
Sudan, and Abyie. 
133 
 
Triggers of Conflict 
Political and development marginalisation in the Sudan of the peripheries by 
successive governments’ policies are commonly assumed by observers to be the 
main factors for igniting and sustaining the conflict in the country (Barltrop, 2011). 
This geographical pattern of marginalisation was rooted in and compounded by the 
colonial policy of divide and rule when it created artificial divides between some parts 
of the country (Mamdani, 2009, Berridge, 2011, Barltrop, 2011). For example, the 
policy of blocked areas in the south separated the south of Sudan and some parts of 
Kordofan state from the northern part of the country and, likewise, from the focus on 
the tribal system through indirect rule in Darfur which deepened tribal sentiments and 
separated the region from being effectively united into the country (Bashar, 2013, 
Mamdani, 2009). Sources of conflict in Sudan can be attributed to many factors 
including political participation, equal and just development, fair resource distribution, 
and identity issues (Bashar, 2013, Barltrop, 2011, Natsios, 2012, Copnall, 2014, 
Malwal, 2005). Many believe that the colonial policy sowed the seeds in Sudan for 
unavoidable conflict which is particularly evident in Darfur and south Sudan which 
were actively isolated from the riverine Sudan during colonial times (Berridge, 
2011,p.25). It is important to note that the conflict in Sudan is neither ethnically 
rooted in a simple way, nor it is religiously motivated (Barltrop, 2011). Mamdani 2009 
indicated that in Darfur, British rule allocated certain tribes a homeland and left 
others without land; this, he says, was then exacerbated by the drought that hit the 
region later and became a source of conflict between those with land and those 
without land (Mamdani, 2009). The competition amongst tribes in Darfur over 
diminishing resources of water, grazing land, and farming land developed into violent 
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tribal conflict in the 1980s and continued into the first decade of the 21st century (see 
Chapter Three) (Mamdani, 2009, Bashar, 2013, Musa, 2011).   
In addition to these internal factors, there are external factors. The former Sudan 
(before secession of South Sudan), was surrounded by nine countries, two Arab and 
six Sub-Saharan African countries, three of which witnessed civil wars.  Ethiopia, 
DRC, and Chad were suffering internal conflicts. The spill over of the conflict of 
Ethiopia and Chad was particularly significant. Refugees from these countries 
flooded into Sudan. As a consequence of the conflict in neighbouring countries, rebel 
groups operated on Sudan’s territory, and firearms became widespread. The eastern 
region of Sudan, bordering Ethiopia and northwest of Darfur, were war zones for the 
Eritrean revolution and Chadian rebels respectively (Barltrop, 2011, Furley and May, 
2006, Woodward, 1990). The combination of internal and external factors left Sudan 
susceptible to insecurity and volatile for insurgency as described in the following 
section. 
South Sudan 
The Colonial policy of divide and rule blocked South Sudan from other parts of the 
country and, thereby, limited the access of people from other parts of Sudan to travel 
into the south and parts of Kordofan regions. Similarly, South Sudanese were not 
allowed to travel to the north. Furthermore, the British restricted the use of Arabic 
language and Islam as well as prescribing that education had to be conducted in 
English and end at lower level than that of the north (Woodward, 1990,p.48).  In the 
Juba Conference of 1947, the British brought together representatives from South 
Sudan and northern Sudan in which the two parties agreed to a united Sudan which 
meant an end to the policy of South Sudan (Woodward, 1990). On the eve of 
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independence, the civil war started in Toret, in South Sudan, when part of the Sudan 
civil defence force that were all from South Sudan mutinied killing their colleagues 
and officers from the northern part of the country . That cycle of civil conflict ended in 
1972 when an agreement was signed in Addis Ababa. Peace prevailed in the south 
of Sudan until 1983.   The violation of the Addis Ababa agreement by president 
Nemeiri motivated officers in Bor led by Colonel of Sudan army Johan Garang to 
start a new war in 1983. Garang formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLA) and launched a war that was wider and more violent than the previous one. It 
included new areas outside the borders of Southern Sudan, in particular, South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile areas which became part of the conflict theatre. Moreover, in 
late 1991, the SPLA sent fighters led by one Darfur Islamist politician to start an 
insurgency war in Darfur. This attempt was crushed by the central government. In 
the east of the Country, SPLA formed an alliance with some north Sudanese political 
parties to launch an insurgency war in that part of the country 1996 (Barltrop, 2011, 
Mamdani, 2009).  
The CPA was based on the Machakos Protocol signed in Kenya, 20 July 2002, 
which, for the first time, granted the South Sudan people the right to self-
determination. Article 1.3 of the Machakos Protocol stated, “. . . that the people of 
south Sudan have the right to self-determination inter alia, through a referendum to 
determine their future status”. The  internationally monitored referendum was thus 
enshrined in the Protocol to be conducted at the end of the six-year transitional 
period agreed between the parties therein. The Protocol planted the seed for the end 
of Africa’s longest running conflict and the breakup of Africa’s largest country. Article 
1.1 affirmed the unity of Sudan to be the priority of the parties. CPA also granted 
South Sudan an autonomous status during the transitional period with the right for 
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SPLA to keep their army intact in addition to a police force to be created independent 
of that of north Sudan. Considerable attention from the international community was 
given to the negotiation of the CPA which was led by the Intergovernmental Authority 
for Development Group (IGAD) of East Africa. The African Union, European Union, 
and United States provided support throughout the prolonged negotiations, and 
finally, their representatives witnessed the signing of CPA in Nairobi on 9 January  
2005 (Movement, 2005, Johnson, 2011). When the last major phase of the CPA was 
accomplished by conducting the South Sudan referendum, it was apparent that the 
CPA had not only succeeded in achieving independence for South Sudan but had 
transformed the Sudanese conflict. In spite of its name, the CPA did not prevent 
conflict from continuing in several parts of Sudan and, indeed, arguably caused 
some of these.   
South Kordofan and Blue Nile 
These two areas are geographically separated from each other but share a special 
status within the CPA. This was due to the fact that people from these areas were 
fighting with SPLA during the South-North conflict. Two separate Protocols within the 
CPA were dedicated to these individuals to determine their status during the interim 
period and decide on their future status through what was termed ‘popular 
consultation’. The protocols stated that during the six-year transitional period, the two 
areas would be governed through power-sharing arrangements that gave fifty per 
cent to both the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLA. At the end of the 
transitional period and before the consultation was arranged, conflicts broke out just 
as South Sudan was becoming an independent country (Movement, 2005). During 
the transitional period, the two areas were home to the Ninth and Tenth Divisions of 
the SPLA army.  Based in South Sudan and rebranding themselves SPLA North, the 
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new leadership of the two areas continued to fight the Sudanese government with 
their back to the new South Sudan state. When violence escalated, the two parties 
went to negotiations in Addis Ababa hosted by the African Union in accordance with 
UNSC resolution 2046 (2012) (Council, 2012b).  
Chapter Five of the CPA was devoted to the two states; Articles 5.8-5.11 dealt with 
policing matters within the two states. Article 5.9 states that police officers are to be 
chosen by the state and sent to get training at the national level in accordance with 
the national standards while NCOs have to be chosen and trained locally. When  
training for groups, officers, and NCOs, the national standards should be adhered to. 
Article 5.10 and 5.11 are concerned with the transferring of police personnel to and 
from the states which must take place upon consultation between national and state 
authority (Movement, 2005). Failure of the two parties to adhere to the agreement to 
clearly define and then implement what they called ‘popular consultation’ protracted 
the conflict in the two states. Article 3.1 of Chapter Five of the agreement defined 
‘popular consultation’ as, “democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of 
the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states on the comprehensive agreement 
reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement”. The agreement went on to state in article 3.2 “that this comprehensive 
agreement shall be subject to the will of the people of the two states through their 
respective democratically elected legislatures”. In later articles, it was stipulated that 
each legislature should establish a commission to evaluate and assess the 
implementation of the agreement and submit a report to the legislature by the fourth 
year of the agreement. Another independent commission was to be set up by the 
presidency to assess and evaluate the implementation of the agreement and to 
report to both the state legislature and the presidency. If satisfied, the legislature in 
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each state would endorse the agreement as meeting the aspiration of the people of 
the state (Movement, 2005). The problem is the final provision in this section which 
leaves the door ajar for rectifying the shortcomings of the agreement in the 
constitutional, political, and administrative aspects through consultation with the 
national government. This simply means that the situation is open to potentially 
never ending negotiations. The section reads, “Should any of the legislatures of the 
two states, after reviewing the Agreement, decide to rectify, within the framework of 
the Agreement, any shortcomings in the constitutional, political and administrative 
arrangements of the Agreement, then such legislative shall engage in negotiations 
with the National Government with the view of rectifying these shortcomings” 
(Movement, 2005). 
 Abyie Disputed Area 
Like the two areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, Abyie area, too, has its own 
Protocol in the CPA. It is an area at the border between South Sudan and Sudan 
with both parties claiming ownership. What distinguishes Abyie is that it was not part 
of the war area during the conflict. In Chapter Five of the CPA, “the resolution of the 
Abyie conflict”, the area was defined in article 1.1.1. as “a bridge between the North 
and South linking the people of Sudan” (Movement, 2005).  The dispute originates 
from the special administrative arrangements during the British time in 1905. This 
administrative arrangement encompasses a change of borders  of land and 
movement of people between the two parts of the country (Movement, 2005, 
Johnson, 2011). A special administrative status was granted to the area during the 
interim period. A joint council equally representing citizens of the area from Western 
Kordofan state and Bahr el Ghazal was to run the area. Being an oil-rich area, the 
revenues of the oil were equally divided between the north and south. The future of 
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the area, according to the Protocol, was to be decided through referendum at the 
end the transitional period. Disagreement arose between the two parties on who 
constitutes a citizen of the area and is thus be entitled to vote on the referendum. 
The issue of the border of the area was contentious, and the Agreement stated that 
a commission should be appointed to demarcate the borders of the area; the 
commission commenced its work to solve the problem, but with little success. The 
two parties took the matter to the International Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague 
(Tribunal, 2009, Deng, 2010). Not convinced by the outcome of the arbitration, the 
two parties reverted to violence which led to the intervention of the UN with the 
deployment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyie (UNISFA). The 
mission was mandated by resolution 1990 which states that it is mandated under 
Chapter Seven of the Un charter and composed of Ethiopian troops agreed upon by 
the two parties (Council, 2011b).   
Darfur 
Darfur, as stated earlier in Chapter Three, was not part of the British Sudan until 
1916 when its then Sultan, Ali Dinar, showed his alliance to the Ottoman Empire 
during the WW1. The British then invaded the region and annexed it to Sudan in 
November 1916.  Recognising its poor economic worth, the British ruled Darfur with 
as little as possible administration. Using tribal chiefs as governing instruments, they 
used an adaptation of indirect rule until the end of the colonial period. Hardly any 
development was recorded in the region during this period (Mamdani, 2009, 
O'Fahey, 2008). Following independence, one government after another  failed to 
adopt an inclusive political policy in the region. What is more, Darfur remained one of 
the least developed areas of the country (Movement, 2011, Musa, 2011, Bashar, 
2013)). 
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The Darfur conflict that started in 2003 extended beyond the region of Darfur to 
include three states of Kurdofan. At one point, the Justice and Equality Movement, 
the leading rebel movement in the region, attempted to attack the capital in May 
2008 (Hoile, 2010, Barltrop, 2011). The spill over of the Chadian and Libyan conflict 
during the 1980s and 1990s exposed the region to large numbers of Chadian 
refugees and filled the region with widespread firearms. Government in Khartoum 
approved the use of Darfur soil by Chadian rebels fighting their government in 
Ndjamena  (Barltrop, 2011). These factors, combined with severe drought, led to 
bloody conflict among the tribes residing in the region who were fighting over 
depleting resources of water and arable and grazing land. Conflict among tribes 
heightened during and toward the end of 1980s with weaker governments in 
Khartoum unable to intervene to restore order. It was further deepened by being 
politicised through politicians in Khartoum seeking support of certain tribes and 
favouring one group over another (Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013, Barltrop, 2011). Tribal 
conflict began to feature in UNSC resolutions expressing concern about increased 
inter-tribal violence as in resolution 2003 (Council, 2011c) and 2006 (Council, 
2012a). With this background, the region was ripe for conflict which effectively 
started in 2003. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in tandem with the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) launched a fierce insurgency war against the 
government. In response, the government embarked on a violent counterinsurgency 
war in which it allied with certain tribes drawing recruits forming militia forces who 
fought beside the government forces. These militias, who become known as 
Janjaweed, were later embroiled in human rights allegations leading the International 
Criminal Court ICC to indict and later issue an arrest warrant against the incumbent 
President Omer Albasheir charging him and other Sudanese officials with war crimes 
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and crimes against humanity (Hoile, 2010, Mamdani, 2009, De Waal, 2007, Daly, 
2007). The violence culminated in large numbers of refugees in Chad and internally 
displaced people (IDPs) in camps around the main cities of Darfur-- mainly Alfashir, 
Niyala, and Zalengi (Mamdani, 2009). This situation led to humanitarian crises 
resulting in a plethora of international organizations stepping in to provide aid in the 
form of food and other basic needs.  In May 2006, the Government of Sudan signed 
The Abuja Peace Agreement with SLM in Abuja, Nigeria. JEM, however, refused to 
sign with the splitting faction from SLM so, the violence continued in the region. The 
African Union, the UN, and Qatar led mediation efforts culminating in the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) which was signed in Doha in 2011 when the 
government and Liberation and Justice Movement agreed a peace deal. The DDPD 
left an opening for rebel factions intending to join it. Later, a faction that split from 
JEM joined the deal while the main body of the movement remained resistant to 
DDPD.  In 2012, the UNSC adopted resolution 2063 welcoming the agreement and 
urging, in vain, the non-signatory faction to join the process (Council, 2011b, Council, 
2012a)At the peak of the violence, the African Union authorised a peace mission, 
and later, the UNSC approved a further peace mission.  The United Nations African 
Union Hybrid Mission UNAMID was then established in accordance with resolution 
1769/2008 to act under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter to protect 
civilians in Darfur from violence (Council, 2008a).     
Eastern Sudan 
The eastern Sudan conflict was the least violent internal conflict in the country. The 
Eastern Front (Beja Congress) operating from Eritrea backed by the Sudanese 
Opposition Parties under National Democratic Alliance (NDA) together with SPLA 
launched, in 1995, an insurgency war against the government. They attacked 
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Kasala, the capital of eastern Sudan, and occupied Hamesh Koraib, thus, 
threatening the strategic road that links the capital Khartoum with main seaport of 
Port Sudan. The signing of the CPA ended SPLA and NDA involvement here 
(Barltrop, 2011,p.26). The Eastern Front remained active in the region until 2006 
when successful mediation in Eritrea, in 2006, led to a peace agreement in the same 
year. The government agreed to establish an Eastern Fund to undertake 
development projects in the region. On the political side, a post of presidential 
assistant was allocated to the region as well as numerous political posts both at the 
national and regional level. There was also a quota of police officers to be given to 
the region, and combatants from the Front were integrated into the police at different 
ranks (see Chapter Five). 
Police in Peace Agreements in Sudan 
According to Barltrop (200) Security sector reform was never a primary aim of the 
negotiate ions at the CPA talks, nor were its elements negotiated in detail. Because 
the agreement granted a measure of autonomy to the south, it, in effect, created a 
second set of security actors, at least for the interim period. However, the CPA did 
not stipulate that the security sector, at either the overarching or local levels, should 
be brought under civilian command; nor did it require conformity with international 
norms about the use of force or other policies that are typically associated with SSR. 
Nor, for that matter, did the agreement contain detailed arrangements for police 
reform (Barltrop, 2008)   
Power sharing in peace agreements usually aims to provide a sense of 
inclusiveness, recognition of self-governance for minorities, and fair representation of 
marginalised groups (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005,p.8). Perhaps, because the Sudan 
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peace agreements are regional ones that did not affect the whole country, DDR 
programmes for the regional former rebel fighters included the possibility to be 
recruited into the police (excluding South Sudan where the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement gave the south the right to have their own police, military, and security 
systems). Furthermore, the CPA provided two separate DDR programs for the two 
parts of the country (Movement, 2005, Barltrop, 2008).  
Despite the fact that police reform was not clearly stipulated in the CPA, it 
nonetheless was hoped by observers that some reform would take place along the 
ethos of the CPA of good governance and equality in both parts of the country. 
However, the fact that there were two separate police forces in both the north and 
south of Sudan, in reality, minimised the chances for real reform that could be 
monitored by the two former enemies.  Both were keen to keep their policing system 
intact and away from the influence of the other party. The implementation of 
agreements of Darfur, Eastern Sudan, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states led to 
the integration of former rebel fighters into the police, but the agreements included 
no provisions to reform the national police.  During the South Sudan peace 
negotiations, representatives of the Sudanese Police were present at the 
negotiations table as they were during the Darfur peace negotiations. One 
representative, who I interviewed, indicated that the two parties avoided committing 
themselves to real reform. He said that the rebel groups were more concerned about 
their quota in the police and having more inclusive police organisations. They 
insisted on securing specific numbers of their fighters to join the police often at 
different high ranks. When they started the recruiting process, they failed to present 
individuals who were qualified for the appropriate rank (see Chapter Six). 
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The CPA provisions did, however, succeed in prompting the Police Act of 2008 to be 
enacted. The imperative of that act was the establishment of a clear division of the 
police into three levels: national, South Sudan, and state level (Government, 2008).  
In the Security Arrangements section within the CPA, the police were only mentioned 
under article 8, National Security Organs and Police Reform, which reads, 
“Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the 
police and National security organs, shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing 
arrangements and tied, where is necessary, to the appropriate level of the 
executive”. In the power sharing section, however, the police force was referred to 
indirectly when detailing the national and state powers. For instance, the passport, 
visa, and nationalisations being specified within national powers, and state police 
and prison guards allocated within state powers (Movement, 2005). The CPA 
included no provisions explicitly regarding the reform of the police; as stated earlier, 
the fact the two parties were intending to have their own policing system seems to 
have left them with no appetite for national police reform. The CPA came close to the 
policing issue in article 2.10.1 of the power sharing arrangements that stipulated that 
there shall be established a National Commissions for Civil Service, Judiciary 
Service, and Human Rights, but it fell short of saying anything explicit about the 
national police. The opportunity that Macaulay alluded to of police reform when 
peace agreements were concluded, has been lost in the CPA detailed provisions of 
power and wealth sharing arrangements (Movement, 2005).   
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) dedicated a section for the reform of the 
selected security institutions, which included the police. For example, article 446 
stated that state police and their subsidiary departments of popular police and the 
nomadic police should be subject to reform. Article 447 detailed the required reform 
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which should include the size, mandate, membership based on merit regardless of 
ethnicity or political affiliation, fair representation of all groups; legal oversight and 
accountability, and representation of women in all ranks with special section to 
address their specific needs. This put the DPA forward as the best agreement to 
address the police issues (Movement, 2006). Despite the promising provisions set 
forth in the DPA, nothing was implemented. It seems that reform of the domestic 
police and their potential role in the peacebuilding process is more present in the 
peace missions mandated to monitor the peace process than in the peace deals 
reached between the parties. Police are an integral part of missions mandated to 
operate in Sudan, but this features the role expected international police forces, 
rather than local police in Peacebuilding. In other peace accords, police have been 
given more attention than this. In Paragraph 6 of the UNSC resolution 2063, for 
example, the Council requested UNAMID to support the implementation of the 
DDPD by working closely with the United Nations country team on Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration and building the capacity of the police, justice, and 
corrections sectors (Council, 2012a). 
Sudan’s Police Force since the CPA 
To understand the relationship between the Sudanese Police and peacebuilding in 
the country, it is useful to have closer look at the mandate of the Sudanese Police in 
the Sudan Interim Constitution of 2005. Article 137 states that the statutory function 
of the Sudanese Police is to maintain internal security (Government, 2005). This is 
how the Sudanese Police force was perceived in the light of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) (Movement, 2005) signed in 2005 and the Sudan Interim 
Constitution passed in the same year. In the aftermath of years of war and conflict, 
the Sudanese Police have, since 2005, become part of the peace process in the 
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country. The CPA stipulated that the police had to be subjected to reform; to achieve 
this, a new Police Act, the Sudanese Police Forces Act (SPFA) of 2008, was 
enacted (Government, 2008).  
As stated earlier, the reform was driven by the provisions of the CPA (2005). This 
required a restructuring of the police system into the three levels-- the Sudan 
National Police, the South Sudanese Police, and the State police. The Sudanese 
Police Forces Act of 2008 abolished the 1999 police legislation. Although much of 
the content was based on the provisions of the previous law, it included new aspects 
of policing to be embraced and clearly stated the police force is a national force that 
is open to all Sudanese people without discriminations as stated in article 11 (1) of 
the Police Act 2008. Guided by the ethos of the CPA, the new act also emphasised 
the observation of the rule of law and human rights article in article 11(2). The 
Sudanese Police force is also required by the Act of 2008 to seek efficiency and 
professionalism through interacting with the international community and to adopt 
international best practice (Government, 2008).  
Despite the significance of these provisions to the development of the police in 
Sudan, it seems that the new Police Act did not set out adequate measures for 
accountability and transparency which are essential elements for any police force to 
be trusted by the community they are providing service to and thus able to play an 
active role in keeping the peace among communities. 
I also stress that, even though these documents introduce most of the new policing 
matters to Sudan, they fall short of specifically linking policing approaches to the 
Peacebuilding process. Policing in post-conflict countries, such as Sudan, is an 
integral part of the peacebuilding process as it is evidenced throughout this chapter, 
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and yet, the legislative framework does not make this clear. Consequently, the 
concept of peacebuilding is not institutionalised in the selection, training system, or 
management of the Sudanese Police. The difficulty of police working in the conflict 
prone areas is described in the following quote from the research respondent: 
 
It is difficult to get involved in peace-keeping or peace-building when you work 
in a conflict area as the police become actively involved in the conflict, 
including heavily armed conflicts and shootings. This is not the role of the 
police because it is a civil service and the army should cover it. The police, 
through international humanitarian law, are protected because its personnel 
are part of this civil service and should not be attacked by any party.  
However, because the police are used in this inappropriate role, officers and 
staff become the enemies of the parties involved in the conflict.  So, they 
cannot support the peace process – in fact the police often become the target 
of those involved in the conflict. This also creates other serious problems as 
the Police Rules and Regulations state that police personnel can only be 
involved in conflict if there is a Presidential Decree, but normal practice on-
the-ground does not involve getting that decree. Consequently, if a police 
officer is injured or killed, there is no compensation for him or his family 
because the Presidential Decree has not been issued. A memo was put in 
about this serious anomaly, but it did not make its way ‘to the top’, so nothing 
has changed (A1/3/7) 
It was noticeable during the fieldwork that the Sudanese police have little 
understanding of the peace process and their role in that process. Their 
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understanding of the peacebuilding is built on what they hear or read in the news as 
opposed to institutional briefing or training.    
The Contributions of the Sudanese Police to the Peace Process 
This section explores aspects of policing in Sudan and examines their contributions, 
or otherwise, to the Peacebuilding process. One of the great challenges for the 
Sudanese Police emanating from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
the securing of the general election in January 2010 and the referendum process for 
the South Sudan people in April 2011. Tension was huge, consequently, both 
activities were monitored by the international community -- The United Nations, The 
Arab league, and The African Union. The whole situation was of great political 
sensitivity. To prepare for this, the Sudanese Police first launched training 
programmes for officers in Khartoum to cover the legal aspects and the potential 
threats.  Experts representing all relevant departments, which included the police, 
the Election Commission, and the Ministry of Justice designed a curriculum to be 
used for this purpose.  At the end of their training in Khartoum, these officers were 
asked to deliver training courses for both officers and NCOs in the different states 
including the South Sudanese Police (which, at that time, had an autonomous status 
by the virtue of the CPA) to secure the election process throughout the whole 
country. Elections went smoothly and without violence. Monitors from the 
international community witnessed that the policing of the elections was excellent.  
The Sudanese Police learned many lessons from the election which enabled them to 
manage the referendum process for South Sudanese people in April 2011.  This time, 
trainers did not go to South Sudan (where a separate training programme took place) 
but replicated the process for police personnel in all the northern states focusing on 
the areas where many southerners reside because people from north Sudan were 
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not entitled to vote for the referendum.  Once again, the tension was high, but the 
international community was monitoring the process which was accomplished with a 
great degree of success. The two parties in the south and the north immediately 
recognised the results as well as the international community which paved the way 
to South Sudan becoming an independent state in July 2011.  The serious violent 
disturbance in the capital following the death of SPLA leader and First Vice President 
John Garang 2005, alluded to in Chapter Three, placed a lot of pressure on the 
police and jeopardized the whole peace process. It was ethnically based violence in 
which hundreds of people were killed; it was all sparked from a rumour that the death 
of SPLA leader was a result of criminal act plotted by Sudanese government. Police 
were able to contain the situation even though many innocent people were killed and 
many private businesses were burned. The success of the police in containing the 
violent troubles and restoring order was necessary for the peace process to continue.  
Conclusion 
The internal conflict of Sudan, as shown in this chapter, is a complex one in terms of 
the length, the area affected, and the human cost. It is also noticeable how much 
international attention it attracted. Yet, comprehensive and durable peace remained 
an elusive goal for a long time.  The peace arrangements reached to end these 
conflicts are marked by the political interests of the conflicting parties and their 
obsession with security arrangements and power sharing thus failing to address the 
root causes of the conflict and to effectively link the police to the peace process. 
Police structure and philosophy have officially not been affected by the peace 
arrangements themselves, which on paper, at least, were expected to operate at the 
margins of the policing establishment. Therefore, the important role of the police in 
peacebuilding, discussed in Chapter Two, is not reflected in the peace process 
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across the country. As the major peace agreement in the country, the CPA did not 
seem to allocate attention to the police and policing matters. The Abuja Peace 
Agreement addressed police matters more than did the CPA; however, the 
implementation was not significant. Despite the neglect of the police role in the 
peace process, it proved indispensable in solidifying the peace process which was 
embodied by the securing of the 2010 elections and the referendum on South Sudan 
independence in 2011. 
I have now presented the Sudanese police case and where it fits within the wider international 
literature on police peacebuilding as well as how the Sudanese police were affected by the 
peace process, where they are located in the peace agreements, and what role the have played 
within the peace process in the country. In the following chapter, I will examine the leadership 
and management of the Sudanese police and consider the Sudanese policing style in the 
context of peacebuilding in the country. 
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Chapter Five 
Leadership and Management in the Sudanese Police Force 
 
Introduction 
“The current promotion system can only produce weak police leaders“(A1/3/8) 
 
 
Quality leadership and effective management system as explained in chapter one 
are key elements that are indispensable for any police force striving to have an 
effective role in peacebuilding. Even with the current structure of Sudanese police if 
leadership and management were different there would be a greater chance for 
success in the several policing-peacebuilding related matters. Issues of community 
policing, accountability, lack of meritocracy in promotions and posting of officers, 
training as well as the overall performance of police personnel are closely related to 
management and leadership. In this chapter I will examine how the leadership and 
management styles adopted by Sudanese police can reduce their effectiveness in 
peacebuilding.   
 Research into the police usually includes one or more of three key aspects: the 
study of the police as an organisation; an examination of policing culture or an 
investigation of activity and practice of policing (Newburn, 2008). This chapter 
explores leadership and management with specific focus on the Sudanese Police, 
which encompasses two of Newburn’s   aspects of police research as it examines 
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both police culture and the police as an organisation. Like other police organisations 
in sub-Sahara Africa, the development of the police in Sudan has been greatly 
affected by perpetual cycles of political instability, insecurity, violence and corruption 
(see chapter four). As a reflection of this, Otwin (2009) wrote that an individual police 
leader’s development efforts would not succeed unless the social context changes 
through the influence of international aid programmes and continuing domestic 
reforms (Marenin, 2009). In this chapter I outline the ways in which this has 
happened in Sudan. 
 
Leadership and management are not the same thing, but are intrinsically linked and 
complementary. All references throughout the chapter to police management cover 
planning, organising and coordinating policing activities, whilst references to police 
leadership include those actions that inspire and motivate police staff to do a better 
job, improve performance and provide a quality service to their communities.  
However, as Murray (2010) states, whilst the roles of leaders and managers were 
traditionally distinct, they are increasingly found in the same person as personnel 
look to their managers, not just to assign them a task, but to define purpose for them.  
Equally, managers must organise their staff, not just to maximise efficiency, but also 
to nurture skills, develop talent and inspire results. Even though Murray is talking 
about leadership as general, leadership in the police is not different.  This chapter 
therefore, takes cognisance of this increasingly important overlap and 
complementary nature of management and leadership (Murray, 2010). 
 
 The chapter commences with a brief overview of  leadership and management in 
policing including references to international trends followed by a description of 
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management and leadership styles within the Sudanese Police. It analyses policing 
systems with an emphasis on the Sudanese Police structure. The chapter explores 
some of the main management features in the Sudanese Police, particularly those 
relating to promotions and postings, as well as women in the Sudan police. It also 
provides insights into the oversight and accountability mechanisms that impact on 
leaders and managers.   
International trends in police leadership and management 
Management 
Whilst re-emphasizing that police leadership and management are not the same 
thing but linked, complementary and overlapping (Kotter, 1999), I also recognise the 
distinct elements of police management as the administrative activities of controlling, 
directing, and coordinating police personnel, resources, and activities in the service 
of preventing crime, apprehending criminals, recovering stolen property, and 
performing regulatory and helping services.  To this end, police managers set goals 
and design plans to achieve organisational aims and objectives.  These are usually 
connected with employees’ and employers’ expectations, for example the police 
organisation expects the employees to do their best and provide a quality service to 
communities with far reaching commitment and dignity.  In turn, the employees 
expect the organisation to meet their needs as groups and individuals whilst treating 
them fairly.  Roberg and Kuykenall (1997a) argue that it is this mutual benefit that 
binds both organisations and their staff to fulfil their obligations, they stress that this 
includes sharing successes and achievements and acknowledging failures (Roberg 
and Kuykendall, 1997b).  However some police managers fail to adopt a policy of 
recognition and fair treatment of all personnel, especially for those at the lower end 
of the organisational hierarchy. Such inaction makes lower ranks feel exploited, 
154 
 
misused, or unfairly sanctioned and often regard others as inappropriately rewarded 
by their superiors (Marenin, 20099). All the NCO research respondents complained 
about the tendency of their superiors to protect themselves by putting the blame on 
NCOs for unintentional mistakes or problems and asserted that they refuse to take 
any responsibility, and so fitted with this general position.  NCO’s respondents 
expressed frustration and disappointment about the ways in which senior officers 
frequently employed tough investigation processes that always seemed to find NCOs 
guilty. Moreover they asserted that the police court frequently used data from 
dubious investigations to apply harsh punishment. In addition all respondents 
asserted that they do not get fair treatment especially in promotions and posting and 
job assignment. 
 
Above the Sudanese police leadership and management there is the Sudan Board of 
Police Leadership and the twin Board of Police Management, as laid out in Article 18 
and 19 of the Police of 2008 Act respectively, they are meant to assist the Director 
General in the leadership and management of police at the national level. The Board 
of Police Leadership is comprised of the Director General as chairman and the 
Deputy Director General; all heads of general directorates are members of the 
board, moreover paragraph D of the same article gives permanent or temporary 
membership to other designated police officers according to regulations. The Board 
has two main roles: one is to assist the Director General to carry out his duties, and 
second is to set out proposals for the police budget. Furthermore the Board would 
undertake any other duties put forward by the minister of interior or the Director 
General.  
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Just like the Board of Leadership, the Board of Management is headed by the 
Director General with the Deputy Director General as a member. The membership of 
the board is organised through regulations, nevertheless the Director General can 
invite any of the directors of police departments and or any specialist to attend the 
meetings. The Board of Management is to be responsible primarily of overseeing the 
general policy, implementation of plans and programmes. Furthermore the Board 
would follow up the plans, programmes and research that aim to the development of 
the police force as well as any other duties assigned by the Minister. The two Boards 
convene for weekly meeting to discuss matters on the agenda and emerging policing 
matters. It is to be noted that statutory functions of the two Boards are not clearly 
defined and are very similar. The composition of the two Boards is very large and to 
have them all available for weekly meetings presents a significant disruption to police 
work, as senior managers have to be away for long periods  two days out of five, and 
in most cases the same manager will go for both meetings.  Mechanisms to 
empower members of these boards to have candid discussions on any policing plans 
or emerging matters that are put before them do not seem to be in place.  
 
Leadership 
“Successful police reform requires widespread acceptance of change across ranks 
and units, but some officers will not modify their behaviour unless they believe it is in 
their personal interest. Tangible rewards (pay increases, transparent promotion 
procedures, etc.) can help win such support. Extensive and genuine consultation is 
also key to winning acceptance for new programmes; it must be demonstrated that 
the views and work of individual officers are respected (Develeopment, 2007,p.170). 
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Leadership in the police is defined by Newburn et, al., as “  the ability to influence 
and combine individuals and resources effectively to achieve objectives that would 
otherwise be impossible ” (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.156). In common with the 
generic trends in leadership theory, police leadership research tends to support a 
less authoritarian style of police leadership than was prevalent three decades ago 
(Denesten, 2003,p.241, Robert and Peter, 2003). Leaders need to acquire certain 
virtues to ascertain their professional leadership and they need to assemble 
resources and proportionately distribute them fairly at all levels, as well as maintain a 
sense of humour (Robert and Peter, 2003,p.242). Police leaders need to develop 
multi-rank, cross-departmental leaders to assist them doing their job by distributing 
responsibilities and roles among subordinates (Gardner, 1990).  Researchers 
believe that every member of a police organization must have leadership qualities to 
perform their ever-increasing and challenging roles from even the most junior ranks, 
such as constable, who must take the lead when dealing with an incident in the 
community.   This emerging concept implies that there are leaders at all levels of any 
police organisation that need to be trained and developed and, in so doing, the 
potential for a department to become vibrant and self-motivated is unleashed, which 
is known a “dispersed leadership” (Gardner, 1990).  
 Adlam and Villiers (2003) agreed with this concept when they highlighted that the 
police officer by the nature of their work to operate alone and consequently must 
exercise discretion is a leader (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). They, along with other 
researchers for example Roberg (1997), highlighted this  as one of the main 
differences between the police and the military; for the individual soldier is always 
operating under command and is among other soldiers. It is very rare that military 
personnel operate independently, whereas police officers can act alone whether on 
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general patrol or dealing with incidents such as crimes, traffic accidents or other 
emergencies. Consequently leadership in policing is not necessarily linked to rank, 
but is more about the role of police officers when the community looks to them to act 
in a way that will lead and coordinate efforts, for instance at a crime scene or 
accident scene (Rogers, 2008,p.4).   
 Importantly, contemporary police research also stresses the need for police leaders 
to be able to adapt their leadership style to suit diverse contexts from helping a lost 
child to managing violent civil conflict, which includes being able to provide directive, 
active leadership  (command and control) when required (Mulcahy, 2008, Adlam and 
Villiers, 2003). The next section explores how the external and internal operating 
environments of the Sudanese Police have an impact on its leadership and 
management styles. 
Police occupational culture 
Mulcahy (2008) asserts that researchers have employed ethnography to closely 
observe police behaviour and practices which make up the police culture in other 
contexts. They believe that studying of police culture is imperative due to its 
relevance to police discretion, legitimacy, accountability and police conduct.  
Understanding police culture requires knowing more about policing as an activity and 
a police force as an organisation and how they deal with issues of gender, ethnicity, 
corruption, class and violence and other police related matters (Mulcahy, 
2008,p.254) 
Police culture refers to the common values, work norms, practices and attitudes 
among police personnel across the world. Whilst there are positive aspects to police 
culture such as camaraderie and a commitment to hard work it can impact negatively 
on police use of discretion and sometimes embrace corruption and misconduct 
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(Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.203). The Sudanese Police is historically dominated 
by male police officers who share similar values and attitudes as in many other 
police organisations. One of the most negative   cultural aspects is unification 
against external scrutiny and public accountability. For example police personnel 
sometimes collude to cover up police misconduct   Adlam et al., (2003) and police 
officers often believe that police work is understood only by the police themselves 
and so staff use this to exclude others, like women groups and minorities. Moreover 
many police officers undervalue office work and social care type of duties, preferring 
enforcement work (Blair, 2003,p.177). These views were corroborated by some of 
my research findings, such as an interview with three senior police officers, who 
raised the case of a police officer who was jailed because he accused Sudanese 
police of some corrupt practices. He was sent to the police court not because of false 
accusations but because he followed the wrong channel to speak out by handing 
written cases of police corruption to a government official. Unanimously the 
respondents said that he was wrong to have done this and should not have talked 
about police issues to the external world3.  
Sudanese Police Organisation 
As stated earlier in chapter three the Sudanese Police force has a federal police 
headquarters in the capital, Khartoum, with one Director General with overall 
authority to manage the organisation (Government, 2008). Article 5 of the Sudanese 
Police Act defines the Sudanese Police as a federal force with two levels; the 
national and the state level, but it is highly centralised in practice because the local 
state police have virtually nothing to do with allocating the budget, the appointment, 
                                                          
3
 Later in November 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled out the police court verdict and ordered the officer to 
be released. This provoked discontent among police leadership on the basis that if they cannot discipline 
police officer this will lead to revolt among the police thus police leadership will lose control over their officers.  
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the promotion, and the transfer of police officers, all of which is managed from the 
headquarters in Khartoum. The leadership of the force as in article 17 of the Police 
Act is placed under the President as supreme leader.   Article 17 of the Sudanese 
Police Act 2008 (Government, 2008) puts the President of Sudan as the top 
Commander of Police, with the Minister of Interior being the direct supervisor of the 
police, with their stated responsibilities in the same Article as shown in chapter three.  
The Director General of Police, with the rank of 1st Lieutenant General, is the overall 
executive manager of the police responsible only to the Minister of Interior.  He and 
the Deputy Director General of the police have to be appointed by the President 
according to Article 20 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008 (Government, 2008) with 
the  Minister of Interior as the second political person supervising the police is 
authorised to draft directors to organise and manage the development of the force 
moreover he is also empowered to oversee the professional, finance, administrative 
and the technical performance of the force as well as the identification of the police 
needs,  appointment of the directors for the general directorates, nominations of 
members of delegation who take part in missions abroad and finally the appointment 
of the directors of other police department that work in partnership with other civil 
departments with the consultation of the head of these departments 4 . Such 
departments include inter alia the railways, the river transportation, the sea ports, 
and judiciary.   In essence the Director General, who is not chosen in a competitive 
manner that is based on merit, is thus empowered with tremendous authority. In 
many countries in the region that adopt a similar federal policing system, such as 
Kenya and Ethiopia, the Commissioner of Police does not have to be a serving 
police officer (Government, 2011), therefore he or she can be drawn from qualified 
                                                          
4
 These also include oil and Minerals, Tourism, Dams and others. 
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individuals of any relevant background, which is also the case in selecting police 
chiefs in the United States, although it is recognised that the US does not have a 
federal police system (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997). In addition the Kenyan system 
has set forth a rigorous selection process for the police commissioner who should be 
chosen by the Kenyan commission of police service (Government, 2011). 
The Sudanese Police force consists of diverse police departments that make them 
unique in this organisational structure where so diverse responsibility that some of 
them often do not belong to police in other countries come under the Sudanese 
police (see Chapter three). Beside the main body of police which include the 
traditional policing aspects of crime preventing and crime fighting there are other 
departments that have different non-crime functions.  
The military identity of the Sudanese Police is more clearly featured in the 
department of central reserve; more like the Gendarme police of France (the central 
reserve police which was established in the late 1970s which is recruited and trained 
to serve as an emergency/intervening force in the areas of trouble and severe civil 
disturbances) (Salim, 2005, Wisler et al., 2009). With military capabilities and strict 
military command they are stationed in the rural areas across the country, mainly 
where the region have destabilised areas and flash points. The mobile nature of the 
units makes it easy to move quickly from one region to the other. Utilising military 
tactics and weaponry the central reserve were used to protect strategic projects and 
secure the roads in Darfur.  Such paramilitary police units as the central reserve 
force of the Sudanese Police are found in other countries within the police according 
to the OECD- DAC document on security sector reform 2007. These units are often 
better resourced than the rest of the force and have a sense of elitism and 
independent identity (Develeopment, 2007,p.171). Some researchers raise  
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concerns about  the violations of civil rights by these units (Campbell and Campbell, 
2010,p.45), which may be an outcome of their selection and training as they are 
recruited with less rigor and their training is often focused on combat, the use of fire 
arms and self-defence techniques rather than law enforcement.   
The composition of the Sudanese Police according to Article 5, Section 1, of the 
Sudanese Police Act 2008, is that of a regular, national force tasked with delivering 
policing services to its communities.  The Act emphasises that every Sudanese 
citizen is entitled to join the police, to ensure the national identity and reflect the 
diversity of Sudanese society with equal representation.  However, the Act does not 
place any responsibility on the police to observe this diversification of police 
personnel.  In comparison, the Kenyan Police Service Act of 2011 stipulates, in 
Article 5 section B, that the composition of the Kenyan police, so far as reasonably 
practicable, shall “reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya”, 
which is more legally binding and obliges the leaders and managers of the Kenyan 
police to monitor the ethnic and regional balance when conducting recruitment 
(Government, 2011).   It evident that police at state level is very much under 
resourced compared to the police at the capital as the majority of my respondents 
stated that the state level is weaker and more poorly resourced compared to the 
police based at the capital.  
In the following section I will present the reflection of the research respondents on 
how they feel towards their police management and leadership. Their feedback is 
featured in the diverse themes as follows; 
 
Poor police salaries and services  
All respondents highlighted the issue of welfare as poor salaries and services such 
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as health care, transport and housing.   Many believed that this was due to the 
negligence of top police leadership and four respondents cited other organisations, 
such as the army, that provided a good health service, social welfare and 
transportation for its staff.   One respondent stated that the Police Co-operative sells 
fridges to police members but it requires 1,000 SDG as a down-payment, whilst the 
police salary is 600 SDG for some junior ranks.  He stressed that this meant he 
could never afford it and that the police could help by selling it with better ‘conditions 
of sale’.   He also suggested that the police could support their junior ranks by 
helping them with income-generating schemes such as a providing a rickshaw-taxi 
for the staff to get income from.  He was aware that the army had run similar 
schemes. 
 
Qualifications, skills, thoughts and ideas are not respected and Junior-ranking 
colleagues leaving the service 
 80% of respondents stated that their qualifications and skills were not recognised by 
senior personnel.  Moreover if they had a ‘brilliant idea’ or a helpful thought it was 
rarely respected.  Taken together this lack of recognition and respect leads to 
dissatisfaction and, as a consequence, the junior-ranking staff stops using their 
initiative as highlighted in the following quote. 
 
‘New ideas are not accepted, although sometimes they would be 
fruitful.  Previous disappointment means that you don’t say them, 
because you fear the consequences.’ 
 
One junior-ranking interviewee, with over 30 years of experience, stated that he and 
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his colleagues regarded the Warrant Officer rank as ‘the end’ because it is so rare 
for an NCO to progress any further than that. For that they call this rank (The Stop 
Rank) another made the following comment: 
 
“I am going to leave when my contract comes to an end next year 
because I feel that it is hopeless; there will never be any reform.” 
 
 
80% of the respondents stated that many of the junior personnel do not renew their 
contracts mainly due to the poor pay compounded by other issues highlighted above.   
It was stressed that many junior-ranking personnel know beforehand that their 
contract is coming to an end before the police administrators realise and go to their 
administration offices to state that they will not renew it. One respondent stated that 
in 2013 three thousand NCOs are leaving the service in Khartoum state alone. 
Another senior respondent mentioned that the pensions department is receiving an 
average of five hundreds file of retired NCOs each month.  
It is highlighted by the majority of respondents that the training system and lack of 
job security can only produce poor quality of leadership. Senior officers do not value 
the skills, knowledge and understanding of their junior staff in many ways therefore 
they do not gain their trust which will ultimately lead to poor communication between 
the top command and the staff. 
 Most respondents stressed that top manager’s interference in individual police 
officers’ decisions, when they exercise their discretion powers, will affect the police 
individual trust on their leaders. Top managers when they bend to pressure by most 
senior ones, politicians, relatives or friends and interfere with their subordinate’s 
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work, they lose respect and find it difficult to enforce the law through those same 
individuals that they once forced to deny the law. When senior leadership distribute 
training opportunities in an unequal manner they have sent the wrong people to the 
wrong course and they end up having on the one hand staff with poor morale 
because they were deprived from well-deserved training opportunity and on the other 
hand have people whom they spent resources to train but they are not competent to 
do a good job. Departments are not given equal resources and finance department 
treat departments not according to what they do but according to personal relations 
this will affect key departments’ performance and again leave the staff with low 
morale This also reflects the dominance of centre over periphery as put forward by 
Berridge, 2011.   
Legal and Structural Contexts  
As stated in Chapter three the Sudanese Police have witnessed rapid changes to 
their operating environment and social contexts since the first police law was passed 
in 1908 (Salim, 2008).  These changes have impinged upon police structures, 
mandates and relations with the different regimes that have governed the country, 
which is also indicative of how different governments have interfered with the 
leadership and management of the police and sought to manipulate it through varied 
measures (Berridge, 2011). This and the extremely overstretched remit of the 
Sudanese Police which includes many different services, as explained earlier, has 
an impact on the leadership and management functions.   According to Leys et. al., 
(1995) the British ‘policing by consent’ to achieve core policing functions stands on 
the following seven principles: bureaucratization; rule of law; the use of minimal 
force; political non-partisanship; providing service to the public; emphasizing 
prevention of crime rather than detection; and providing effective law enforcement to 
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all classes (Leys and Saul, 1995).   However, because Article 16 of the Sudanese 
Police Act 2008 specifies the many diverse functions of the police, some are related 
to the common principles of police work in nature, but many are not such as 
customs, wildlife, civil defense (fire and rescue emergency response); passport and 
immigration; and prison services.  In other countries these are separate services and 
not commonly part of the police. It is therefore difficult to cite principles that cover all 
of these functions, and if one does, they look less like police ones since there seem 
to have little in common between these distinct departments.  Nonetheless the 
Sudanese Police force is not alone in this regard.  As Leys et. al (1995) argue that 
many police officers around the world are performing functions that are not related to 
law enforcement and crime prevention activities (Leys and Saul, 1995,p.133, Leys, 
1995).  There is no available information in Sudan regarding the number or 
percentage of police officers and NCOs who are actually working in core policing 
activities and those who are dedicated to non-policing activities, so it is difficult to 
explore the comparison systematically.  Whatever the case, it would be challenging 
for such police force to develop effective management and leadership styles to 
effectively manage this wide range of responsibilities.   
Impact of the Rank Structure on Leadership and Management 
 As explained in chapter three and earlier in this chapter the Sudanese Police force 
has a multi-layered military rank structure with clear distinction between officers and 
NCOs.  
          Table 5.1: The Ranks in the Sudanese police                                       
Officers Non-Commissioned Officers 
First Lieutenant General Warrant Officer 
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Lieutenant General 
Major General 
Brigadier 
Colonel 
Lieutenant Colonel 
Major 
Captain 
First Lieutenant 
Lieutenant 
 
 
 
 First Sergeant 
                                                     
Sergeant 
                                                      
Corporal 
 Lance Corporal                                              
  Private 
 
 
 Article 20 stipulates that the Director General and his deputy are appointed upon 
recommendation by the Minister of Interior and only two conditions apply: first that 
they must be commissioned police officers and second they must be of the rank of 
Major General or above.  The act provides no other more requirements or 
qualifications, unlike Article 11 of the Kenyan Police Service Act where the police 
commissioner has to meet a set of requirements such as distinguished career, 
serving in senior management post for at least fifteen years in key areas relevant to 
his job, good knowledge in related areas, commitment to maintain integrity, honesty, 
impartiality as well as commitment to fight corruption and nepotism (2011).  Once 
nominated from among the Major Generals within the Sudanese Police leadership, 
the Director General is appointed with formidable administrative and financial powers 
as outlined in Article 21 of the Act.  However, these powers are poorly described and 
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insufficiently detailed with no laid down limits or constraints, in comparison Article 10 
of the Kenyan Police Service Act put forward a set of constrains and clear guidelines 
for the police commissioner to abide by.  
The Director General is not accountable to anybody other than the President and the 
Minister of Interior who appointed him.  Even though the Director General serves 
under the Minister of Interior there is no published oversight mechanism to hold him 
accountable. Literature in this regard does not show how the Director General would 
be held accountable nor does it show any precedent where the Director General has 
been held accountable for any mismanagement. For example, the last Kenyan police 
officer was a former army police officer. I believe that employing a neutral character 
from outside the police who is not influenced by the organisational culture and free 
from colleagues’ connections might prove good practice. An example of that 
occurred at the end of the civil war In Sierra Leone when a retired British police 
officer was appointed to lead the Sierra Leonean police (Albrecht and Jackson, 
2010). Keith Piddle who was appointed Inspector General of police in Sierra Leone 
in 1999 demonstrated effective leadership that was not influenced by ethnicity or 
region. He managed to carry out serious reforms within the police, most importantly 
he was able to reduce the rank structure from twenty two to just ten ranks (Kabia, 
2012). The Sudanese police structure with 16 ranks makes it less motivating for 
those who join as privates to rise through the ranks in addition this long chain of 
structure make it hard for top command to communicate with lower levels. 
 
 The total number of civilian staff in the Sudanese Police is less than two hundred.  
As recounted to me by a senior civil servant at the police headquarters, the police no 
longer recruit staff in civil roles. The Sudanese police before the current government 
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came to power used to employ bigger numbers of civilians. Most of those were 
encouraged to join the police during the early nineties. The idea was that they would 
be easy to control when they are police than if they are working for the police as 
civilian staff. The Sudanese police can recruit more civilians to undertake non-crime 
related tasks which can include administrative, finance, IT and communications and 
office work. This could release more police officers and NCOs who are currently 
undertaking these tasks to work in crime fighting and law enforcement work. The 
cost of recruiting and retaining civilian staff is less than that of the police personnel, 
which allows the police to have more staff with the same budget that they have now. 
Moreover having more civilian component in the police may ease the military spirit 
throughout the force and make them less militarised and more prepared to work with 
their communities. 
Promotion and Transfer 
Officers’ Promotion 
The Sudanese Police promotion system for officers allows people to be promoted 
mainly because of the period of time the officer has spent in his or her rank, rather 
than on a merit or on a competence basis.   When a Batch (a group of police 
personnel who joined on the same date) reaches the required number of years in the 
rank, individual promotions are decided upon by a committee set up by the Director 
General in accordance with article 30 of the police act of 2008.  The committee 
assesses the possibility of individuals from that Batch being promoted; dependent on 
their line manager’s performance reports, his training or academic qualifications, and 
their seniority within the Batch. Upon recommendation from the promotion committee 
the Director General will put forward a recommendation before the Minister to 
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approve promotions for officers below the rank of Colonel (Government, 2008). For 
those from the rank of Colonel upwards the President would sanction their promotion 
upon the recommendation of the Minister. The majority of officers interviewed as 
research respondents expressed their distrust of the promotion process believing 
that it is based more on the top leadership and manager’s personal views and 
preferences rather than being fair, objective or structured.  
 
At no time during consideration for promotion is the individual called for interview or 
assessment.  Furthermore, they are not asked if they wish to be promoted or remain 
in the rank, it is as though the system gives no options; you either get promoted or 
removed to allow others to move forward.  Each individual has three chances 
(generally once a year) of being promoted; on the third occasion they will be forcibly 
retired if there are no vacancies in the next rank.  Promotions on this basis has led to 
many ‘bottle-necks’ as there are a plethora of personnel in the senior ranks resulting 
in there being higher numbers in some senior ranks than numbers in lower ranks, 
which is considered to be an administrative error which could have been avoided 
with a better promotions system and  planning . A similar situation existed in Sierra 
Leone in the aftermath of the civil war when there were 19 percent of the force were 
senior police officers with more non-commissioned officers than constables, as 
stated earlier this led to drastic reform in the police structure (Kabia, 2012,p.63, 62).  
 
Data on the numbers of officers in each rank in Sudan is not obtainable but some 
respondents said that the numbers of police officers in some senior ranks are 
markedly disproportionate to the strength of the force and the other ranks therein.   
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Naturally, this system does not encourage police officers to make any effort to get 
promoted.  Moreover, the actual personnel strength and associated current needs do 
not guide annual recruitment and it is notable that annual recruitment to the College 
of Police Sciences and Law is fluctuating in numbers and there has been no limit on 
how many candidates should be recruited each year. One respondent indicated that 
in 2010 the police recruited over 700 police students for training; the number was far 
higher than the capacity of the police college could accommodate. In one case they 
have to be trained in a borrowed training centre that belongs to the army, in another 
case they have to be trained in a temporary training centre that was originally 
designed to train NCOs. In both cases a lot of money had to be spent to refurbish the 
new site. These large numbers would often result in officers being massed in certain 
ranks wthout enough vacancies at the next rank. Officers who complain about the 
promotion process when they were overtaken by other junior colleagues often do not 
get satisfactory answers and are more likely to get into future troubles, because a 
complaint made by any officer will be understood as challenging a decision made by 
the headquarters. Promotion in the UK police, for example, as described by a retired 
UK police officer with experience working at the UK prestigious police training 
college, Bramshill, are based on the individual indicating that he or would to be 
considered for promotion. Such individuals would apply then subjected to specific 
training assessed by specialist panels before decision can be made regarding 
his/her promotion. This was asserted by the majority of respondents who are all 
police officers representing different ranks. Retirement from the police can easily 
take place at the promotion season where large numbers would be forced to retire at 
the same time. This represents a great loss of experience and knowledge for the 
police. To have them all retiring at the same time means that the police force loses a 
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lot of resources which have been invested in training those officers and risk the loss 
of institutional memory.  
 NCO promotion 
NCO promotions are a far more transparent, structured and straightforward process 
than that of the officers. According to my experience, the task is often conducted by 
a panel set up by the head of the relevant department who is delegated by the 
Director General of Police to conduct promotion among NCOs within their 
department as stipulated in article 35 of the Sudanese Police act of 2008. The panel 
would consist of senior officers with relevant experience. They will record the points 
that each candidate achieves depending on seniority, qualification, training 
certificate, performance report etc. According to the higher marks won by each 
candidate measured against the available vacancies they panel will make a decision 
and recommend it to the head of department for approval. An appeal is available for 
those who believe that they unfairly missed their promotion and will often be 
considered by the panel. Like officers’ promotion process individuals eligible for 
promotions are not required to indicate their intent to be promoted neither they are 
personally assessed by the promotion panel. 
Transfers and tenure  
NCOs are not subjected to transfers, except within their own States, therefore this 
section relates primarily to officers.  The officer’s transfer system is conducted 
regularly and often without clear objectives, ostensibly to transfer knowledge 
between different departments (many of which are not related to core policing 
functions) and expose police officers to different policing environments, with a view 
to expanding their knowledge and policing skills in different contexts.  Consequently, 
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when they get to the top of police hierarchy they have a wider understanding of 
policing matters in different areas and police departments. In reality it is not clear 
how many of these police officers make use of the experiences they gain from 
working in markedly different departments.  Moreover, this process could only 
produce a fruitful outcome if it was based on a systematic, fair method of transfer 
through the maintenance of accurate, computerised, personnel data on police 
officers, which would be used to both achieve organisational goals and individual 
officer’s development goals.  Such a system is not in place, although members of the 
Sudanese Police Headquarters are currently seeking to implement one entitled 
‘Right Person, Right Place at the Right Time’, even so it is currently in an embryonic 
form. As a senior police officer from the Headquarters that I have interviewed 
confirmed, they are aiming to rectify the transfer system so that the skills, and 
relevant training, among other issues, would be considered to achieve both 
organisational goals and individual police officers’ development. 
The downside of current method of posting is that much is lost in terms of resources, 
experience and knowledge as a result of posting people with rare expertise who 
have undergone expensive training programmes.  Some of these programmes have 
taken place abroad at high financial costs.   Additionally, if such an officer is engaged 
in vital partnership activities, for example in high conflict areas, their relocation could 
result in a breakdown of the partnership.   
In the UK, the Home Office has driven police services to address this issue of tenure 
through the development of effective policies.  For example, paragraphs 11.1 to 11.3 
of the Sussex Police Tenure Policy states that the length of an officer's posting 
should be determined by the needs of the Force combined with the development and 
well-being of the officer.  The minimum tenure period will normally be 24 
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months.   However if the officer’s post required a formal training element equal to 
or greater than 4 weeks, a minimum tenure of 48 months will normally apply.  The 
policy also states that there ‘is not ordinarily any maximum tenure but police officers 
must not expect to occupy any post on a permanent basis’.   Paragraph 11.6 goes 
on to state that the following facts should be considered when establishing periods of 
tenure (either minimum or maximum); the Force’s needs, especially regarding 
continuity of partnership activities; individual career development aspirations; cost 
and extent of training; and the individual's wellbeing (Police, 2010).  
Regular posting is common police practice, and the French police for instance 
adopts a similar system built on the tradition of building a united nation with public 
servants attached to the center of the state. This became the rule for the police in 
France where officers are constantly posted and were often reminded that no one 
should expect to stay in the same place for more than three years (Wisler et al., 
2009,pp.105-106).  
It worth noting here that the states according to article 31 section 3 are entitled to be 
consulted if any officers working in that particular state are to be posted out of the 
state. A senior officer at state Headquarters stated in an interview that he has yet to 
be consulted, as the police Headquarters continue to conduct postings as before the 
enactment of the law in 2008. He also confirmed that in article 23, the Director 
General should appoint the police state commissioners on consultation with the state 
governor, but that this too has not been adhered to yet (Government, 2008). All 
respondents unanimously said that the posting system is fraught with injustice and 
corruption and is conducted without consideration to the individual’s welfare. The 
posting was ostensibly conducted to give officers diverse experience, fight corruption 
and inject new expertise into some departments but it is also been used punish 
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rogue officers who do not comply with what their departments or managers needed 
of them.  As a result some officers stay for long periods in one department while 
other are constantly being posted to different regions and departments. The 
implications of this for an effective police force are officers feel insecure. 
Guarding the Guards; Accountability and Human Rights 
It has always been a matter of debate as to who will supervise the police to ensure 
that public power is used in public interest. To put it differently who will handle pubic 
complaints against police misconduct and corruption. To achieve these police 
organisations as literature shows, various mechanisms and methods have been 
thought to be necessary. A mixture of agencies, rules, management tools and 
practices need be employed for that purpose. Designing of such bodies and systems 
will help holding both police personnel and police organization accountable for 
malpractice which may ultimately  assist in building the public confidence in the 
police  (Palmer et al., 2012,PP.282-285, Mulcahy, 2008,pp.6666). These will include 
rules, institutions staffed with high integrity personnel to adequately investigate 
police misconduct and corruption. The Patten Report on Northern Ireland policing 
(1999) in paragraph 4.1 stated   that: “The fundamental purpose of policing should 
be the protection and vindication of human rights of all.”  This was reinforced in 2001 
by Neyroud and Beckley when they argued that police have been challenged by new 
policing ethos at the beginning of the 21st century full with many challenges and 
protection of human rights (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). Researchers are divided on 
the issue of police corruption and whether or not it is a widespread phenomenon, but 
evidence of police corruption around the globe has been seen time and time again. 
Well established police organisations, like the UK police, are not immune from such 
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behaviour where cases of perjury and beating of suspects were uncovered 
(Gottschalk, 2010)  
Oversight and accountability within the Sudanese Police is one of the sensitive 
issues that still not adequately addressed. There is no independent body entrusted 
with the duty of oversight and accountability. The parliament  is empowered with 
overall responsibility to oversee all public body’s performance (Government, 2005). 
Below that there is nobody that is entitled to hold the police accountable or ensure 
their compliance with rule of law and observation of human rights standards. 
Oversight and accountability over the police within Sudanese Police is exercised 
primarily through the parliamentarian Commission on Security and Defence of the 
Parliament. Internal accountability within the police system is conducted through the 
general directorate of the police headed by the Deputy Director General of the 
police. As in article 12/2 of the Sudanese Police Act, this is the department that is 
tasked with conducting regular and surprise inspections of all police departments by 
sending teams to the different states and departments to check their compliance with 
the laws and regulations and see how they are performing in general (Police, 2008, 
Government, 2008). Moreover the police departments have responsibility to check 
on how their subordinates at the lower level are performing. Leaders of departments 
are required to check on their subordinates to ensure that they are doing their job in 
accordance with the law. The police also have a security department that is assigned 
to report on the police conduct and the irregularity of police departments directly to 
the Director General (Police, 2008). Civil society organisations also have a role in 
monitoring the police conduct but this is not done in a structured manner, as they are 
not empowered with specific code to do so.  
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On the finance aspect of the matter the police have an internal audit unit that is 
tasked with ensuring that the finance process is being managed in accordance with 
the regulations. The Auditor General who has overall responsibility to check on the 
spending of government financial resources is also entitled to inspect the police 
finance process. Two respondents pointed out that there have been allegations that 
the police did not allow the Auditor General to inspect the police.  
 
The police also are seeking to engage with the public through the police media 
branch which publishes its own magazine and newspaper to make the public aware 
of their role as partnership. Moreover the police have their own radio FM station that 
broadcasts programmes on policing issues and some of these are live programmes 
that receive calls from the public and seek to respond to their concerns (Jubara and 
Moaweya., 2010). 
The financial department is part of the police structure staffed by police personnel 
from all ranks. This, with the military structure that governs Sudanese Police, does 
not seem be creating a healthy environment for oversight and accountability. 
Newburn 2008, argues the more militaristic and more centralised the police the less 
accountable they are (Newburn, 200823). Haunted by corruption and misconduct the 
police organisations around the world tend to adopt a culture of blame and 
punishment which can be seen more prevalent as police always thought to seek to 
please the public through disciplining of their staff. This usually leads to the police 
staff become more secretive and less open so that they avoid getting punished for 
mistakes. Care for both staff and customer is a core element of organisational 
success.  As Roberg et al, (1997) rightly put it, managers should treat their staff the 
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way they want them to treat the organisational clients (Roberg and Kuykendall, 
1997b).  
 
The Sudanese Police introduced a e code of conduct in 2009 to raise awareness of 
the police personnel that they have obligations towards suspects, citizens, and the 
public at large and that they should behave and conduct their duty in a good manner 
that does not  abuse the law but also preserves the dignity and rights of all citizens to 
be treated with respect without segregation based on any background (Police, 2009). 
 Accountability, as I see it and in light of what has been said in this section, would do 
well for the police by removing and / or punishing those with “corrupt attitude” who 
tend to violate the law and abuse the rights of others, thus preventing them from 
besmirching the reputation of the police. Moreover it will reassure the public and help 
building their trust in the police by showing that justice can be done and no-one is 
above the law including the police themselves. Through seriously investigating public 
allegations and the due process of law be applied to any-one proven to have done 
wrong, misbehaved or committed act of misconduct.   
 
Alalie-h or ‘Mechanism’ 
All the junior officers and NCOs believed that if they were taken to the mechanism 
they would be convicted without a proper investigation or any clear evidence; 
because the presiding officers believe it is important to ensure public/complainant 
satisfaction and protect the reputation of the police rather than be just in their 
decision.  The research respondents were adamant that if a member of the 
community wants revenge on a police person he or she would go to the Alalie-h.  
The following quotes are indicative of this: 
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‘If you are reported or a complaint is put against you to your superiors the 
complainant is always right and you are always wrong.’ 
  
“The Alalie-h is never merciful; there is no protection for us as police.” 
Despite this, and in comparison with regional forces, corruption in the Sudanese 
police is not as endemic or rampant as put by British police consultant with diverse 
working experience in different African countries.   I also recall that when DFID 
introduced training programmes and used police officers from the neighbouring 
countries as trainers a young south Sudanese police officer said “we lived as 
refugees in the countries where these trainers come from and we know what the 
police is like there, they are too corrupt and brutal to train us to be good police 
officers” 
 
 
Planning in the Sudanese Police  
Planning is the activity that can take the individual or organisation from where they 
are to a future point, as John Adair writes; poor planning would usually lead to 
endless chaos (Adair, 2011,pp.66-67). An integral part of effective police leadership 
is the  ability of leaders to guide their subordinates with clear vision and direction 
which can only be achieved by the knowing where they are heading to (Adlam and 
Villiers, 2003,p.240). Police planning in Sudan, as described by respondents, does 
not exist. Each police leader at any level posted to a new department will set his own 
plan, but that plan may not be followed by his successor. This is also the case at the 
national level with successive Director Generals.  
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Respondents gave the example of the police 2010 recruitment that increased the 
police strength by one third in matter of few months to prepare for the elections and 
the referendum of South Sudan. To achieve that goal recruitment was done in haste, 
there were no adequate training facilities for large numbers, especially at state level, 
so trainees had to be recruited in a poor training environment in a hasty manner to 
meet specific dates. This happened when the need for the police to play this 
important role had been known since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 (Movement, 2005).  
 
Ethnicity and Gender in the Sudanese Police culture 
The Sudanese Police force is historically dominated by ethnicities from the riverine 
region of the northern Sudan (Berridge, 2011). In legal terms the laws of Sudan have 
set out clear provisions to form a representative police force that is open to all 
Sudanese regardless of ethnicity or region. Article 148 of the Sudan Interim 
Constitution affirms the right of every Sudanese to join the police as a national force 
which should reflect the diversity of the Sudanese society in its composition, article 7 
and 12 of Sudan interim constitution emphasizes the same point through equal rights 
of citizens (Government, 2005). So far this law has not changed the ethnic makeup 
of the force. The women only focus group explained that they have little chance to 
get to the top ranks not because of incompetence but due to male domination and 
the negative view of the male managers towards female police officers, which is 
similar to the situation reported by women in many other forces like the British police 
in the 1970s (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). 
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Policing in a Competitive World 
In many countries the police are no longer the primary agency in preventing and 
detecting crimes, as is evident in the UK by the introduction of the Crime and 
Disorder Act in 1998. The local authorities also have responsibilities (Adlam and 
Villiers, 2003,p.184). The wide functions of police duties make it necessary to 
evaluate the work done by the police or if it is done by other agency, or as Adlam et. 
al., pointed out the police is a public sector agency and they should be guided by 
competition in the way they conduct their business. In that they pay attention to their 
clients, focus more on their staff as human resources and motivate them and 
consider value for money issues (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.181).  
 
Baker (2010) argues that in Africa it is not the police that people will go to for 
protection from crime nor it is  where they go when crime is committed, adding that 
private security companies are claiming dominance and people are seeking their 
own means of providing alternative policing (Baker, 2010).  Police are required to 
adopt efficiency in policing and management and effective leadership is becoming 
even more indispensable.   
 
Senior officers 
This sub-section covers issues that were unique to senior officers or were only 
discussed by a senior officer. One issue in this category is the budget. This may 
indicate the lack of transparency around budget issues in that lower ranks have little 
understanding of issues related to budget.  They all emphasised that budgets are 
shrinking year by year and they even if they are increasing in the annual budget they 
are losing their value due to the rising inflation and prices. One senior police officer 
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stated that: 
 
“We have very little budget to do our work it’s simply not sufficient this coupled with 
lack of transparency at the financial department at police Headquarters” 
On the budget issue another senior police officer stated that: 
“We do not have enough budgets to provide food to the detainees in custody and we 
had to find money from private service to other organisations to pay for that in some 
cases we have sought resources from other organisations which might influence our 
work”. They all pointed out that if you are well connected then you are more likely to 
get a bigger budget for your department. And you have to push hard to get you a 
larger budget. 
90% of this group stressed the point of insecurity of job and the uncertainty, so they 
have to spend most of their time worrying about whether they will be leaving soon or 
not by that they do not commit themselves to any long term planning. They as well 
expressed their strong feeling of insecurity in terms of posting and promotion and 
that it is unfair and is conducted without rationale and all respondents were clear 
about role of cronies, tribe, and political affiliation in the posting and promotion 
process. 
In relation to peacebuilding this group seems to have better understanding too of the 
issue than the other two groups of junior and middle ranking officers. One senior 
police officer stated that:  
“Police can contribute to peace by adopting plans that prevent fight between the 
different groups being religious, political ethnic or other” 
 
another senior police officer stated that some international organisations provided a 
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lot of support to the police in relation to the peacebuilding particularly in the Blue Nile 
state these organisations include the DFID, UNDP, JCOM, World Vision and Blue 
Nile Emergency Fund but then he added that some of these organisations take 
advantage of the situation and seek to trigger the conflict by supporting one group 
and ignoring the other. Another one added that some organisations like the United 
Nation Mission in Sudan UNMID and Qatar supported the peace process in Darfur 
but he went on to accuse UNMID of supporting the rebel groups also by spreading 
exaggerated news about the security situation in the country which will make people 
panic. It is however recognised by the collaboration between the UNMID and the 
Sudan police while their presence there and that they are able to provide some 
training in the areas of child and family protection, control of small arms conference 
and human rights., they were also able to provide refurbishment for police custodies, 
solar energy units for remote police stations and communication equipment. Two of 
this group pointed out the police contribution to the peace process by securing the 
safe return of internally displaced people to their home towns and play crucial role in 
preventing escalating disputes between tribes. That role would often include 
identifying safe routes for nomads so that they do not pass through farmers’ farms 
and damage their crops.  
 
Two respondents stressed the importance of the police not to be tasked with military 
duties like the case of Central Reserve Force now fighting the rebels in Darfur that 
will detract them from their primary duty and the police resources in this case would 
be misplaced.   
On the equipment this group also stated there is generally shortage of equipment 
and those provided were not of good quality because they provided by unqualified 
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and inexperienced agencies due to corruption. In most cases equipment were 
provided without providing training to the staff that will be operating them.  
 
The Police Leadership and Management - Peacebuilding Nexus 
Police officers and NCOs are empowered to enforce the law and act in any situation 
that requires them to intervene as law enforcement agents. This role becomes even 
more imperative when they operate among communities especially in post conflict 
and war-torn societies like that of Sudan with protracted multi-region conflict. In order 
to operate effectively they need to be in an environment which promotes individual 
initiative, which allows them to freely exercise their discretionary powers without fear, 
but all this is constrained in the Sudanese Police as shown earlier. The paramilitary 
Sudanese structure and the strong chain of command within the police does not 
support the police personnel work in contexts where they could contribute to the 
Peacebuilding process through their day to day policing activities.  
 
Peacebuilding often requires time as one critique of the international peace builders 
is that they work within tight time frame works to implement Peacebuilding 
programmes; the Sudanese police with their posting system that does not allow them 
to stay long enough in one area have little chance to take part in successful 
Peacebuilding programmes. The national recruitment system which brings 
individuals to work where they are not familiar with the local context is also more 
unlikely to produce officers or who are not in good understanding of the local setting 
and carry out sustainable Peacebuilding process. The Sudanese Police 
headquarters’ policy of not consulting with the states in regard to recruiting of new 
officers is contradicting one of the root causes of conflicts, that is the share of power 
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and the feeling of being represented, the same thing apply to transferring officers in 
or out of the states and finally the appointment of state police commissioners seems 
to be contrary to the one of the important principles of Peacebuilding that stands on 
trust self-governance and adequate understanding of the local context.  
 
The unfair non-transparent promotion system deprives the police of competent 
potential future leaders and also leaves police officers working with low morale and 
feeling uncertain about their future. Effective and fair accountability mechanisms can 
improve the police image and thus put them in a better place for community trust and 
support which is vital for police working in Peacebuilding contexts, but this is not 
present in Sudan as accountability is either absent or done in a punitive manner 
through unjust processes. Systematic development of police leadership at all levels 
is crucial in improving the chances of the police to work more effectively in 
Peacebuilding settings. It is however the selection of the Director General that might 
have the most significant implications for the role police can play within the 
Peacebuilding. A more rigorous selection process for the Director General based on 
merit would ensure selecting the most competent experienced and committed people 
to run the police. An independent commission for the police service like the case in 
Kenya could help in nominating police leadership.  Selection of good leadership 
could provide a good example for others to follow, ensure effective management and 
better performance. Most conflicts arise from unequal development as seen earlier in 
chapter four police at state level is less well-funded than that of the capital, and this 
could have serious multi-dimensional implications. Finally the more representative 
the police the more confident they are to introduce themselves to the public and seek 
their support.  So in sum leadership and management can impinge on police 
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effectiveness in general and in particular if they are expected to take part in peace 
process. 
Conclusion 
Leadership that can be promoted on the basis of merit is more capable of setting a 
good example of leadership and administer the force by employing the most efficient 
and fair methods. Effective leadership needs to be neutral, free and immune from 
being influenced by colleagues; region, ethnicity or other which are common in Africa 
particularly in Sudan. In some countries the Director General can come from outside 
the police and such option tends to widen the pool of experienced impartial 
candidates who are more likely to succeed.  In Sudan these criteria are not met. The 
promotion system is flawed and does not gain trust among police officers which may 
result in them losing morale and confidence. The transfer in the way that it is done 
within the Sudanese Police does not seem either to be achieving the organisational 
goals, or be in the interest of the individual’s welfare. Moreover it does not value or 
recognise experience, or speciality training that police personnel have received 
during their service. An independent body empowered to look into police misconduct 
and corruption may help reassure public and clear the police from malpractice.  All 
these limitations have significant impacts on the police relationship and management 
with local communities which are crucial to any Peacebuilding effort that may involve 
the police.  
 
To further explore aspects that can affect police suitability for peacebuilding role the 
selection, recruitment and training in the Sudanese police will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
The Selection and Training of Human Resources in the Sudanese Police 
Introduction 
“Issues surrounding the numbers, recruitment and training of police personnel are 
one of the key issues to be addressed by post-conflict policing” (Baker, 2006,p.23). 
Training, recruitment and selection of police in war divided communities is an 
essential element of peacebuilding. Issues of police representation of the community 
and the dominance of one ethnic group over others are often raised. Moreover police 
must select the right individuals and subject them to the right training to prepare 
them to work effectively in war-torn societies. The right selection of the right 
individuals who undergo relevant training would ensure the observation of human 
rights, the rule of law and the understanding of sensitive issues present in such 
environments.  There is a dearth of literature on the Sudanese Police; axiomatically 
very little has been written on the organisation’s recruitment and training methods or 
the capacity of its training institutions and facilities (Berridge, 2011). This scarcity of 
literature on Sudanese Police and the lack of accessible documents and data on 
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training is the main limitation of this chapter. Despite that, I critically examine the 
organisation, human resource, recruitment, and selection and training mechanisms 
of the Sudanese Police and its relevance to peacebuilding.  Data collected from the 
field in the form of written documents as well as data generated from interviews and 
focus groups will be employed to inform the argument throughout the chapter. 
First, I provide an overview of the recruitment and selection process, including the 
multi-entry level and initial training, then examines on-the-job/in-service training 
together with the training environment in which training activities are being 
conducted.  I then go on to explore the role of the Training Authority, which is the 
department responsible for training within the Sudanese Police, including its 
statutory functions, and its horizontal and vertical relations with related departments 
within the Sudanese Police structure. It draws some comparative examples from 
police selection and training systems in other countries, then it points out the 
relevance of police training to Peacebuilding and finally leads to a conclusion on why 
selection, recruitment and training of Sudanese police are important for 
peacebuilding in the country.   
Overview of the Sudanese Police Recruitment, Selection and Initial Training 
Processes 
The selection and recruitment process is so essential to achieving an efficient and 
effective police service or, to paraphrase Newburn et al., (2008), it is the stage at 
which the quality of  any police force can be judged (Newburn and Neyroud, 
2008,p.257). The three seemingly different processes of recruitment, selection and 
training of police personnel are intrinsically interlinked and inseparable. Recruitment 
refers to the stage where police organisations will seek to attract candidates to join 
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the police, while selection is the process that follows, and through which the best 
candidates are selected according to a set of criteria. Recruitment and selection are 
significant for the success of any police organisation and prerequisite for good 
policing. Training often encompasses relevant knowledge and skills conferred on 
those new recruits and other in-service police personnel to further build their skills 
and expand their knowledge (Osse, 2006, Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).    
The Sudanese Police methodology for the recruitment and selection of personnel 
varies markedly between the officer class ranging from 1st Lieutenant up to 1st 
Lieutenant General and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) , ranging from Private up 
to Warrant Officer as stipulated in article 24/1 and 2 of the Sudanese Police Act 
(Government, 2008). This includes the length and quality of initial training which the 
two groups receive, always in two separate training environments and, ultimately, the 
roles and tasks they will be assigned to following that training (Government, 2008). 
In these disparities between officer corps and lower ranks, Sudanese Police is not 
different from other African police forces (Marenin, 2009, Marenin, 1982).   This 
section first examines the various entry levels to the Sudanese Police, followed by a 
description of the methodologies for recruiting officers and NCOs moreover it will 
provide insights into the system of recruiting and training of women in the Sudanese 
Police.  
Entry Levels to the Sudanese Police 
The Sudanese Police adopts a multi-level entry system for potential police recruits 
(Government, 2008). This system, as with other recruiting and training matters, is not 
clearly stipulated in the police law or regulations. Yet, from respondents’ feedback 
and my own experience of levels of entry to the Sudanese police force, we learn that 
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potential recruits can join at one of the following levels. The first and main entry route 
provides the personnel for the vast majority of the police for non-commissioned 
police officers  and is conducted at a state level,  rather than national level, which 
involves recruits being trained within their recruiting state for a period of three to six 
months, resulting in them graduating at the police rank of Private and then deployed 
within that same state as in article 35/1 and 4 of the Sudanese Police Act 
(Government, 2008).  The second level is the one that is conducted at the national 
level in accordance with article 25 of the Sudanese Police Act for Officers who, once 
selected, are trained for three years at the National College of Police Sciences and 
Law and graduate at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant with Bachelor in Law and 
Police Science. The newly graduated recruits will be deployed across the country 
throughout states and police departments (Government, 2008).  The third level 
relates purely to what is known as Technical Police NCOs (literal translation of 
Shurta Faneyah) who are recruited at the national level and must hold a minimum 
qualification of the Sudanese Secondary Certificate which is the same qualification 
required for officers to join the police college.  Technical NCOs are trained for one 
year at the National Unified Training Centre, based in the capital city of Khartoum, 
and graduate at the police rank of Sergeant to be deployed at the national level.   
The fourth level is an internal recruitment process that focuses on upgrading 
outstanding NCOs with good performance and conduct who have served for 
minimum of seven years to be police officers.  This group receives additional training 
at the National College of Police Sciences and Law for one year and, once 
graduated, they join the Officer class at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant.  The fifth 
level involves the targeted recruitment of specialist individuals such as doctors, 
engineers and IT technicians who join the police at different ranks according to their 
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specialist qualification and work experience.  These specialist recruits are trained at 
the National College of Police Sciences and Law for six months  before moving to 
their specialist posts for induction training, for example within the Police Hospital, 
prior to beginning their new posts.  The sixth level involves the recruitment of officers 
to join specialist areas such as Customs, Scientific Support to Criminal Investigation 
(forensics) and Civil Defence departments known as Specialist General Directorates. 
Officers for these departments also receive training at the National College of Police 
Sciences and Law for one year and graduate at the police rank of 1st Lieutenant. The 
last entry level is that for skilled individuals such as mechanics, carpenters and those 
with building and painting skills and the like, recruited to provide specialist service for 
the police. This group, after being trained at NCOs training centres, will be given 
ranks within the NCOs as appropriate to their experience and specialist area. Their 
recruitment will take place under article 35 of the police act (Government, 2008).  
The following section will provide in-depth analysis of the recruitment and training of 
officers and NCOs followed by the recruitment and training of women police officers.  
The officers’ recruitment process  
The Sudanese Police recruit candidates to be officers each year from among those 
who are qualified for university study at about the same time as when universities 
start the admission process for new undergraduates. The recruitment process for 
officers begins with an advertisement by the Sudanese Police stating that it will be 
recruiting officers during specified dates,  in accordance with article 25 of the 
Sudanese Police act (Government, 2008). The process will be managed jointly 
between the administrative department at the headquarters and the police college, 
with the administrative department having overall authority over the process.  These 
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advertisements are distributed via national and regional media outlets, including 
newspapers, radio and television, also by posting a copy of the advertisement at 
police stations.  However, remote areas of Sudan may not have access to these 
diverse media outlets, making residents less likely to hear of the recruitment 
campaign. In recent years Sudanese police began to upload the advertisement on 
the police website, but with a tiny percentage of the population having access to 
internet, not many people will benefit from this.  The application form has to be 
completed manually and handed in to the police college in person.  
Having heard that the Sudanese Police are recruiting, potentials applicants have to 
buy the application form for 60 Sudanese Pounds before they can begin the 
recruitment process. This process commences with a preliminary interview during 
which time the panel will check the applicants’ certificates, height (which must not be 
below 5.8” for males and 5.5” for females), as well as his or her ability to hold a 
conversation using a few basic questions that often include the candidate’s 
motivation to join the police. The Police Headquarters would form a set of panels to 
run interviews at this stage both at the national and state level. Each panel also 
checks the physical wellbeing of the interviewee, to make sure that he or she is not 
disabled in any way, as disabled people of any kind are not accepted in the 
Sudanese Police.  At this preliminary stage almost half of the recruits will be 
disqualified and the successful candidates will be referred for a full medical 
examination and, if successful, they will then be subjected to a written test to 
examine their general knowledge, intelligence and level of English language.   
This is followed by a test held at the National College of Police Science and Law to 
examine the candidate’s physical strength, which includes running for a certain 
192 
 
distance and doing some body exercises.  For those fortunate enough to pass the 
physical test there will be another interview panel, which is headed by senior police 
officer from the police Headquarters who represents the Director General of the 
Sudanese Police. The outcome of this interview will be send to the Director General 
for the final approval and his office releases the final list of selected candidates, who 
will be required to report to the National College of Police Science and Law to start 
their three-year training programme. This recruitment and selection process takes six 
months or more to be completed. The training of the new recruits will take place in a 
confined camp that they do not leave for 45 days. After this period they are released 
to stay with their families during weekends until the end of the three-year training 
programme. The training programme is often a mixture of parade, physical exercise 
and law, with a total five weeks of work placement at different police departments. 
During these weeks recruits experience police work and they also get the chance to 
be tasked with small duties like patrol under the supervision of an experienced police 
officer from the relevant department (college, 2012).  
For those who are disqualified there is no explanation as to why they were 
disqualified apart from in the case of medical examination.  The majority of the 
research respondents reported that, in spite of this clear set of required stages, at 
every point new applicants are added to the pool of potential recruits who have not 
been through the former stages (and they will not be required to do so) as the panel 
members are approached and influenced to include them by influential people from 
inside or outside the police. Thus some are considered without undertaking any of 
the preliminary tests due to patronage. A clear  example of corruption in the 
recruitment and selection for officers  which happened during the interim period 
following the signing of the CPA when  South Sudan was allocated a certain quota 
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for officers to be selected by the South Sudanese authorities  and trained at the 
police college in Khartoum.  Some senior police officers and dignitaries managed to 
put their sons and relatives within that quota. At independence when South Sudan 
demanded to have officers trained in those quotas to be transferred to South Sudan. 
The families of those officers came forward saying that they do not want their sons to 
be transferred to the South as they are not South Sudanese. 
 The final interviews are designed to test areas of self-confidence, communication 
skills, decision-making and other key performance areas that have not been tested 
during the earlier stages. These interviews are not run in a structured manner and 
the panel will make the test as they think is appropriate. The police officers who sit 
on the panels and run the interviews are selected regardless of their knowledge and 
/ or training in assessment and interviewing and they are not subjected to any 
training to prepare them for the important role that they are going to undertake5. I 
experienced sitting in one of these panels in 2006 during my work at the police 
college. What I noticed is that we were making judgements without adequate 
knowledge or training to exclude some applicants who could have become good 
police officers. We were not trained, briefed or provided with systematic assessment 
criteria to do that job. A process with this level of importance needs to be conducted 
by well-trained, independent individuals who enjoy high standards of commitment 
and integrity.   
Additionally, scenario based testing and role play are not part of the recruitment 
system in the Sudanese Police. Assessment of the candidates’ KUSAB in 
(Knowledge, Understanding, Skills, Attitude and behaviour) is undertaken through 
                                                          
5
 From my own experiences of being a member of such panels there are no pre-conditions to be part of them.  
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hypothetical situations in many other police forces but not in Sudan (Roberg and 
Kuykendall, 1997a).  
In some countries where the community is involved in policing issues, the selection 
and recruitment process would scrutinised by community members. as is the case in 
the US (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b). From my experience I did not notice any 
form of involvement of community members in selection process in Sudanese police. 
To this end the selection for Sudanese Police officers is a solely police managed 
process that is managed directly through the police Head Quarters and takes place 
at the police college.   
Non-commissioned officers’ recruitment and training 
As stated earlier in this chapter, there are two main levels of recruitment for NCOs, 
one level is the Technical NCOs, who are required to be holders of the Sudanese 
Certificate (the same certificate required of officers to join the National College of 
Police Sciences and Law - it is only the grade that differs slightly).  This group is 
recruited with far less scrutiny and assessment than officers and they are graduated 
as Sergeants after undergoing training in a confined training camp for nine months.  
They are deployed to work only at the national level in the capital city or in other 
central departments based in the capital. Like the officer-class, states are not 
allowed to recruit or train this group at state level.    
The second level of NCOs recruitment is those men and women who are recruited 
and trained at the state level to graduate at the police rank of Private in state training 
schools. They are recruited with even less scrutiny, with lower or no academic 
qualifications and receive a shorter period of training that does not usually exceed 
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three months also in closed training centre, during which they are taught basic legal 
knowledge, physical training, parade and the use of fire arms. 
It is of note, that the recruitment and training requirements of this vast majority of 
police personnel is not clearly explained in the Police Act of 2008 (Government, 
2008). This group is recruited and trained in accordance with article 35/1and 4 but 
there are no further explanations as to provisions of their recruitment and training. 
There seems to be more focus on the officer’s selection and training, whereas the 
aforementioned percentages of officers in contrast to NCOs indicate that the largest 
percentage of police work, particularly at the front line and community interface, is 
done by the NCOs.  A later section in this chapter examines how much of the 
financial resources allocated to training is spent on officer’s training and how much is 
spent on NCO’s training.  
 60% of respondents asserted that the vetting system for all recruits is flawed and 
fraught with corruption and nepotism, and, as a result, many people with poor skills 
and questionable criminal records found their way into the police. They added that 
the police headquarters is obsessed with recruiting large numbers of recruits but 
they pay little attention to the quality of those recruits. 
The recruitment of women in the Sudanese Police 
“We are not seeking to be the same as men, but we do not want to be discriminated 
against” (Respondent) 
The role of men and women in each society is shaped by how the society perceives 
them and the expectations of each, which differ in most societies, depending on the 
socio-cultural understanding of that particular society (Donais and Geneva Centre for 
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the Democratic Control of Armed Forces., 2008,p.107). Police forces are historically 
dominated by masculine cultures everywhere, as women even in the United 
Kingdom were not accepted into the police until during the Second World War.  The 
first women to be police commissioners did not appear in the UK until the mid1990s 
(Peter, 2003, Neyroud and Beckley, 2001, Mulcahy, 2008). Since 1975 the number 
of police women in the UK police grew rapidly until by 2008 they reached 23 percent 
of the total force in England and Wales with three women as chief constables and 12 
assistant chief constables (Mulcahy, 2008,p.655). The United Nations Security 
Council 1820/2008 acknowledges the role of women in conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding stressing the significance of their involvement in such situations   
especially at decision making in these contexts. Resolution 1325/ 2000 supports 
women’s representation and involvement in the international, regional and national 
institutions. Moreover the resolution calls for mainstreaming a gendered perspective 
into the United Nations peacekeeping operations and the need to pay attention to the 
special needs of women as stated in paragraph 8 of the resolution specially the 
encouragement of local women to participate in the peace process and to ensure 
that women’s rights are enshrined in the relevant documents when negotiating the 
peace deals. Having police women operating in peacebuilding settings is thought to 
help protect women’s rights and enhance their role in peacebuilding (Council, 2000, 
Council, 2008b). 
The Sudan Constitution of 2005, Article 32/1 states that women should be granted 
equal rights to men, including the right of work, equal pay for equal job and all other 
job privileges. These rights apply to the Sudanese Police. However, women are still 
under-represented in the police service, totalling only 5% of the workforce 
(Government, 2005, Police, 2008). Article 7/1 of the constitution also supports 
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women rights when it links the rights to citizenship where the rights and duties are 
based on citizenship status. More over article 25/1 of the Sudanese Police act also 
asserts women’s right when it explicitly states police is open to all citizens regardless 
of religion, gender or other differences (Government, 2008).     
Despite this, women were totally excluded from the 2012 and 2013 intakes to the 
National College of Police Sciences and Law, as the authorities believed that the 
administrative posts for women, where they usually work, were adequately staffed, 
according to the women- only focus group who were all senior police officers.  As put 
by one respondent “The law never discriminates against women, it is people who 
discriminate.”  However, they noted that, the exclusion was not announced in any 
recruitment drive or recruiting advertisement as that would be against the law and 
unconstitutional.  Consequently, women applied by filling in the application forms, 
paying the associated fees and even went to the first interview – before being told at 
later stage that female applicants were excluded from the process in that year, 2012.  
So the College of Police Sciences and Law included no female recruits in the 2012 
and 2013 batches. Nevertheless women’s under-representation in any community is 
not entirely due to discrimination against them, according to Pankhurst (2008) it can 
take place due to culture as stated previously. Similarly women’s political 
participation may be hampered by cultural issues family and community pressures 
(Pankhurst, 2008). 
 Police women in Sudan are subject to the same training programme as their male 
colleagues and receive equal pay.  However, conditions of service and deployment 
vary between male and female officers. For example women are not required to work 
in patrols or operational departments, particularly night shifts.  Additionally, women 
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police officers predominantly work in administrative departments and do not get 
posted away from their family residence. In legal terms Sudanese laws do not 
discriminate against women as they are entitled to equal pay and equal job and they 
are allowed to all police jobs, its their preference of not doing certain type of police 
work or working away from family home which became part of police culture this 
regard. This is not the case for male officers who are frequently posted to different 
states. There are a few exceptions such as: women work night shifts in departments 
for example at customs in air and sea ports as well as passport departments and 
police hospital. The level of grievances expressed by the group shows that the 
Sudanese police women are not satisfied with the way the Sudanese Police handles 
their representation within the force. The women focus group cited another example 
of discrimination when they explained how they were excluded from the newly built 
police flats which were all distributed to male police officers in 2013. When they 
asked why they were excluded they were told that they could be married to a non-
police person, they said even though this applies to their male colleagues: they were 
not judged by whom they were married to. 
 In the UK a gender balance policy within the police was introduced in the light of the 
new Equal Opportunity’s Act in the 1970s, and the new public management policy 
and the police reform. According to their study the ability to confront violence and 
danger is what determine police identity, the use of force, coercion and some degree 
of brutality is a necessary feature of police work that women are not prepared to 
cope with for both physical and emotional reasons. Therefore police women were 
traditionally assigned to social service type of work rather than law enforcement one 
(Peter, 2003). As stated by the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1974 “until relatively 
recently policing has been regarded as pre-eminently masculine profession 
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necessarily depending in part for its success upon the size and physical strength of 
its membership. The time has come for these attitudes to alter. Discrimination 
against qualified girls and women is not only insulting and unfair it’s also wasteful of 
skills and abilities of half our population” (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.177). When the 
Equal Opportunity Act was introduced in 1975 the three police associations in the UK 
opposed the inclusion of police women on an  equal basis with their male 
colleagues.They built their arguments on the following points; the unsuitability of 
police work for women; their physical and emotional deficits; and the risk they posed 
to male colleagues (Peter, 2003).6  
Despite strong resistance the act was passed and police women in the UK were 
integrated into the police structure but their promotion chances were adversely 
affected due to special women departments being abolished and women being 
assigned to the type of work that traditionally is not valued by police. They also 
prefer not to work nights or hard shifts and go home early thus limiting their chances 
to get promoted.  It was thought that women were better at working with other 
women and sexual offences and tended to be excluded from crime fighting activities. 
Police work is putting gender demarcation and exclusion against women who cannot 
put in long working hours and pursue aggressive, competitive behaviour. Police work 
has often been difficult to balance with the domestic responsibilities held by women 
police officers (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001). Police work is widely not considered to 
be an attractive job for women since police organisations in countries like the United 
States, Germany and India are all facing difficulties in increasing the numbers of 
female police officers in their police organisations (Call, 2007). It is the right balance 
                                                          
6
 (these were twofold: the distraction caused by possible sexual entanglements and their inability to provide 
back-up to male colleagues); their economic worth, this is explained by the likelihood that they would leave 
after marriage and /or child bearing 
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of equal opportunities for women coupled with job duties and consideration of culture 
that can bring up the police women contribution up and allow them to do their best 
and achieve their full potential. As Adlam et al., put it police women found 
themselves in a work environment predominantly dominated by men. In this 
masculine culture they argue, women can only adapt to the organisational culture 
rather than change it as studies in the women police officers concluded in the UK, 
USA and Canada  (Adlam and Villiers, 2003,p.175). In India where women police 
officers have reached high positions the total percentage of them with the police is 
only 4% of which 89% are in lower ranks, and they are assigned to specific 
departments that do not include operational type of police work.  Police women who 
ask for part-time assignment due to family responsibilities face resistance within the 
police organisations and consequently being deprived of potential training and 
advancement. Research in this area also suggest that organisational police culture 
needs to change to accommodate female police officers and pave the way for them 
to advance (Kratcoski and Kratcoski, 2011,p.20). 
The situation in the Sudanese Police is not different in terms of police organisations 
being discriminative against female police officers. In their focus group interview 
seven women Sudanese police officers unanimously stated that they are facing 
discrimination from their police departments. They confessed that they do not do the 
same job their male colleagues do like working night shifts, working in hardship 
areas, operational departments or get posted away from their family residence. 
However they say this should not make them victims of discriminative organisational 
policy. Despite the fact that they are treated equally in pay and promotion 
nevertheless they do not often get promoted to ranks higher than colonel. One 
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respondent stated that “We are not seeking to be the same as men, but we do not 
want to be discriminated against”(A1/3/9). 
Integration of Former Combatants into the Police 
This practice has a long history in Sudan dating back to 1972 when rebels from 
South Sudan were integrated into the army and the police after the Addis Ababa 
agreement in 1972 (Licklider and Roy, 2014). In recent years as Sudan has 
undergone its major peace process, an additional entry level was added into the 
Sudanese police. This entails recruiting former combatants into the Sudanese Police 
as part of the arrangements for power sharing and the demobilisation, disarmament 
and reintegration programme.  This process involves many challenges relating to the 
maintenance of the established recruitment standards.  Most ex-combatants had 
been bush fighters, with little opportunity for education and predominantly possess 
skills relating to warfare, making it very difficult for many of them to achieve the 
established recruitment criteria. Reintegrating former combatants into the police of 
civilian society is part of the Peacebuilding process as stated by the UN panel 
looking into the United Nations peacekeeping operations (Durch, 2003,p.3). However 
integration of former combatants into the police is becoming more common in recent 
years (Hills, 2011). The implications of former combatants joining the police such as 
their poor qualifications and the antagonistic relations with existing police were 
identified by Leys et.al.,(1995) in the context of Namibia at the end of the 
independence war when the new SWAPO government had to deal with restructuring 
the police by incorporating former combatants into the police (Leys and Saul, 
1995,p.138).   
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Similarly, in the years following 2004, the Sudanese Police witnessed for the first 
time groups of former combatants joining the police as a result of the peace 
agreements between the Sudan Government and the groups fighting in Eastern 
Sudan, the Darfur region of Western Sudan, Blue Nile State and South Kordofan 
State.  A key challenge relating to this process occurred because many of the former 
combatants had been given ranks in the bush, but these ranks did not match the 
qualifications and requirements of the corresponding police rank. To cope with this 
challenge the groups were subjected to a training programme that was specifically 
tailored to their needs.  Unlike other groups, these recruits had been indoctrinated 
into a ‘war mentality’, which required specific training focusing on the principles to 
counter this attitude such as the rule of law, human rights, and some legal 
knowledge. The groups were then assigned to different police departments around 
the country.  The following table provides some information on the numbers of ex-
combatants from each area in recruitment batches 39 and 40 who were trained at 
the police college 2007-2009 and graduated as police officers at different ranks. 
These figures were obtained from the registration office at the police college during 
my visit to the police college in 2013.The process also led to 2687 former 
combatants being integrated into the police as NCOs. Darfur region has the largest 
number 1545, followed by Eastern Sudan 192 and the two regions of South 
Kordofan and Blue Nile 95 as provided by the Department of Administrative Affairs 
when I visited the Department in 2014.  In both visits I had to go through someone 
that I know and they provided the figures on personal trust as they are not publically 
available anywhere. 
Figure 6.1: Number of combatants in Batch 39 and 40 (2006) 
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The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur DDPD stipulated in article 456 that for 
former combatants to join the police or the army they have to undergo a vetting 
process agreed upon between the two parties and to meet the following conditions; 
Sudanese National; age not less than 18 and not exceeding the age or retirement 
(60 years); medical and mental fitness; have combat experience; no previous 
conviction and the voluntary consent of the individual to join the police or the army. 
Furthermore in article 457 the document included specific conditions for former 
combatants to integrate as officers as they have to have a minimum qualification of 
secondary school attendance and / or completion. Nevertheless some field 
commanders can be exempted from this and their long experience would be 
considered in lieu of school certificate. Secondly potential officers cannot be 
considered if they have previously been dismissed due to incompetence. Article 458 
states that all former combatants joining the police or the military should be subject 
to military training; this reflects the fact that military training is an integral part of the 
training for police in Sudan. According to article 460 combatants joining the police or 
59 
47 36 
63 
Total number of Former Combatants in Batch 39 and 40 (2006) 
East Sudan
Darfur region of West Sudan
Blue Nile State
South Kordofan
204 
 
the military for the first time are to be trained according to the training requirements 
of the respective force whether military or police. In article 459 the document 
explains how the numbers of the former combatants who are to become officers 
should be based proportionately on the size of the NCOs and soldiers according to 
the organisational structure of the police and the army. Ranks for the former 
combatants are determined according to age, training, combat experience and 
academic qualifications as stated in article 461 (Movement, 2011).  
I interviewed one of the Sudanese Police’s representatives at the Doha peace 
process who was present during the negotiation and was also tasked with 
overseeing the implementation of the peace deal in particular the integration of the 
former combatants into the police. He expressed frustration at how the armed 
movements are failing to fulfil their obligations with regard to numbers and conditions 
to complete the integration process. At negotiations rebels would claim certain 
numbers and ranks but then they often fail to present these with the matching 
qualifications for integration into the police.  The integration of those former 
combatants into the police, as I see it, will further the dominance of certain ethnicities 
within the police especially in Darfur where the rebellion in Darfur, for instance, is 
made of three tribes of (Fur, Zaghawa and  Masalit) (Natsios, 2012). Including 
recruits from specific tribes can deepen the existing imbalance within the police and 
may lead to those who did not take part in the fight against the government thinking 
that violence is rewarded better that seeking peaceful means. A Nigerian army 
officer informed me that recruiting former rebels into the police or the army was not 
contemplated in Nigeria. The DDR programme there sought to find jobs and support 
the former rebels in civil sectors but not the police or the army. He pointed out the 
unpleasant outcome of recruiting such groups who mainly come from certain 
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ethnicities in the army and the police without rigorous vetting. Such recruitment may 
bring into the force people with serious human rights violations and deepen the 
unbalanced representation of certain ethnicities in the police.  
 At the end of each training programme for each group trainees, they will be 
graduated in special ceremony which the police college used to do for each 
graduating group of officers; this will be outlined in the next section.  
Graduation ceremonies  
As detailed above, four of the entry levels receive training at the National College of 
Police Sciences and Law.  On successful completion of this training, the Sudanese 
Police normally holds a luxurious graduation ceremony for each batch. According to 
three respondents with experience in the training field, interviewed in this study, the 
aim is, as they see it, to raise the morale of the graduates and boost the police 
profile through a wide media campaign that is orchestrated for many days before the 
ceremony.  These prestigious ceremonies are usually attended by the President of 
Sudan, other government officials and diplomats. It often takes place at a large non-
police venue, which is rented by the police because the ceremony attracts large 
crowds and is open to the public, and is attended by the families, relatives and 
friends of the graduates.  Ironically therefore, the event requires a major policing 
operation to maintain order and security.  
The parade represents one of the military features of Sudanese Police. Instructors at 
the police college will aim to present a more impressive parade than military college 
graduation parade. Ample time is allowed for preparation and practice, with as much 
as eight to ten weeks usually dedicated for that purpose.  Additionally, rehearsal 
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parades are often inspected by high ranking officials from Sudanese Police 
Headquarters before they declare it ready for the actual ceremony. This type of 
ceremonial activity is very costly in terms of money but the police leadership believes 
that they are important to improve the image of the police as well building effective 
community police relations. Both points can be seen relevant as the ceremony 
usually attracts huge crowds. The following section details the Sudanese Police 
Training Estate. 
The Sudanese Police training estate and police training process 
The expanding duties of the Sudanese Police and the wide range of policing roles 
and services make training in the Sudanese Police a daunting task. This is 
particularly significant when we link it to peacebuilding and examine whether training 
institutions are qualified to produce police personnel to serve the peacebuilding 
process and to what extent are these processes are equipped to train officers and 
NCOs to be more effective in peacebuilding. According to article 16 paragraph L of 
the Sudanese Police Act 2008, training is one of the national matters that must be 
designed and monitored at the national level (Government, 2008).  Then article 37 
stipulates that training is subject to the national standards set out by the police 
Headquarters and would include the following issues.  First, identifying training 
needs and designing of training plans to be implemented internally and externally; 
second, designing training curriculum and crafting training programmes at the 
national and state levels; third, preparing qualified trainers and modernising training 
facilities; fourth, developing relationships with training institutes at bilateral, regional 
and international levels; and fifth, supervising and inspecting police training 
institutions at state and national level (Government, 2008).  
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Coping with the diverse tasks and duties required from Sudanese Police has 
necessitated the establishment of multi-function training institutions.  Considering the 
hugely diverse policing functions it is almost impossible to establish training 
institutions to match these functions. The figure below explains the police training 
institutions and the relations between them. It is worth noting that these institutions 
provide training in a wide range of subjects and that officers and NCOs are trained in 
separate institutions. 
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 Figure 6.2 Sudan National Police Training Authority 
 
 
As the flowchart demonstrates, Sudanese Police training is the primary responsibility 
of the Training Authority, which is one of five Directorates working under and 
supporting the Director General of Police to achieve strategic policing objectives 
(Police, 2008).  Police training is divided between many institutions. Some of them 
are purely under the management and supervision of the Sudanese Police but 
others are not. For example the Forensic Institute is a faculty of Ribat University, 
which is a Ministry of Interior (police) and Ministry of Education establishment.  Some 
provide initial training and others provide on-the-job and promotion training, which is 
detailed later in this section.   
 The main training body in terms of facilities, budget and level of management is the 
National College of Police Sciences and Law, which was established in 1952 (Salim, 
2005) and is entrusted with initial training for all police officers (officer-class).  In 
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1997, the National College of Police Sciences and Law gained university status and 
was transformed into the Ribat University, retaining its original name as a faculty of 
the University.   The intention of this transformation was to enhance police training, 
development and research by giving it academic status; consequently it now falls 
under the Ministry of Higher Education.  
To this end, the Sudanese Police Personnel Department posts police personnel to 
Ribat University’s Faculty/College of Police Sciences and Law, making them 
responsible for training police officers in accordance with police law and regulations 
and the stringent academic requirements of the University. The officers graduate 
with a Bachelor in Law and Police Science after spending three years of combined 
training that includes physical training, police sciences and law subjects.   Examining 
the semesters of the College of Police Sciences and Law (Law, 2005) it is noticeable  
that human rights is not covered till the forth semester after the trainee officers had 
attended their operational one-month beat course, where they are expected to 
engage with citizens. 
 Two other police training institutions are faculties within Ribat University – one is the 
Police Academy, which is tasked with providing on-the-job training to police officers 
in a variety of subjects.  The main programme delivered by the Police Academy is 
the Fellowship Programme for police Colonels to develop their leadership skills, as 
the programme is a prerequisite for promotion to the next rank of Brigadier.   
However, officers holding a Master’s degree in any subject are exempt from 
attending the programme, even if their Masters are in a field that is not related to 
police work.  The Fellowship Programme originally ran for one year, but the 2012 
batch spent only six month after it was reduced in terms of both time and content, 
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said the head of Fellowship programme at the Academy in an interview. He added 
that, the Fellowship Programme includes a didactic trainer-centred element covering 
police-specific subjects such as crime prevention and detection plus other academic 
and generic subjects such as management, leadership and planning. Furthermore 
he added; Officers in the programme also have the opportunity to share their policing 
experience and discuss diverse policing matters from different Sudanese 
perspectives in a semi-academic environment, which enhances their understanding 
and deepens their policing knowledge.  The programme concludes with an academic 
research project, that each participant must complete in any police or police-related 
subject, the head of Fellowship programme concluded.  These research projects 
despite being of less academic rigor nonetheless enrich the Police Academy’s 
Library and help researchers in police science and other subjects.  
A major criticism of the Fellowship Programme, as pointed out by one respondent 
with working experience in the training institutions, is that it does not sufficiently 
prepare the participants for their next role as senior and strategic managers, as the 
leadership element is generic and tends to be academic in nature. Moreover, it is not 
focused on the actual implementation of improved policing through enhanced 
competence for leaders and managers. Furthermore, the programme does not 
closely examine individual participant’s competence through scenario or work-based 
assessments, to ascertain if they have the correct knowledge, understanding, skills, 
attitudes or behaviour  to be senior managers (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). The 
Academy also runs other shorter courses for officers most of which are promotion 
related course for different ranks. This limitation of such programme features even 
more when the challenges of peacebuilding are considered. 
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 The third police Faculty of Ribat University is the Institute of Forensic Science, 
which has the main objective of providing training to enhance scientific support to the 
legal justice system, by ensuring the presentation of scientific and legally acceptable 
evidence that corroborates other evidence before the court.  To this end, the 
Forensic Institute specialises in training and developing police personnel, particularly 
those working in the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the scientific 
support to Criminal Investigation General Directorate, which covers areas such as 
crime scene investigation, ballistics, DNA, forged documents, chemistry and trace 
evidence.  To a lesser extent, the Forensic Institute’s remit also covers the 
development of other agencies working in law enforcement, including but not limited 
to judges and prosecutors, by building their knowledge and understanding, of some 
relevant forensic science, in particular crime scene management, which includes the 
gathering and securing of evidence, investigating cyber-crimes and relevant 
advances in contemporary science.  The role of the institute continues to expand as 
a result of those advances in science in order to fight emerging crime trends through 
advanced investigative techniques such as the emerging and fast developing fields 
of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and high technology crimes (Forensic Institute, 
2010). 
Selection for Training Courses 
The Sudanese police force is conducting a lot of training in other countries, as 
explained in Chapter Three and later in this chapter, even though data on numbers 
of officers being trained each year is not available. The importance of this type of 
training is exhibited by the fact the Police Act explicitly addressed the issue in 
several provisions.   For example the selection for training police officers abroad is 
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organised by article 37/2 of Sudanese Police Act 2008 which states that a panel is to 
be established to select police personnel for training programmes and scholarship 
for studies in other countries. This panel should include representatives from both 
the central and the state levels and should be set up by the Director General of the 
police. The same Article fell short of elaborating how the panel will make the 
selection or on what basis and what are the criterion to be employed for that purpose 
(Government, 2008).  However, this panel has never been established, leaving the 
selection process fraught with nepotism and cronyism preventing the police from 
nominating the most suitable individuals to ensure maximum benefit for the police 
and the communities they serve.  This difficulty was pointed out by the majority of 
respondents.  For example, as one middle rank police officer puts it “well-connected 
officers are being given more chances than others”.   Two focus groups asserted that 
to date the Training Authority has no reliable records on the number of courses each 
police officer has undergone.  The groups continued, to correct this situation, the 
Authority circulated a letter requiring officers to declare what type and how many 
courses they had attended abroad. However, as widely expected, officers abstained 
from telling the truth, believing that this might deprive them from future training 
opportunities abroad. 
 The overlap between posting and training courses is also obvious as many officers 
seek to join training programmes if they are posted to a hardship area whereas the 
same officers would avoid being on that same course if they are stationed in the 
capital, Khartoum.   This is of particular concern when the course is abroad as many 
would want to have the opportunity to travel and gain per diems, which is covered in 
the next section. 
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On-the-job training 
‘I had never been to any training course during my seventeen year service, 
until last year when I was sent to a course about firing big guns, it is 
completely irrelevant to the administrative job that I am doing’.(A1/3/10). 
Police organisations need to regularly update their staff on new laws, growing 
community expectations, contemporary policing methods and new technology and to 
have them ready for new roles, new policing challenges, deployments or promotion, 
a process which is known as on-the-job training in Sudan, or in-service training in the 
United States, whilst other countries, such as the UK,  call it Refresher Training 
and/or Promotion Training (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b, Peak and Glensor, 
2002).  For police to maintain good performance they are required to incorporate 
new policing approaches in their training programmes and subject their staff to 
regular training to build their knowledge and sharpen their skills to face new 
challenges.  It is recognised that senior or older police officers may be less 
enthusiastic to attend training than newly recruited ones and they may need to be 
motivated to go on training courses (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).  Police officers 
also need to be prepared for new roles to be executive or managerial ones.  
 The programme and courses for on-the-job training are of particular significance in 
that they need to be designed in sufficient detail to cover all policing aspects and all 
police personnel who need to be trained.  The date and time of the course, the cost, 
and the necessary arrangements of replacing candidates to go for the training are all 
matters of significant importance that they need to be considered through the lens of 
scientific assessment.  The latter is especially important so that the operational or 
administrative job of the trainee is not being affected by selecting key individuals with 
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rare skills to attend training programmes, without ensuring there is a replacement.  
How much money is dedicated to training, which aspect of training should come first, 
at what time, for how long, which ranks the training should focus on are  also issues 
to be considered when planning for such training (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a). 
Training is particularly challenging when it is connected with introducing new ideas 
and concepts, it could lead to organisational resistance if the concepts are going to 
lead to change. Such training that includes new concepts is a necessity for both new 
recruits and those already in police service (Peak and Glensor, 2002, Develeopment, 
2007). 
Just like the basic training described earlier most of the resources are spent on 
officers’ training internally and abroad rather than NCOs. All research respondents 
made similar comments to the quote at the beginning of this section and expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the management and the contents of training programmes. 
They explained that the contents of most training programmes are outdated or 
irrelevant and the selection for these courses is flawed. They presented examples 
when people are sent to courses that are irrelevant to their job or attending the same 
course several times.    
Quasi-military training in the Sudanese Police 
The authoritarian military command style of policing is contrary to democratic 
principles of participation. The authoritarian style is known to produce low morale 
and the rigid rank structure fails to provide sufficient job satisfaction for police officers 
(Peter, 2003: p 160). 
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As stated in Chapters two and three, many police organisations around the world 
have a military component and therefore they are classified as paramilitary police 
(Newburn, 2008, Campbell and Campbell, 2010, Lutterbeck, 2004b).  The Sudanese 
Police, as in many African countries, (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011, Francis, 2012b, 
Marenin, 2009) have the same military characteristics as exemplified by the military 
training that includes military command, parades, firearms, and tactics. This primarily 
goes back to the historical origins of police forces in British colonial Africa which 
were established to  enforce forced labour, taxation policies and so forth (Marenin, 
1982,p.387). Marenin pointed out the  blurred boundaries between the police and the 
military and the interchangeable roles that they undertake in Africa, therefore it is not 
surprising to see the police include a substantial element of military training in their 
curriculum (Marenin, 1982). 
However, in countries that experience serious violent crimes and/or civil conflict such 
as Sudan, it may be relevant to train only selected police personnel in the use of 
firearms and military tactics, since they work in high crime areas or conflict zones, 
where they are exposed to attacks by heavily armed robbers, drug-smugglers or 
rebels (see chapter three) (Berridge, 2011). Conversely, it is however not clear to 
most of the research respondents why all Sudanese Police have to undergo that 
type of military training, including even those who will be assigned to work in 
departments that are not exposed to such dangers.   
According to Adlam and Villiers 2009 military-like police organisations tend to use 
training as a way to sustain the military style so that the military spirit is passed onto 
recruits during the training programmes, through what they called the militaristic 
high-stress approach (Peter, 2003).  Proponents of this militaristic high-stress 
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approach argue that it has three main advantages. First, it helps the recruits to 
weather high stress in work; second it builds their spirit of working as a team and 
third; it prepares them to obey commands from their superiors. In addition to the 
points made at the beginning of this section another  criticisms of these “advantages” 
is that this type of training will produce officers who are less flexible and more 
aggressive, moreover they may not be able to make decisions in difficult situations 
especially where force might be used (Peter, 2003). In his criticism of this type of 
policing Newburn (2008) explains that it does not only undermine the public trust it 
as well shake the legitimacy of the state (Newburn, 2008).  Nonetheless in recent 
years many police organisations across the world, driven by the growing rate of 
crime and violence, are moving towards adopting paramilitary policing style. This 
includes the UK police with long established tradition of civil police who does not 
carry firearms (Mulcahy, 2008,p.666).   
Training abroad: disorientation, confusion and poor impact 
The Sudanese Police have training protocols with a host of countries around the 
world including but not limited to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, India, Russia and 
United Arab Emirates. They also constantly send their officers for training 
programmes in other countries such as South Africa, Malaysia, the UK, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia and Pakistan. In most cases Sudanese police officers will be sent to these 
countries to attend  training programmes, short courses or a study visit where they 
will be able to see how policing is being done in other countries.  The length of these 
programmes extend from one or two weeks to lengthy programmes lasting several 
weeks and cover a wide variety of subjects from the host country’s perspective.  
Additionally, officers also attend short workshops, meetings or conferences in other 
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countries. In a few cases trainers from these countries were flown into Sudan to train 
Sudanese Police personnel in the country.  
These interactions with diverse police organisations around the world provide 
chances for the Sudanese Police to experience and learn from different police 
practices. It is widely accepted that policing globally has common features such as 
the protection of life and property, crime prevention and detection, and maintaining 
the peace (Newburn, 2008). Conversely, it is also true that each country constitutes 
a special policing case that needs to be well understood in order to design and 
deliver specific policing requirements for that particular context. The selection of 
these country partners comes on political bases; the Sudanese police do not select 
which country to work with. Countries with political ties or interest in Sudan would 
offer support in various aspects that might include the police. Most of these countries 
are inexperienced in peacebuilding, none of them have successful track record in 
peacebuilding which make their contribution irrelevant to the acute need of the 
Sudanese police in acquiring peacebuilding related policing knowledge. The 
exception of that is the DFID/UK programme which was implemented in two phases 
with the first starting soon after the signing of the CPA providing training for police in 
north and south of the country. The second phase provided training to police in 
Sudan with special focus on Blue Nile and South Darfur state.  In the absence of 
proper evaluation of training programmes it is difficult to assess how much Sudanese 
Police are learning from these programmes. For this it would be interesting to 
evaluate whether it is useful for Sudanese Police to be exposed to that diverse range 
of policing or does that lead to different views about which policing method should be 
adopted, because of the range of different policing styles covered.  At present, 
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deepening the understanding of trainees of the policing issues through such 
programmes is not evident.  
It is also not clear whether these courses are included in the Sudanese Police 
Training Plan and represent a genuine training need for the police.  It is known that it 
is a very expensive type of training as the police often pay travel expenses, 
accommodation and living expenses for officers travelling for training abroad.  Even 
in the cases where the host country provides accommodation and food, officers will 
take advantage and get paid per diem ‘expenses’ that are not pertinent to the actual 
course cost.  I can say from my experience and observations, that it is the norm in 
the Sudanese Police that once an officer is nominated for these courses he or she 
views it as a chance to earn some money, believing it to be their right to improve 
their conditions caused by poor salaries.   
 These external programmes according to all NCO respondents rarely include NCOs, 
and when they do they usually involve courses on protecting VIPs, rescuing 
hostages or similar subjects in Turkey or Egypt. This reflects how the small officer-
class is dominating the training opportunities at the expense of the vast majority of 
the NCOs-class who do most of the police work in the real world.  
 Furthermore similar police organisations working in similar environments, in similar 
cultural contexts, with similar resources may learn from each other.  In the example 
of Sudan, the training conducted abroad is taking place in such diverse 
environments that most cases are markedly different from the Sudanese one, 
making it difficult to understand the relevance and measure the impact of such 
training in the Sudanese context. 
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70% of respondents asserted that in many cases, the selection for these external 
courses is conducted arbitrarily, as there are no set criteria on who should go on 
each course.  As a result some people go for the same course twice or more and 
some go on a course that is irrelevant to their role.  Most of them said that since it is 
considered a chance for travelling and earning extra income it would be attractive to 
every single police officer and should be equally distributed between officers.  The 
Training Authority is currently trying to manage the process by establishing a 
computerised record that contains the details of the courses each officer has 
undergone and measures that against the specialisation of the officer, in order to 
avoid sending officers to course that do not correspond with their experience or 
having people going twice or more for the same course. However this process might 
be hampered by those who are interested in maintaining the current system. There is 
growing discussion within the Sudanese Police about the selection criteria for 
candidates for courses abroad as there is a widespread belief among police officers 
and NCOs that the awarding of training opportunities abroad system is flawed, as 
was reiterated by all research respondents. 7 
Sudanese Police Trainers 
Prior to designing any training programme there needs to be a training need 
assessment to determine the training need for the personnel and the police 
organisation (Peak and Glensor, 2002). Following this process a qualified staff of 
trainers will need to be deployed to deliver the training. 
                                                          
7
 Sudanese Police also have a long tradition of hosting recruits from other countries including Ethiopia, United 
Arab Emirate, Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia and Palestine to be trained in the police college. 
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The standards of those who work at the police training estate in Sudan, both as 
officers and NCOs, are not measured as there are no qualification or assessment 
processes to determine the standards of those working at the College of Police 
Sciences and Law or other police training institutions.  Any police officer or NCO can 
be posted, often randomly, to work at a training institution or assigned a training role.  
Until comparatively recently officers transferred to a training roles were regarded as 
being punished, as training is considered to be less attractive and undervalued by 
police officers as emphasised by the majority of respondents.  In recent years Police 
Headquarters is placing more attention on the training environment. For example 
2012 was denoted as ‘the year of training’ and great efforts were made to enhance 
the welfare of those working in the training estate, making training more attractive for 
some officers (Authority, 2013).   Additionally, in a move to adopt international 
training standards, the Training Authority became an Accredited Centre of the UK-
based international Institute of Leadership and Management (ILM) resulting in 32 
officers undergoing an ILM ‘Training of Trainers programme’ during 2012 and 2013, 
requiring them to meet internationally recognised standards, although the majority 
are still not in a training posts (Programme(SAJP), 2012). Respondents from NCO 
focus group pointed out that trainers from junior ranks cannot train senior ranks 
however competent they are, this rank barrier in their opinion is depriving the police 
from some of the best trainers from mostly junior ranks. 
Comparative examples from police recruitment in other countries 
The quality and effectiveness of the police service could be said to start with 
recruitment (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.237)  
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Internationally, police work has always been important for maintaining order and 
keeping peace within communities (Newburn, 2008). However in recent years 
emerging issues such as globalisation, the easy travel of people and advancing 
technology has made the policing role even more essential, requiring the police to be 
more sophisticated, dependent even more on the use of technology and embracing 
the relatively new tendency of working closely with communities to gain support and 
trust.  This necessitates police institutions recruiting the best possible qualified 
individuals to undertake law enforcement tasks with higher standards (Wilson, 2012, 
Escobar, 2008, Gray, 2011, Newburn and Neyroud, 2008). However, recent 
research findings show that police organisations are facing increasing challenges 
because of the expanding role of police and the decreasing pool of police recruits; 
additionally growing numbers of police officers are leaving the police through early 
retirement to find new careers (Wilson, 2012). This last point has been the case in 
Sudan where all respondents asserted that more police personnel were leaving the 
service because of the poor pay. One NCO respondent said that “my contract is 
going to end soon and I am not going to renew it for whatever reason”A1/3/11). 
As to the qualities required of recruits, police organisations do not always keep up 
with the most relevant qualities in terms of education, cognitive intelligence, gender 
and age, which they can build further with effective training.  For example, for many 
years physical strength coupled with a tall physique was viewed as essential, 
whereas it is less valued today as the contemporary policing focus is on proactive, 
rather than reactive, measures (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a).  It is also essential 
to note the difficulties associated with measuring the laid down criterion and 
assessing whether they are related to the contemporary police role (Roberg and 
Kuykendall, 1997b). For example, in 1971 the United States  Supreme Court decided 
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on the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, that the requirement of certain 
certificates and tests disqualified a high percentage of black applicants and were 
irrelevant to job performance and ruled that this represented discrimination against 
the complainant (Griggs) personally, and blacks generally.  The impact of this court 
decision in the US is that police have to prove all the tests conducted on candidates 
are job related.  This was reinforced in the case of Davis v. City of Dallas (1985) 
because the police of Dallas were able to prove that the forty-five college hour’s 
requirement was necessary because of the complexity of police work.  It was 
recognised that some minority groups may not be able to fulfil the requirement, but 
the supreme court upheld the Dallas police view (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997a).  It 
is therefore necessary that selection criteria and methodologies should be built upon 
job analysis. An interview with former United Kingdom deputy chief constable police 
officer reinforces the US court findings.  The interviewee spoke of two inappropriate 
tests that were abolished in view of the need for them to be job-related and non-
discriminatory.  The first prevented internal female applicants from becoming police 
motorcyclists on the grounds that they would not be able to lift a fully-laden police 
motorbike if it were to fall over.  When this criterion was contested through an 
internal grievance procedure two findings caused it to be abolished: the first finding 
was that the incidences of having to pick up a fully-laden motorcycle were very rare 
(only one reported incident in three years) making it unrelated to the job; the second 
finding was that the majority of in-post male motorcyclists were unable to pick up a 
fully-laden motorcycle without assistance, making the criterion a discriminatory one 
as it only applied to women. 
The second example related to the criterion that men should be 5’ 7” tall and women 
5’ 4” to join provincial police services (and taller in Metropolitan forces) despite their 
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policing roles being identical, which clearly discriminates against men if women can 
be an effective and efficient police officer at 5’ 4” then a man of the same height 
should be able to.  Moreover, it also discriminated against many ethnic minority 
groups, such as British-Chinese, as the majority of males and females did not reach 
the required heights.  Consequently, the height criterion was completely abolished in 
the UK on the grounds that it was discriminatory, for that the UK police is adopting 
recruitment standards that require no minimum or maximum height for applicants 
(Newburn and Neyroud, 2008,p.237).   
Therefore, it is agreed by many international police institutions that using job-related 
and non-discriminatory criteria is the most efficient and effective way of recruiting the 
best possible candidates or, in the words of Beckley (cited by Neyroud and Beckley, 
2001), recruiting “supermen and women’ to be members of their forces”.  According 
to them, the characteristics required to join the police are: 
Able to monitor personal performance; Investigative skills; Job and general 
knowledge; Decision making, problem solving and planning skills; Practical 
effectiveness; Clear and succinct written reports (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001).  
This debate reflects international move towards policing that does not rely heavily on 
physique.  
The issues of age is usually the first consideration for selecting new police recruits, 
including the Sudanese Police, which requires that applicants must fall in the age 
category of 18-21 years old, believing that this is the ideal age for recruitment into 
the police.  Many think that at this age people are too young to be assigned to a 
policing mission but Roberg and Kuykendall, (1997b) query if age really matters, 
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regardless of being discriminating against certain segments and deprive the police 
from potential highly qualified personnel. The UK police have a minimum age of 18 
but there is no maximum age (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008, Roberg and Kuykendall, 
1997a). Different countries adopt different minimum ages: the Kosovo police, for 
instance, have their minimum age at 21 years old for new recruits (Gorani, 
2005,p.21). These examples from the US and the UK reflects an international move 
towards change in policing which is more proactive and does not rely heavily on old 
norms relating to physique. This move could be seen as useful for police engaged in 
peacebuilding as it paves the way to attract recruits from diverse backgrounds and 
experiences. 
Many policing institutions strive for representative recruitment to ensure that the 
diverse needs of their communities are met. This is mainly because the relation 
between the police and some ethnic minority groups is widely affected by the level of 
representation in the police  (Verma et al., 2013, Sabaratnam and Meera, 2013). For 
example the UK police drive to recruit more ethnic minorities into the police started 
before the Scarman report following the riots of the 1980s. Even so the percentage is 
still below the ambition however the number of  ethnic minority police officers have 
risen considerably in recent years (Mulcahy, 2008).  As a result of the conflict 
settlement in Northern Ireland in 1999, the Northern Ireland Police Service adopted a 
clear policy to achieve balance between the underrepresented Catholics 
(Republicans) and the Protestants (Unionist) who were dominating the police. For 
that a fifty percent recruitment plan for both conflicting groups was set and the 
necessary legal documents to maintain this policy were enacted (Hall and 
McClintock, 1999, Ireland, 2013).  
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 Several other countries with multi ethnic and or religious population are adopting a 
policy that ensures equal representation of all groups. In Nigeria for example all 
security agencies are required to reflect the federal composition of the country. 
Despite the fact that the policy was started many years ago a special multi 
stakeholder commission was established and entrusted to oversee the process. 
Necessary guidelines were  provided by the commission to ensure that recruitment is 
being conducted equally among all states and the different cultures (Group, 2013).  
Article 5 of the Kenyan Police Service Act states that there should not be more than 
two third of the appointments of the same gender and that the police should reflect 
the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya (Government, 2011). In 
summary, recruitment must encourage diversity of police recruits to match the 
community being policed, which is important for political and performance reasons 
(Roberg and Kuykendall, 1997b).  
In large multi ethnic countries, such as Sudan, it is relevant to have similar provisions 
to ensure equal representation of all ethnicities. Articles 7 and 12 of the constitution 
and article 25/1 of the police act  stipulate the right of all Sudanese in taking jobs 
within the police, nonetheless the provisions seems to be generic. A binding 
measure like that of the Nigerian or the Kenyan cases does not exist within the legal 
documents available. Article 25/3 of the police act clearly states that states are to 
nominate their candidates for national training at the police college . During the 
interviews most participants said this provision has not been adhered to and the 
police headquarters continued to recruit for the police college without any 
consideration to this article.  
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Training Budget 
The Training Authority which is the Sudanese Police’s department responsible for 
training is divided into the following two Directorates: the Officer’s Training 
Directorate and the NCOs’ Training Directorate.  According to the Training 
Authority’s 2013 Training Plan, the national training budget for the Officer’s Training 
Directorate was estimated at 9,291,300 Sudanese pounds (SDG) of which,  
2,730,950 is dedicated to train 8,204 officers within Sudan and 6,560,350 SDG to 
train 1,074 officers in other countries.  The total national budget of the NCOs 
Training Directorate was 17,051,192 SDG, of which 2,140,000 SDG has been 
allocated to the external training of 340 NCOs.  Internally, the NCOs Training 
Directorate is aiming to train 94,230 NCOs through some 598 training programmes 
(Programme(SAJP), 2012). 8 
From the figures shown, it is clear that money spent on officer training, whether 
internally or externally, is proportionately far more than that spent on training 
programmes of the NCOs. It is also noticeable that training abroad is more 
expensive than training conducted within the country, in that the figures show the 
numbers of officers trained abroad are less than that trained in the country but the 
cost for the latter is less than that of the former. It seems as well that Sudanese 
Police tend to regard training their personnel abroad as more valuable than training 
them in the country.    The acute variation in officers as opposed to NCOs training 
raises the question: ‘to what extent does the job of officers differ from that of the 
NCOs?’ In reality, as stated earlier, NCOs undertake the great majority of the work 
                                                          
8
 With the value of the Sudanese Pound constantly deteriorating its hard to make sense of these figures when 
compared to Dollar nevertheless this does not minimise their significance  when put in Sudanese context (the 
official rate is $1:6SDG). 
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due to their numbers and availability.  This is more understandable when we know 
that officers are usually assigned to managerial roles while NCOs have front line 
duties where they interact more with community members. There are no data 
available from previous years as I was not able to find access to data that can allow 
analysis to understand whether the training budget was growing or decreasing 
during the last decade. 
Discussion of Comparative Recruitment and training with Sudan  
Selection and appraisal is in the heart of the human resources management globally, 
which nowadays are influenced by many factors such as technology, personality and 
psychometric tests, bio data, and performance appraisal reviews. These  factors are 
crucial in securing objectivity, efficiency and scientific standards (Storey, 1989,p.92). 
Article 25 of the Sudanese Police Act of 2008, paragraph (1) on recruitment for the 
College of Police Sciences and Law, stipulates that all Sudanese have the right to 
join the college regardless of their gender, region, religion or any other description 
and that selection should be conducted on the basis of fair competition (Government, 
2008). This stems from article 7a and 12 of the Sudan interim constitution on the 
equal rights of all citizens as well as article 148 of the constitution which states that 
the police is a national force and that all citizens are entitled to join the police to 
reflect the diversity of the country (Government, 2005).   
In the same Article, paragraph (2) sections C, D and E do not clearly specify the 
required academic qualifications and the physical test or agility needed.  Paragraph 
(3) also specifies that states select their nominees in accordance with the national 
standards set by the police Headquarters at the national level.  This right for the 
states to nominate their candidates was fully exercised by the ten South Sudan 
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states during the six year transitional period that followed the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.  When South Sudan seceded to become 
an independent country in 2011, the remaining eighteen states of northern Sudan did 
not exercise that right as the recruitment process is still being conducted by the 
Police Headquarters in the capital city of Khartoum. Interestingly the Khartoum state 
enacted its own police law in 2009 which is almost replica of Sudanese Police law of 
2008, the Khartoum state police law did not mention the appointment or selection of 
officers even so it did mention the appointment of the NCOs in article 22 of the act to 
be the conducted by the Director of the state police (2009).   
The training of the police is one of the national powers bestowed on the training 
directorate to oversee and set the standards for training at  the national level 
according to article 16 paragraphs 1/A and B.  These national standards are not 
included in the Police Act, however, and it is not clear who is entitled to decide on 
them, which make this area highly ambiguous.  Moreover, it is not clearly stated if 
these standards are to be updated and revised regularly to suit the changing needs 
of the Sudanese communities and there is no guidance on ensuring they are job-
related and non-discriminatory.  A key problem associated with this is that some 
deprived groups from the most disadvantaged states with poor education systems 
might not be able to obtain the same qualification that it is easy to obtain in the 
capital.  Moreover, to ensure the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes and 
behaviour that candidates are required to demonstrate are job related, a critical 
analysis of their future role and job is required.  
It was in comparatively recent times that police organisations worldwide sought to 
attain professional policing. In the UK, for example, it was not until 1960 that the first 
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police academy was opened and around the same time in the USA, also in Latin 
America the Colombian police college was first opened in 1950 (Leys and Saul, 
1995, Escobar, 2008) 
The training system in the UK has witnessed great change since 1998 when it set 
out to link the content to aims and objectives with measurable outcomes and more 
focus on the knowledge, understanding, skills, attitudes and behaviour (Neyroud and 
Beckley, 2001).   Nonetheless these objectives did not include ethics or professional 
behaviour and the tutor constables do not get any training on how to manage 
vocational assessment for new recruits undergoing on the job training (Neyroud and 
Beckley, 2001).  
The 2011 report of Peter Neyroud on the leadership and the training of the UK police 
recommended that a professional body be created to oversee a set of international 
standards including the establishment of qualifications and new approaches to 
training for police officers, requiring police forces to engage with higher education 
institutions to help deliver the proposed qualification (Yesufu, 2013,p.75-76). With 
these developments in mind, it is not surprising to see police in the UK moving 
towards linking police work to higher education. This was further stimulated  by the 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) thematic report of 2002 on police training. 
The report suggested that if the police are to catch up with other professions, 
especially within the field of criminal justice, they have to raise their qualification 
standards. The move resulted in modules being taught at university level to prepare 
graduates to join the police. The police will thus be provided with qualified recruits 
and also boost the chances for those with policing degrees to join the police 
(Waddington and Wright, 2010). 
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Training modules should thus develop regularly to include the emerging issues and 
concepts related to police and policing. An example of this is the Northern Ireland 
situation in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, when human rights were 
incorporated into all training modules in accordance with the European Human 
Rights Convention of 1998 (Hall and McClintock, 1999, Independent Commission on 
Policing for Northern and Patten, 1999). Unlike those in the UK system described 
above, the Sudanese Police training modules are not linked to any aims or 
objectives, therefore it is not clear as to the purpose of the training or what impact 
they intend to have on the trainees or, importantly, what impact they may have on 
the communities the recruits will ultimately be serving when deployed at the end of 
their training period.. 
As stated earlier in Chapter Three the Sudanese Police Forces’ Act of 2008, Article 
11 introduced three contemporary concepts for the first time, which obviously has 
important training implications these are: Respect for the rule of the law; Vindication 
and respect of human rights in accordance with the constitution; Adhering to the 
acceptable national and international standards of policing to include professional, 
technical and conduct issues. Despite this the Sudanese Police did not develop a 
training strategy to capture these new concepts or produce competent trainers who 
can fully understand these modern concepts and are able to pass the message on to 
their trainees. Despite this a third of the respondents stated that in recent years the 
training quality have been improved in terms of content and training environment.   
Matters of age limit and time spent in training in the Sudanese recruitment and 
training system are not justified. For example Sudanese police   recruit officers from 
university graduates who are over 22 years old and train them at the police college 
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for one year proves that age does not matter since these recruits are from different 
age groups and there is no available evidence to suggest that they are less 
competent than the younger groups who are recruited from the age group between 
18-21 years (college, 2012). The existing multi-level system of recruitment allow 
recruits from different age groups to join the police  For example, those recruits from 
university are six to seven years older than those who are recruited into the police 
before they join universities. Due to the high cost of training its imperative that it 
should be based on clear examinations of the time spent on training and the 
programmes covered and whether they are job related. In particular the training 
period for officers who spend three years in the college, those who spend one year 
coming from NCOs background and those who are not actually going to do real 
police work, like doctors, engineers and so forth. For these groups it seems like 
waste of time and resources to keep them in training for that long time 
To achieve that goal their training modules need to be analysed to ensure that they 
are both police related and also relevant to the specific job training. Spending six 
months in a confined training centre must  be justified otherwise it might be true that 
officers are trained in some policing aspects that they do not use throughout their 
career which would constitute a waste of resources, and time. Many weeks are 
dedicated to train police recruits in parade-related exercises, for instance, but their 
main / sole purpose is in preparation for the graduation ceremony. 
Post-war Reform and Police Recruitment 
At the end of civil wars police recruitment and training is often discussed within the 
context of ‘restructuring or reforming the police’ and or ‘power sharing arrangements’ 
because the police were invariably affected by, or were part of, the conflict.  This is 
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evident in the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, among other post-conflict contexts 
including Northern Ireland (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Willoughby, 2002, Smith and 
Charles, 2013, Hall and McClintock, 1999).  One of the main aims is to achieve a fair 
balance of posts within the police institution through awarding equal opportunities to 
the conflicting groups.  In Rwanda, the police visited every prefecture (county) in the 
country over several months and held mass community meetings and/or small focus 
groups to ascertain from each region how they wanted their new police service to be 
recruited, formed and act, particularly in relation to human rights, involving over 
7,000 community members taking part in meetings or focus groups. This resulting in 
new police recruits taking part in peace-camps to encourage them to take an active 
role in Peacebuilding and encourage a spirit of Rwandese nationality, rather than 
being divided into Hutu and Tutsi groups (Willoughby, 2002). It is through the 
broader post-conflict police reform  programmes that the rules govering the selection 
and recruitment of police candidates will be altered to allow formerly under 
represtative minorities to find their way into the police. That reform will in most cases 
be met by resistance from institutions and indivduals (Charles, 2002, Francis, 
2012b).  The reform of the police in post-war conflict countries is often led by 
international actors, with Northern  Ireland being an exception .  
In Sudan the international actors also have a lighter footprint, to use a term coined 
by Lakhdar Brahimi (Durch, 2003, Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Here a 
distinction should be made between reforming the police at the end of the conflict to 
make it more representative of the whole poulation and allowing former combatants 
to join the police as part of the peace deal, whether in the form of providing jobs, 
achieving balance between the different groups  as part of the power sharing or 
removing of notorously abusive police officers from their powerful positions. The 
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aftermath of the conflict will also provide opprtunities to restructure the police to be 
more transparent and accountable (Call, 2007, Network, 2009, Adlam and Villiers, 
2003).  
Conclusion   
The Sudanese Police training system which seeks to prepare police officers in every 
policing aspect is expensive, confusing, unfocused and arguably leads to police 
personnel being unable to master any of their policing duties well.  The multi-entry 
system of the Sudanese Police leads to training being of a generic nature, designed 
to suit the markedly diverse groups of trainees. Furthermore,  the wide remit of the 
Sudanese Police that expands well beyond the traditionally known police functions 
(maintaining the peace, crime fighting and crime detecting) to include a host of 
services, that are normally provided by other agencies in many countries, is making 
recruiting selecting and training of suitable personnel a much more difficult task. This 
diversity in the remit of the Sudanese Police is also contributing to the daunting task 
of delivering adequate training to embrace all these extremely diverse tasks of the 
police. This acute diversity of tasks turns the police into multi-service delivery 
organisation, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the police to capture the 
required knowledge and skills to effectively fulfil their mandate.   
The training systems appear to have included nothing about peace education in the 
curriculum of either the police officers or the NCOs during the initial training period. 
Nor it is incorporated into on the job training for both groups. The time spent in the 
theoretical teaching of law, criminology and police sciences compared with that of 
the practical training suggests that far more time is spent on the former which means 
that police officers have not been prepared to put their theoretical knowledge into 
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practice. Yet, research findings suggest that police students are more interested in 
the on the job training than theoretical approaches (Lauritz et al., 2013).  
The multi-national partnership and training conducted by many countries seems 
inconsistent as the policing requirements vary from one country to another and there 
is no evidence to show that that type of training delivered actually leads to the 
expected outcome. It could potentially have been beneficial for the Sudanese Police 
to be exposed to different policing experience if offered free of cost training or to get 
international experience at  reasonable cost.  This could have been achieved   by 
conducting some of the training in the Sudan and by employing the same 
international experts to run in-country training. By having them in Sudan the trainers 
may be in a position where they will be able to understand the local context and 
therefore tailor programmes that suit the Sudanese Police instead of subjecting them 
to programmes that were originally designed for different police officers, with 
different experience, and are operating in totally different policing environment.  
Most importantly the Sudanese police recruitment and selection system, despite 
clear provisions in the Police Act, does not guarantee fair representation of the 
Sudanese community in the police, a matter that is vital for police in peacebuilding 
settings as shown in literature. The matter of equal representation in the police as 
stated in Chapter Two is part of the inequality which feeds into the root causes of 
conflicts. 
Sudanese Police recruitment, selection and training appear to be completely 
unconnected to the peace process and do not seem to address the core peace 
issues to be dealt with by police officers. Matters of equal representation, community 
policing, accountability and human rights are all essential for police operating in post-
235 
 
conflict settings. Among these, community policing is constantly proposed by peace 
builders as the policing approach that is suitable for policing post-war and conflict 
contexts as will be explained in the next chapter.   
 
 
Chapter Seven: 
Community Policing in Sudan  
Introduction 
The Relationship between Community Policing and Peacebuilding 
Discourse stresses the common-sense mantra that proactive and credible 
policing ensures peaceful development and that without durable security 
provided and maintained by the police there will be no development and this 
may potentially lead to or create the conditions for violence and armed conflict 
or relapse into further war (Francis, 2012a,p.8). 
 
This chapter examines community policing as an approach, which has been 
relatively recently introduced across many countries, and considers its relation to 
peacebuilding. It will first define the community policing approach as a philosophy 
and a set of activities that aim to engage communities in the policing process.  It then 
explores the international concept of community policing, how it was developed, and 
examine, particularly, international practices and how international peace builders 
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have championed it as suitable policing style for war-divided societies.  It then seeks 
to analyse community policing in Sudan, both history and practice, then examine to 
what extent is the deployment of community policing in the Sudanese context is 
suitable for or incompatible with peacebuilding. For that, it will explain how the 
Sudanese Police sought to apply community policing as an ethos and implement it 
through ‘Community Committees’ and ‘Community Policing Academies’ among other 
smaller initiatives. Further, it will discuss the diverse perspectives and practices of 
community policing as well as the advantages and disadvantage of this approach to 
policing. Finally, it explores the relevance of community policing to peacebuilding in 
the Sudan and the wider contexts of post-war and divided societies in transition.  
Policing and Community Policing in Perspective  
 Common characteristics can be identified among colonial police in Africa. As stated 
earlier in Chapter Two, they are often militaristic, centralised, armed, and barracked 
focusing more on public order as well as acting on behalf of the colonial authority as 
opposed to focusing on the indigenous community. Moreover, to ensure that police 
did not establish close relations with communities, it was common practise that 
police personnel were not recruited from the local communities, rather, they were 
drawn from the army and had their senior officers rotated between the different 
colonies 9 . Towards independence as the nationalist movements grew, colonial 
regimes built more oppressive police; this was preserved by the national regimes at 
the departure of the colonial administration (Newburn, 2008,pp.23-25). Hills (2001) 
argued that policing in Africa was predominantly established by the former colonial 
powers to serve the interests of their ‘masters’.  This role of police organisations 
changed little after independence; they simply shifted from serving the colonisers to 
                                                          
9
 Colonial Police Service was based in London with its Inspector General of Colonial Police appointed in 1948 to 
ensure direct central control (Newbern, Handbook of Policing, 2008) 
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serving the national governments that came to office after the departure of the 
European powers. Therefore, the dominant style of authoritarian policing of this 
period of history will need time and support to make the necessary mental shift to 
working with the community (Hills, 2000, Berridge, 2011, Francis, 2012b). Francis 
(2012) asserts that,  “Societies across Africa have an historic and justified mistrust of 
the police for, In the majority of these societies, the police have been separate from 
the society” (Francis, 2012b,p.8). Therefore, he argues for weakening the 
relationship between the two parties (Francis, 2012b). In Sudan, the situation is not 
much different as reflected by the following common saying embedded into the 
contemporary street level discourse, “If your finger is a police officer, chop it off”. 
This reflects the perception of police as extremely untrustworthy and not in any way 
there to serve their communities, rather, they serve other bodies that created them 
which could be the ruling regime.  Writing in 1980, Carter and Marenin asserted that 
the Nigerian Police often found themselves in conflict with the Nigerian society 
because of what they did to implement the colonial policy which entailed routing 
nationalists, exacting taxes and labour, and suppressing dissent (Marenin, 
1980,p.244).  
 
Hills (2007)  examined these issues across Africa and asserted that she did not 
expect much change in the antagonistic relationship between the police and the 
communities in Africa because the police are actually governed by the heads of the 
state to serve the leaders’ interests without the public having any say to hold the 
police accountable. The Ugandan Police in the 1960s and 1970s, during the eras of 
president Obote and Amin respectively, have had more focus on political disloyalty 
than on crime fighting; they committed wide spread atrocities against the Ugandan 
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citizens during that period (Musiime, 2012,pp.98-99). The Ugandan Police, as other 
police forces in Africa, found themselves at odds with their communities after being 
used by the Obote regime 1985-1989 to fight the rebels in Luwero during the 
guerrilla war that resulted in NRM taking power (Francis, 2012b,p.105, Marenin, 
1980). As a result, when the Ugandan Police introduced community policing later, it 
was met with suspicions; the public was sceptical about the real objectives of the 
programme. The Ugandan constitution of 1995 in article 212(d) encouraged the 
police to cooperate with the community, nevertheless, like the case of Sudan, the 
Ugandan Police Act does not include provisions on community policing (Francis, 
2012b, Government, 2008). In comparison, the community policing as policing 
approach is enshrined into the Kenyan Police act as institutional policy (Government, 
2011).  It is true that police cannot develop democratic policing practices, such as 
community policing and accountability, unless the overall political system is 
operating within a democratic environment. Democracy is, with its principles of rule 
of law and good governance, a prerequisite for democratically accountable police; 
likewise, a corrupt police organisation has the potential to hinder the progress of a 
given country towards democratic rule (Hinton and Newburn, 2009). Hinton et al. 
(2009), in identifying characteristics of developing democracies, set out five elements 
that all affect the police to varying degrees: weak democratic institutions; corruption 
and weak rule of law; significant level of poverty and inequality; high crime and 
societal instability; and finally, poorly institutionalised channels of police 
accountability and responsiveness (Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.6). These 
overlapping, highly interconnected issues can actually be related to police and 
policing in different ways.  
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Consequently, changing this situation through police reform, meliorates community 
and police relations and improves listening to community concerns about police and 
policing issues that have come to the fore as a key part of central national 
development, economic growth, socio-political progress, and the maintenance of 
long lasting peace and security (Francis, 2012b).  
Community policing was introduced in Latin America, primarily, when the police 
reform began as a result of the process in El Salvador and Guatemala when peace 
agreements were signed in these countries in 1991 and 1995 respectively. The 
reform followed the community policing model that was prevalent in the United 
States and Europe during the 1980s(Palmer et al., 2012). The democratisation 
process that swept through Latin America in the 1990s further influenced the police 
reform which was as well driven by the rise of crime and the dissatisfaction with 
police across the region (Palmer et al., 2012). In the US, community policing was 
introduced following the rise of violence and disorder and the associated fear, the 
changing method of crime, and the demographic changes in the American society as 
well as the poor relations between the police and the community. The demographic 
change in the American society in 1980s, as a result of the wide migration from Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America which indicated that whites might not remain the 
predominant ethnicity in the near future, had significant impact on the move toward 
interacting with the community being policed in what came to be known as 
community policing (Peak and Glensor, 2002,p.18, Trojanowicz, 1991).  
 
Reform of the police, democracy, and accountability of police are very much 
interconnected issues. The democratisation climate that followed the end of the cold 
war was interrupted by the global war on terror which led to first world democracies 
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adopting non-democratic policing practices. Such practices undermined the 
credibility of these well-established democracies as proponents of democratic 
change in other countries. The move away from democratic norms in these countries 
was featured through adopting more central policing systems, harsh policing 
techniques, increased detention periods without charge, and poor detention 
conditions (Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.24). This becomes particularly relevant 
when we remember that most police reform programmes are driven and funded by 
countries with democratic forms of governance even though the outcome of such 
programmes does not always appear to be consistent with democratic practices 
(Hinton and Newburn, 2009,p.2). 
 
 At the end of the Cold War and the corresponding collapse of the Soviet Union, 
international peace actors – led by the western powers – started to launch 
‘peacebuilding’ missions.  This implies that the peace would be built on the most 
basic of liberal principles of democracy and the free market (Pino and Wiatrowski, 
2006, Paris, 2006).  In this context, technical assistance was provided to war-torn 
countries to achieve stable peace and democratic systems.  In comparison, the 
traditional peacekeeping mission (before the end of the Cold War) more or less 
abided by the mandate of not interfering with internal issues of the host countries. 
This period is also marked by the increased focus on UN Police rather than the 
military. It was recognised that the police role was more viable than the military after 
a relative level of stabilisation, and, therefore, the police should be entrusted with 
domestic security (Grabosky, 2009b, Greener, 2011b). In this paradigm shift in 
peacebuilding missions, as stated earlier in Chapter Two, peace builders 
commenced to undertake a diverse set of activities including drafting laws, reforming 
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the security and justice sector, monitoring elections, and enforcing peace-terms 
between the former combatants.  Between 1989 and 1998, eleven missions of this 
type were launched (Paris, 2006).  In some cases, the UN missions conducted police 
functions such as in Namibia. While in other countries, the UN took responsibility for 
running the affairs of the host country such as in Cambodia.  Still, in other countries, 
they were authorised to use fire not only for self-defence but to enforce peace such 
as in Somalia and Bosnia (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Barash, 2000, Paris, 2006). 
The 1990s have witnessed tremendous efforts at reform exerted by international 
community to rebuild or reform police forces in countries such as Nicaragua, Haiti, 
Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Namibia, El-Salvador, Guatemala, East 
Timor, Panama, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Kosovo, and South Africa. Most of 
these came as part of UN peacekeeping missions. The participation of police in 
these missions has increased dramatically from 35 in 1988 to 9000 in 2000, and by 
September 2008, the number of UN Civil Police (CIPOL) deployed around the world 
peaked at nearly 13,000 police personnel. The growth in number of UN Police was 
coupled with rapid increase in their role which, until 1990s, was to monitor local 
police behaviours but has expanded to include reporting, advising, and training for 
local police. Finally, UN Police were empowered with firearms to undertake a law 
enforcement role in Haiti in 1994 and Kosovo and East Timor in 2001. This means 
that UNCIVPOL in these countries are empowered to arrest, search, and detain 
suspects of criminal behaviour (Bayley, 2006,p.233). So, the police role in 
peacebuilding missions expanded from merely a SMART model (Support, 
Monitoring, Administrating, Reporting, and Training) to include structural issues and 
whole set of activities such as elections, human rights, selection and recruitment, law 
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enforcement, and  providing security to internally displaced people (Grabosky, 
2009b).      
  
In building effective institutions, the police would come to be recognised as one of 
the most important bodies responsible of maintaining the order, vindicating human 
rights, and securing the democratic process. These goals are often achieved, among 
other things, through implementing community policing strategies. This means that 
the police are becoming a tool for and subject of peacebuilding; in other words. They 
have to adopt the necessary organizational changes to embrace reform and 
implement new policies that link policing to peacebuilding principles which, in this 
case, means adopting community policing. International actors in peacebuilding 
contexts would often propose community policing within the wider security sector 
reform programmes as one of the peacebuilding tools. As stated by Call (2007), 
police reform is so important because it is linked to many other areas of reform in the 
journey to achieve stability in the aftermath of civil conflicts (Call, 2007, Greener, 
2011b).  
 
Community Policing a Catalyst for Changing Old Policing Styles: Why 
Community Policing is Necessary  
From what has been said, here, we see that a whole lot of reasons are making 
community policing a necessary policing approach to achieve many objectives at the 
heart of that peace among divided communities. The chart below summarises the 
drivers for community policing.  
Figure 7.1: Drivers of Community Policing 
243 
 
 
 
Community policing came at time when police organisations shifted away from the 
beat patrol and replaced it with car patrol with officers in air-conditioned police 
vehicles fitted with radios to communicate with their controllers. Officers would not 
leave their cars to interact with the community thus, they would have little knowledge 
of what is actually going on at street level. By being stationed in police cars, they 
also miss the opportunity of obtaining valuable intelligence through talking to 
community members and being able to closely observe their activities (Verma et al., 
2013). 
The Role of Domestic Community Policing in Peacebuilding 
In recent years, domestic police services are becoming more centred in playing a 
crucial role in the development of transitional societies, especially in Africa.  Within 
that role, there is an increasing focus being placed on the model of community 
policing with the belief that the police can help societies in war-torn contexts to 
develop, adopt democracy, and maintain durable peace (Francis, 2012b).  Francis 
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(2012) explains how donor countries pushed for policing reform in war-torn countries 
with the underlying objective of achieving liberal peacebuilding. In doing this, they 
aimed at creating police organisations that are accountable to the public within the 
overall democratic structure of the state.  Contemporary discourse suggests that 
police personnel were involved in human rights violations and became part of the 
conflict isolated from the societies they were supposed to serve. This was 
highlighted in Chapter Two and shown in the cases of Rwanda, Northern Ireland, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Willoughby, 
2002). 
Community policing is becoming more and more the common theme within the 
international peacebuilding missions around the world. That is because this 
approach to policing is believed to be capable of, among other things, bringing 
members of divided societies to work together in the aftermath of civil war.  The link 
between police and peacebuilding is clear when we recognise the fact that domestic 
police are necessary to maintain order, stability, and guard the democratic process in 
post war countries. Moreover, when the police are completely destroyed by the 
conflict, the international police will move in to fill the vacuum – clear examples of 
which were stated earlier such as the interventions in East Timor and Cambodia 
which both had a strong focus on community policing. As was shown in Chapter 
Two, international police come with a number of problems which hinder them from 
having an effective role in host countries.  By implementing community policing, the 
international actors champion this policing approach in conflict contexts to lessen the 
tension between warring parties and make them have trust in the police.  
Nevertheless, community policing that is proposed by international actors does come 
accompanied by some flaws which some research alluded to in Chapter Two 
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(Greener, 2009b, Grabosky, 2009a, Holm and Eide, 2000b). Despite the greater 
hope that has been placed on community policing as a suitable policing approach in 
post conflict contexts, there are, however, some caveats around introducing the 
approach. Francis (2012) claims that, “Community policing, the concept is still “alien” 
to the traditional policing culture and institutional philosophy. The practice itself is 
challenged by several limitations, and it is far from being the panacea or magic wand 
for peaceful civil-police relations that its proponents claim” (Francis, 2012b,p.31). It 
could be true that community policing has been successful in some areas where it 
was introduced. However, mechanisms to test that can be problematic since the 
management of the overall police performance is not clear cut (Adlam and Villiers, 
2003, Newburn, 2008). Even if community policing is proven successful in one area, 
does that really guarantee its success in another? 
 
Literature shows that community policing, as a concept, can be defined in a variety 
of ways(Tilley, 2008, Grabosky, 2009a, García Chávez and University of, 2012, Peak 
and Glensor, 2012, Wisler et al., 2009, Verma et al., 2013); nevertheless, it might be 
useful, in this context, to look at to what extent community policing is different from 
what the police have always been doing. Below is a count of differences between 
traditional policing and community policing:  
Table 7.1: Differences between Traditional Policing and Community Policing 
Community policing Traditional policing method 
 Involve average citizens in the 
community 
 Seek advice/ consult with the 
community 
 No involvement of the community 
 Reactive policing 
 Police can hide in the big crowd 
(some cover their badges) 
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 Answers and solutions may come 
from community 
 Community is the primary source of 
intelligence 
 Listen to all community concerns 
 Minorities are especially engaged 
 Police are accountable to the public 
and transparent 
 Work for the community 
 Better relations with the community 
 More trust in police  
 Local police working at grassroots-
level 
 Beat patrols of small numbers (one 
or two police officers) 
 Proactive policing 
 Individual police officers are 
encouraged to be innovative and find 
alternative solutions 
 Community policing officer is known 
by the community and is accountable 
to them 
 Policing by consent 
 Depends on recruited informants 
paid by the police to provide 
intelligence 
 Police alone have the answers for 
community problems 
 Police are the experts and seek no 
advice from the community 
 Focus on specific type of crime that 
may be of interest for the police 
 Minorities are most probably 
targeted 
 Unaccountable police force/ 
accountable to the state 
 Work for the state 
 Tense relation with the community  
 Organisational crackdown policy  
 Suspicious relationship/ less or no 
trust 
 Centralized police  
 Motor patrols or patrols of larger 
numbers 
 Policing by coercion  
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The Role of the Popular Police in Community Policing and Peacebuilding 
The Sudanese Police, as with other police forces in Africa, remains close to the 
political regimes and has conducted coercive policing towards citizens of western 
regions during the 1970s in the aftermath of the armed protest against the Nimeri 
regime in July 1976 (Berridge, 2011). Furthermore, during the first decade of the 
21st century, there were several other occasions where the police acted against 
citizens to serve political agendas of the ruling system in the country (Berridge, 
2011,p.252). 
 
Since 2007, community policing in Sudan has been represented by the Popular and 
Community Policing Directorate (PCPD).  Its predecessor Directorate, the ‘Popular 
Police Directorate’ was established early in September 1992 with a similar mandate; 
however, as the name suggests, the new PCPD has an expanded remit with more 
focus on police community relationships (Hassan, 2009, 2007, Sudan, 2010). This is 
a separate police department that is directly linked to the police headquarters with no 
coordination with other police departments (see Sudanese Police organisational 
structure in Chapter Three). This makes the community policing very isolated with 
little opportunity to impact on the vast majority of the police personnel that constitute 
the different police departments. Community policing is thus not being 
institutionalised within the policing structure in the country. Furthermore, community 
policing, as a philosophy and policing approach is not mentioned in the Sudanese 
Police Act of 2008; article 13, which articulates the police functions, includes nothing 
about community policing. However, in paragraph F, the police are required to raise 
the awareness of the public through making available all relevant information about 
crime fighting to ensure the public’s engaged support for the police to carry out their 
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duties (Government, 2008) (see Chapter Three). Article 13, therefore, does not 
explicitly talk about community policing, but it can be inferred that community policing 
can be legally located within the wider meaning of this article. Community policing in 
Sudan means that people work at a specific department on a volunteer-basis; 
nevertheless, they are paid some money as a salary. This is contrary to the 
international concept of community policing where the whole police organisation 
moves to work closely with the community and, with their consultation, to set up 
policing objectives and be part of the policing process.  
 
Just as its predecessor, the Popular and Community Policing Directorate is staffed 
by volunteers (Morabiteen) recruited by the Sudanese Police Headquarters and 
regular police personnel, both officers and Non-commissioned officers, according to 
article 4 of the community and popular police regulation (2007).  The Morabiteens’ 
conditions of service differ from those of regular police personnel, for example, they 
do not get pensions and/or promotions in the same manner as the regular police, 
and they do not get the same depth or length of training prior to starting their service.  
However, they do get paid a comparable salary to the regular police. So they are 
considered volunteers, but not in the sense that they are not paid; their volunteering 
comes from the fact that their future professional development and pension are, in 
contrast to the regular police, not considered as part of their conditions of service.   
Headed by a senior police officer, often a Major General, the PCPD also has a 
senior civil coordinator (Monasiq) at the national level, appointed by the President10.  
The Monasiq’s role is to represent and engage the wider community and civil society 
organisations with the PCPD.  Furthermore, as part of his responsibilities, the 
                                                          
10
 The Monasiq is usually a political figure from the ruling party with direct access to senior politicians in the 
country. 
249 
 
Monasiq is to secure support and funding for the PCPD from government.  He is 
adopting a structure akin to the police in terms of national, regional, and local levels.  
This means that the PCPD has two heads-- one for the operational administrative 
and day to day matters and another for coordination with external bodies and entities 
as was pointed out by one respondent working at the department of popular and 
community policing.  
 
According to one respondent, this department was politicised during the South-North 
conflict. Before the secession of South Sudan, this department was criticised for 
sending some of its members (Morabiteen) to voluntarily fight side-by-side with the 
Sudanese army.  The criticism was based on the fact that this is outside of the police 
remit. Other respondents argued that it was not the only police department to take 
part in the fight against the rebels of former South Sudan.  For example, the Central 
Reserve Police were ordered, at different times, to send units to the South even 
though they may only be operating in guarding roles and not actively engaged in the 
front line combat. 
The new directorate’s aims and objectives are to work with the communities.  To 
achieve this, comprehensive Peace and Security Centres were established in most 
of the urban centres with the purpose of reassuring the communities and to help and 
support individuals in need. These centres used to be part of the original Popular 
Police Directorate but, in recent years, they have become attached to the local police 
stations under the command of the relevant Station Commander, although they are 
still staffed by the ‘Popular and Community Police’.  Each centre is hosted by the 
local community; they voluntarily provide the building, furniture, and food for the 
small group of centre staff who often work in shifts.  At night, community members 
250 
 
from the area, together with the serving police staff at the centre, will organise joint 
patrol teams to patrol the area.  These patrols have the effect of reassuring the 
communities, deterring burglars, and reducing other types of criminality.   
 
Community Committees were introduced in 2007 to be a regular standing body to 
work closely with the police stations so that their members can actively take part in 
identifying the policing needs and provide the necessary support to the police 
(Hassan, 2009).  They are meant to represent the community by drawing interested 
members from different agencies, backgrounds, and experiences. In forming these 
committees, police are also seeking to maintain gender balance through 
representing females who are, in most areas, still reluctant to participate due to 
culture barriers. However, in those areas where the police commanders have made 
an effort to break the barriers, women have become very active members of the 
committees; for example, in Gezera State, there are 52 Community Committees 
associated with the 52 police stations. In the majority of those committees, women 
form 50% or more of the group.  Community policing in Sudan is more flourishing in 
the rural areas than in urban areas because the police in the rural areas will interact 
with the tribal chieftains to nominate trustworthy individuals to serve as members of 
the ‘popular police’.  That may explain why the popular police is formed along the 
lines of tribal and ethnic lines.  The PCPD members intervene in simple community 
matters to prevent problems, but without detention or investigative powers, although 
they do have the authority to stop and search.  Therefore, the PCPD personnel have 
to refer any significant matters to the relevant police stations as they are not 
empowered to take reports of crimes and do not have the necessary police folders. A 
similar practice occurs in Mozambique where the police contact tribal leaders to 
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nominate the individuals whom they think are suitable to work with the police (Baker, 
2010).   
 
Respondents of this research comprised of both officers and NCOs all confirmed that 
working with the community within the community policing approach is better for the 
police and the community. They highlighted the positive impact on police work where 
valuable intelligence is provided for police. Three respondents expressed caution, 
saying that community policing in Sudan is being politicised and is being directed to 
serve a political agenda, but they could not give further explanation. Most 
respondents also said that training and the selection of the right people is essential 
to make community policing successful.  
 
Reflecting on relations with the community, the majority of NCO respondents 
considered the Sudanese community relations with Sudanese Police to have been 
better before but are now deteriorating and especially damaged after the riots of 
September 2013 during which many citizens were shot dead and many private 
properties were looted and burned. They said citizens think that we failed to protect 
them and their properties. Interestingly, none of the respondents from officers’ group 
mentioned that the relationship between the police and community is worsening. 
This perhaps can be attributed to the fact that NCOs work closely with community 
members at the front line of service delivery unlike officers who rarely leave their 
offices to interact with community. One focus group of NCOs stressed the role of the 
media in shaping the relationship between the police and community whereby 
misunderstandings occur as the media tends to focus on the negative side of police 
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work and does not reflect police achievement. Here, they say, the role of police is 
essential in getting the right message to the community.    
 
As shown in Chapter Two, the scant resources available to the police and growing 
policing needs are forcing the police around the world in the direction of community 
policing as it is thought to be less expensive and to better address the concerns of 
communities regarding their policing matters. It is also the policing approach 
recommended to police in divided societies who suffered civil and intra-communal 
violence. Both are relevant to Sudanese Police who suffer financial difficulties in a 
country that witnessed protracted internal conflict and lack the trust of the Sudanese 
community (see Chapter Four).  
  
Forms of Community Policing: Police Academies, Community Policing 
Developers and Neighbourhood Watch                    
The UK’s Department for International Development’s Safety and Access to Justice 
Programme (SAJP) in partnership with Sudanese Police introduced a range of 
initiatives to support the community policing approach in Sudan. These are 
international initiatives implemented in other countries but were introduced for the 
first time in Sudan between 2011 and 2014.  Citizens’ Police Academies have been 
implemented in five of the Sudan States. These are Red Sea, Blue Nile, South 
Darfur states, Khartoum state, and Jazeera state. They emanate from the same idea 
of engaging the community in police and policing matters in the hope of building trust 
and getting support. It is based on bringing members of the community in certain 
areas into one forum to educate them in policing issues by presenting short inputs 
given by police officers from different specialities. This is usually done over one or 
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two days and for two or three hours each day. Responding to community members’ 
questions, listening to their concerns, and getting them to tell stories of their 
experiences with the police is the general approach taken. The police commissioner 
in the relevant state or his representative might step in during the process and may 
engage in an interactive session answering questions or just making himself 
available to the public for further clarifications.  
 
It is an innovative idea that captures the core principle of community policing by 
engaging the community in a way that reassures them about what the police are 
doing, meanwhile, providing the right opportunity for the police to get some feedback 
that can be used to develop police plans and/or modify them to avoid mistakes and 
make them more suited to the community needs. To this end, this kind of policing 
which engages the community, suits the Sudanese culture that is known to be more 
open and social. Sudanese can also easily respond to join a public consultation 
forum where they can talk and show off their knowledge in different subjects. In 
practice, the programme seeks to attract people from all backgrounds regardless of 
their profession, gender, age, or ethnicity. In this way, they often get a group that 
almost reflects the various segments of that community.  
 
Sudanese Police leadership recognised the usefulness of the police academy and 
adopted it as an official policing method that has to be disseminated throughout the 
country. It is important to note that when interacting with the community, the police 
do not want the community to take part in the operational policing but to participate in 
a consultative process where members have their questions answered and their 
concerns listened to and have the potential chance to be addressed.  
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Community Policing Developers (CPD) are members of the community and 
members of the SNP who will work together as part of a role model initiative of 
police-community partnership. As the Sudanese Police philosophy of community 
policing is focussing on the development of external partnerships with community 
members in order to implement problem-oriented policing (POP) through 
neighbourhood policing (NP) and intelligence-led policing (ILP), the SAJP is training 
the CPDs in all these concepts of community policing plus the methodologies they 
must employ to implement the concepts. 
 
A neighborhood watch has recently been implemented in two areas of Sudan, in 
Khartoum and Red Sea State, by groups of citizens who are devoted to crime and 
vandalism prevention within their neighborhood. The term originated in the United 
States and builds on the concept of a town watch from Colonial America. In Sudan, 
the pilot areas have preferred to coin the term ‘safer neighbourhood policing’ as local 
police officers are heavily engaged in supporting the members of the community. 
This practice was implanted successfully in West Aljereef Police station. 
Community Policing for Peace: Policing IDP Camps in Khartoum and Darfur 
Since first piloted in Sudan in 1976, and introduced in a more formal way throughout 
the country in 1992, community policing is set to be practiced in many areas to 
support the mainstream Sudanese Police. One area that was considered for 
community policing was the camps of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) who fled 
their homes as a result of the conflict in other areas of the country especially in 
South Sudan (Sudan, 2010, Hassan, 2009). The initiative that brought together the 
Sudanese Police, represented by the department of community policing and the 
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United Nations Mission in Sudan UNMID, sought to introduce community policing in 
IDP camps. The initiative, which received financial support from the UNDP office in 
Khartoum, was developed into a two-year programme which was based on the 
Sudanese community policing model and aimed to address issues of human rights, 
gender, and local traditions including tribal and sensitive religious matters. The 
targets were IDP camps around the capital city of Khartoum: Al Baraka north of 
Khartoum, Wad El Bashir in Omdurman area, Dar El Salaam, Jebel Aulia, and Mayo 
camps all south of Khartoum (Sudan, 2010, Hassan, 2009).   
 
The programme that was implemented between 2007 and 2009 started with 
developing a training model for both police and community members to educate 
them about the importance and the objective of the programme. The programme 
aimed to achieve a set of goals such as to improve community safety and develop 
partnership, communication, and interaction between the IDPs, community, and the 
police; empower the community to work closely with the police to promote safety and 
security in the camp; and encourage reporting of criminal activities and prevent 
crime. The programme gave special consideration to training women police officers 
which culminated in the training of 240 female police officers in community policing, 
gender, and child protection. Community safety committees were established 
throughout the camps to liaise with the police to achieve the stated objectives. By the 
end of the programme, 175 such committees were established to represent the 
different sectors of the camps with representatives from youth, women, teachers, 
traditional leaders, and other groups.  It was recognised between the partners in this 
programme that the police of Sudan would be taking the leading role with the UNMID 
Police supporting the effort (Sudan, 2010). 
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In Darfur, where the most populated IDP camps exist as a result of the conflict that 
started in 2003, police have also worked throughout the camps to provide security 
and to engage members of these camps to take part in policing themselves. Otash, 
Kas, and Alsereif camps in South Darfur; Alsalam camp in North Darfur; and Mornay 
camp in West Darfur all witnessed engagement of community in policing the camps 
and facilitating voluntary return for those who wanted to go back to their home 
villages. In total, 93 members of these camps joined the process to work as 
members of committees to work beside Sudanese Police and UNPOL to police the 
IDP camps (Hassan, 2009,p.84).  
 
The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) included an element of community 
policing; it defines what it termed as ‘Community Police’ as follows, “Community 
Police means volunteer personnel who are recruited by GoS in consultation with 
Darfur Regional Authority DRA from local communities to undertake patrolling 
activities to assist in maintain public peace and tranquillity” (Movement, 2011,p.5). 
Furthermore, article 413 of the document urged the government of Sudan (GoS) to 
recruit with the consultation of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) volunteers, both 
men and women from the internally displaced camps, local community, and the 
returning refugees and tasked the recruits to work in community policing and to keep 
the peace and security in the camps and the villages where the displaced people are 
returning to homes that they fled at the peak of the conflict (Movement, 2011). 
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Despite these provisions, hardly anything has been done with regard to 
implementing them. Mistrust between the parties to the peace agreement hindered 
efforts of implementation. 
A Soft on Crime Approach; Challenges of Community Policing 
The direct benefit of community policing, as its proponents claim, (see Chapter Two) 
is building trust between the police and communities which would lead to the 
community providing essential intelligence to help the police do a better job. Also, it 
is a much more affordable way of policing than expecting police to gather all the 
intelligence themselves. One main concern that I see is that if the community is to 
come too close to the police, that might create the environment for corruption, 
nepotism, or give those with close ties with police the chance to influence police 
work and bend it to serve their narrow interest. On the other hand, the close 
relationship between police and the community can also serve to make the police 
more transparent by helping the community keep an eye on the police organisation 
and its activities. Another disadvantage could be that the police officers might not be 
keen to engage in building a working relationship with the community since they 
know that they could get posted to another area any time if operating within central 
policing system like that of Sudan. Literature also suggests that this method of 
policing will work better in truly democratic countries than in non-democratic ones 
when there is separation of power and the rule of law in semi-independent police 
institutions. In such independent police institutions, the government does not 
interfere with the operational work of the police even though this is contested as 
explained in Chapter One. As Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) put it, “community policing 
is inherently more democratic than the professional model of policing” (Pino and 
Wiatrowski, 2006,p.2). Employing community policing seems to be a necessity for 
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today’s complex world where communities are more sophisticated, exposed to 
different cultures, and more aware of their rights.  Moreover, literature on community 
policing suggests that it is not entirely welcomed as a policing approach by both 
senior and junior police personnel (Verma et al., 2013, Grabosky, 2009a). The 
difference between those who embraced community policing as promising approach 
that may yield good results and those who questioned its viability may stem from the 
way community policing is implemented in different areas (Palmer et al., 2012,p.38). 
Palmer et al. (2012), too, alluded to the importance of training for personnel in 
community policing as best way to introduce them to the model, thus, they will by 
more prepared to accept it as a better policing model. 
The police are the first line defence of the community, and they are expected to 
intervene when conflict starts among people. But the police image is marred by the 
way it was used against minorities throughout the history; adopting community 
policing may prevent that practice from being repeated (Trojanowicz, 1991,p.9).  As 
Verma et al,. puts it, police officers need to be stationed for extended periods to 
better know the geographical area and the population. Even if this might bring in 
fears of officers becoming corrupt, there can measures in place to counter corruption 
practices through close supervision and discipline as well good pay for the police 
which can all help reduce corruption (Verma et al., 2013). 
  
It is also true that some communities are more prepared to engage with the police 
than others due to their education, culture, or economic status. The risk associated 
with this is excluding part of the society, which may lead to their policing needs not 
being heard. The police may, as well, lose some of the potential intelligence from 
that side-lined part of the community. Police officers also fear that they will be closely 
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watched by community members if they come to work closely with community 
(Verma et al., 2013).  
 
Community policing can also be used sometimes to cover some malpractice of 
traditional policing. It is a fact that community policing is being applied in so many 
different ways and to such an extent that it may impede the practice producing 
measurable desired outcomes. Nevertheless, the element of community involvement 
and the building of relationships, which is always at the heart of community policing, 
can secure the minimum of acceptable outcomes. According to Pino and Wiatrowski, 
this philosophy of policing is closer to achieving democratic means of policing and 
engaging the public by allowing the community to design their policing plans and 
take part in monitoring them while being implemented (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006). 
Mobilizing the community to engage in the process and persuading police personnel 
to embrace community policing are among the issues that make implementing 
community policing a challenging task (Grabosky, 2009b)    
Community Policing: A Panacea for Policing Increased Complexities of 
Modern Society   
“Due to their place in society, distinct training, ethos and underlying 
philosophies, police are uniquely placed to help disseminate certain values 
within the communities they are policing”  
(Greener, 2011b,p.184) 
 
Research on the effect of community policing in improving police work by reducing 
crime and the fear of it, building better police-community relations, and ameliorating 
the quality of life for targeted communities is mixed (Palmer et al., 2012,p.39). The 
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fact that community policing is becoming more and more common does not 
necessarily mean that it has succeeded but rather suggests that there is no better 
alternative to it (Palmer et al., 2012). Much has been said in the literature on 
community policing about the imperative of public trust in the police; this one-way 
trust does seem to fall short of building the two-way trust as the police have also 
some caveats toward their communities. As pointed out by Verma et al. (2013),  
working with community can make police officers uncomfortable as they, according 
to him, “can be very paranoid ” (Verma et al., 2013,p.6). They fear that working with 
community will uncover their corruption, and, therefore, officers may be reluctant to 
engage with community members in partnership or work closely to achieve common 
policing goals (Chávez, 2012a,p.270).                                                                                       
Community in Sudan context 
Three respondents from the senior police officers’ group linked the community 
policing to the traditional system of chieftaincy pointing out that it is the right way to 
do community policing through the traditional tribal system since tribal leaders have 
a good knowledge of their community members. Furthermore, they can 
communicate easily with their community and, thus, can pass on policing issues and 
receive community concerns around police and policing. 
Disturbances and Demonstrations of September 2013 Adversely Affecting 
Relationships with Community Members  
One focus group stated the relationship between the police and the community was 
adversely affected by the September riots, and they said that some other forces who 
were not police but were in police uniform were wandering around Khartoum streets 
shooting firearms and killing many people. Part of the public understood that it was 
the police who were shooting, but some do not know who they are. This, they say, 
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deeply affected the relationship between the police and the community especially for 
those who thought that it was the police who fired at the gatherings. Because of the 
burning of private properties such as houses, fuel stations, pharmacies, and shops 
by demonstrators, some citizens, they say, felt that the police were unable to provide 
appropriate protection for them. This also left a negative effect on the police-
community relations.  
 
 As I was in Khartoum during the September 2013 riots, I noticed that the police did 
not publicly admit shooting at the riots, and they defended their position of being 
unable to protect the properties of individual citizens by stating we were trying not to 
shoot. This was the case because the operational police on the ground have no 
orders to shoot at rioters.  I also observed that this was not mentioned by the senior 
or middle ranking officers including those who work at the relevant departments. 
Perhaps they were unaware, and this group of junior police personnel were more 
close to the community and, in interacting with different segments of the society, 
were able find out what was said by the community. 
Conclusion: Identifying Best Practices and Gaps in the Sudanese Version of 
community policing 
Sudanese Police, as other police forces in Africa, suffer a historical mistrust by their 
communities. Community policing is intended to bridge this trust gap. However, and 
despite the efforts made to introduce community policing, the central Sudanese 
Police system that manages the recruitment for officers at the national level 
combined with the posting system which requires the officers to be moved every two 
or three years, does not encourage or support officers to build relationships with the 
community. It is also a great loss for the police to lose out on the relationship with the 
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community built by posted police officers. Their successors have to navigate through 
the community to establish new relationships. It may as well be a reason for the 
community not to go too far and put much trust in the police when they know that the 
officers will be moved from their current area sooner or later. Community policing in 
Sudan is not institutionalised or embedded within the Sudanese Police 
establishments; therefore, community policing is not a policy that is adopted by all 
police departments. It is located in a separate department without clear coordination 
with other police departments. 
 
Community policing in Sudan is based on a voluntary basis in that the members of 
community policing are recruited and trained in a separate process to that of the 
mainstream public police. Community policing is seen to be closely linked to the 
peacebuilding process in the international literature. The United Nations Police, 
through their role within the UN missions, have often proposed the approach as 
relevant to post-war divided communities (Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006, Greener, 
2009b). The problem with community policing is, despite wide disparities in its 
concept and application, it has not been integrated in the police strategy in many 
countries including Sudan. The early attempt of introducing community policy in the 
1970s, and more practical steps taken to introduce it in the early 1990s, does not 
seem to have made the approach an integral component of the police. The 
introduction of community committees to work closely with police stations was a 
significant move toward achieving real partnership with local citizens and working 
with them to achieve commonly identified goals. The international understanding of 
the community policing as a suitable policing method in the peacebuilding setting 
has evidence in the Sudan context where Sudanese Police have worked with 
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partners in IDP camps to provide security and build trust between the police and the 
inhabitants of the camps who are affected by the conflict. The peace agreements 
have not affected the Sudanese Police’s existing structure culminating in the police 
maintaining their traditional police structure and practises. This might be a reason 
why the existing department for community policing has witnessed little change to 
accommodate the peacebuilding efforts into its activities with specific programs to 
address peace concerns. As we have seen earlier in Chapter Two in Latin America 
and elsewhere, this approach is linked to peacebuilding in the way that in has been 
introduced as part of the peace process. For Sudanese Police to introduce 
community policing as a policing approach for the whole force, they will need to 
integrate and institutionalise the concept into their policing curricula and training 
programs. 
The next chapter will bring together arguments and themes discussed in the different 
chapters. 
 
 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis has focussed on the question of whether or not the adoption of 
community policing by the Sudanese Police force can be seen as successful. In 
particular, it has considered the management and leadership style; training and 
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human resources management systems; and community policing approaches with 
regard to whether or not they are suitable for peacebuilding endeavours?   
Furthermore I have considered these questions within the overall context of a 
concern about an overall Liberal Peace approach. Critics of this approach suggest 
that the imposition of a ‘one size fits all’ approach by western donor countries is 
focussed on achieving a specific form of democracy, free market and the rule of law, 
and is connected to a more hidden agenda which serves the specific interests of 
donor countries. They also argue that the interventionist manner of liberal peace as a 
strategy tends to deny the recipient communities opportunities to be engaged in 
matters of concern to them (Paris, 2006, Doyle, 2012, Mac Ginty, 2011).  
In order to consider this question I have considered first what is thought to be 
appropriate on an international level, subsequently undertaking an insider’s view of 
the recent and current context of the Sudanese Police Force. The strength of the 
thesis is in its contribution of original data generated from an insider’s perspective. 
Policing in peacebuilding contexts is usually considered with respect to international 
police that are part of peace missions, along with donor programmes to aid, reform 
or build domestic police forces. In so far as policing is considered as part of a ‘liberal 
peace blueprint’ it contains both of these elements, but the emphasis is far greater 
on the former; the roles of international police (Durch, 2003, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Pino and Wiatrowski, 2006).  
The expectation was, and to some extent still is, that international police officers can 
transport their skills to new locations and manage other communities in a less 
authoritarian manner than soldiers. Nonetheless there is now widespread awareness 
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of their limitations precisely because they are international and not sufficiently aware 
of local cultural, social and political issues to be effective, as described in chapter 2.  
As donors strive to improve the performance of these forces then nonetheless are 
criticised by anti-Liberal Peace writers In particular for the illegitimacy of police 
operating in other countries, especially when working in executive roles, not least as 
policing is so strongly associated with sovereignty (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Grabosky, 2009b).  
 
Donor focus has shifted somewhat towards the reform of local forces, with an 
emphasis on human rights and accountability. Beyond this the promotion of a 
‘community policing’ approach has become part of the reform package, which is 
derived from mixed experiences in western countries. On the face of it this is another 
manifestation of donors setting an agenda (particular that of general police reform), 
but with the intent being to achieve the same result through better use of local 
knowledge – through community policing. 
Domestic Police Forces in Post-Conflict Settings 
Domestic police in conflict zones and post-conflict contexts such as Sudan are 
inevitably and to various degrees affected by that context. Conflicts as literature has 
shown in this research can inflict damaging consequences on police. They may 
totally collapse, become demoralised and/or find themselves surrounded by 
insurmountable problems. In extreme scenarios police are attacked by rebels as in 
Sudan (shown in chapter two and three) and in others they can thus be distracted 
from their core policing tasks of crime fighting and crime detecting(Willoughby, 2002, 
Francis, 2012b).  
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In the cases where the police force collapses it is said that this provides a chance for 
building a new police force in which the failings of former police regimes could be 
avoided. In the cases where police survive the conflict some sort of reform can be 
introduced when peace is initiated as policing is becoming more and more present in 
peace deals (Durch, 2003, Greener, 2011b).  
 
In Sudan’s case the experience was complex. The Sudanese police force was left 
under resourced as the war impoverished the country and the limited resources were 
directed to support the military in their counterinsurgency war to quell insurgents.   
Nonetheless the force did not collapse but policing issues marginalised in the peace 
deals as explained in chapter four, and as is common in other peace agreements 
(Macualay, 2012, Hills, 2006, Paris and ebrary, 2004). Therefore police and policing 
have not changed as much as might have been expected from a reform process built 
into the peace process. Only insignificant reform took place in the aftermath of the 
signing of the CPA when a new police act was introduced in 2008. The act included 
provisions on fair representation for all Sudanese and conferred some rights to the 
states in the appointment and transfer of police officers, but as revealed during field 
work little of these reforms found their way to implementation.  As stated in chapter 
four the two parties of the major peace deal in Sudan, the CPA have shown little 
interest in conducting police reform with Sudan’s government unwilling to reform the 
national police while SPLA sought to build their own largely autonomous police along 
with other institutions in anticipation of independent South Sudan state (Barltrop, 
2008, Movement, 2005).  
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In chapter five it is evident how the remaining military structure of the Sudanese 
police impinges on the force’s ability and chances to be better placed for 
peacebuilding role. The centrally managed force in vast country with poor means of 
transport and communication is detached from local policing concerns relating to 
Peacebuilding. Discretionary powers of police leaders are limited by the fear of 
blame prevailing among the force. Sudanese police have employed severe 
disciplinary punishment for misconduct especially for NCOs. Whatever advantages 
that might bring in relation to observing human rights and eliminating misconduct, 
this research has shown it has also impacted negatively on the willingness to be 
innovative in tackling problems, and undermined their confidence in tackling 
complicated policing matters. Police leaders, to avoid being blamed by communities 
and governments and perhaps to win some approval, tend to place harsh 
punishment on those who misbehave, especially in Khartoum where they send them 
to the notorious Al alia (see Chapter Six). It is a double-edged sword that on the one 
hand maintains discipline and reassures citizens and on the other hand it prevents 
force members from being proactive in dealing with issues on the ground which is 
key if police are to have role in Peacebuilding. 
 
It is claimed that Peacebuilding through community policing is well suited to serve 
post-war communities but neither of the local police such as Sudan one nor the 
international police are without problems to undertake the Peacebuilding roles, 
especially where a militaristic style and culture prevails, as in Sudan. 
 
A better approach is to establish strong partnership with the local police supported 
and empowered to take the leading role in policing issue. One main aspect of 
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building the capacity of the local police through such partnership is effective police 
training. 
Locally Anchored Police for Peacebuilding  
An emphasis on the virtues of local knowledge can also lead to problems as of 
course local forces also have their shortcomings, as in societies that are ethnically 
deeply divided. Using members of police organisation from the opposite group to 
police particular community can have damaging consequences, and this does 
happen in Sudan. Moreover local police in such environments are often corrupt, 
unequipped, or incompetent for Peacebuilding roles. Nevertheless the right balance 
can be achieved by seeking to empower local police with clear ownership strategy at 
the end of peacebuilding programme (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006a). Francis 
(2012) and others noted the quick fixed short termed programmes of the 
Peacebuilding missions in which they have to meet tight mandate and time line and 
specific budget in extremely unstable environment. This coupled with staff related 
issues in particular policing background and lack of pre-deployment training put 
pressure on mission’s implementation strategy (Greener, 2009b, Merlingen and 
Ostrauskaite, 2006a, Francis, 2012a).   
 
One of the root causes of the conflicts in the country is the domination of the centre, 
with some ethnic groups taking much power than others; unequal development and 
representation as explained in Chapter Three and Four (Copnall, 2014, Berridge, 
2011, Musa, 2011, Bashar, 2013). The actual composition of the police reflects one 
aspect of the country’s policy of equal opportunities as police in post conflict is 
dominated by one ethnic group. Chapter six shows that recruitment policy is not 
targeted to provide equal chances for all Sudanese despite the guarantees provided 
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in the interim constitution of 2005 and the Police Act of 2008. Moreover data from 
field work show how police at state level are neglected and under resourced 
compared to the police in the capital city as yet another evidence of marginalisation 
and neglect of the centre towards the periphery. 
 
Examining the peace agreements in Sudan reveals that the role of local police in 
Peacebuilding is hardly acknowledged. Peace agreements on the South Sudan 
conflict and the subsequent conflicts emanating from it and Darfur focus more on the 
power sharing security arrangements. Security arrangements tend to be centred on 
military DDR programmes while power sharing is widely understood as political 
participation by allocating ministerial posts to former combatants at central and state 
level (Johnson, 2011, Movement, 2005, Barltrop, 2008). These security 
arrangements as stated in their provisions deal mainly with the military aspect of the 
conflict. It includes demobilisation, disarmaments and redeployment of the former 
combatants.  
 
Integration of former combatants into the police is part of the power sharing 
arrangements where former combatants join the police mainly as police officers. This 
was clearly stated in the DDPD compared to other agreements. DDPD provided a 
framework for integrating former combatants in the police following a set of 
requirements as articulated in Chapter Four. The missed opportunity for reforming 
the Sudanese police within CPA seemed to have been addressed in the DPA but in 
practice implementation delivered on this regard as Chapter Four shows can hardly 
be seen (Movement, 2006). The major Sudanese police achievement in regard to 
peace process is their role in the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections 
270 
 
which involved South Sudan after CPA this was followed by the referendum that led 
to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 as explained in chapter four. Both 
processes were run amidst considerable political tensions but passed peacefully with 
Sudanese police leading the role of providing secure environment.     
Training the police for peace role   
 
Quality training is not only essential requirement for effective policing in traditional 
police duties as explained further in Chapter Six. It is also a necessity for police 
operating in conflict setting (Baker, 2006, Durch, 2003). Training in the Sudanese 
police is affected by the extraordinary wide remit of the force. With such a wide remit 
it is challenging to develop training that address the wide and varying needs of 
policing and equip police personnel with the required knowledge and skills.  Training 
in Sudan is not targeted to serve peacebuilding in the way that key components of 
police training in post-war settings. For instance human rights and the rule of law are 
not properly incorporated into the training curricula. Trainers in Sudanese police are 
not selected or especially trained to undertake training duties; any police officer can 
be drawn into training regardless of their experience. It is not credible that trainers 
chosen in this way would be qualified to deliver effective training.  
UNPOL is mandated in some missions to train local police; as shown in Chapter 
Two, but they also do not have specialist trainers to provide training for police in the 
host country. Any police officer within the mission can be assigned to training role. 
This often because of the hasty way police personnel for international missions are 
selected. The Sudanese police experiences (chapter six) show that the UN mission 
does not have qualified trainers to help training the host police. Without training 
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experience and good understanding of the local contexts, including host policing 
challenges, international police are incapable of supporting police in conflict zones 
with the required training, and there is no effective implementation of training for 
Sudanese trainers.  
Lacking training and experience Sudanese police are doing peacebuilding as de 
facto operation without sufficient preparation. Sudanese police officers are not 
gaining relevant experience from working in the UNPOL as police forces from some 
other countries are doing.  Chapter Two shows that working as peace keepers in UN 
missions brings expertise into the police organisation. This can then be used to build 
local police capacity to better police post-conflict situations. Competent police 
officers trained by international police leave the country for better opportunities 
working with the UNPOL. A senior British consultant in Sierra Leone reported that 
the well trained police officers left the country to join UN missions in other countries.   
The difficult ‘post-conflict’ situation in Sudan is not conducive for police to undertake 
peacebuilding roles in the country.  They have to police conflict zones at the same 
time as working to build peace among communities in areas where peace deals 
were reached and a relative calm prevailed. Areas such as Darfur where part of the 
region is in peace and others are still in war require the police to adopt two different 
policing styles to fit the situations. With that wide remit and generalised training 
method of the Sudanese police it is unlikely that they will be able to deliver training 
that can serve the peacebuilding issues and prepare personnel for peacebuilding 
role.  
The multi-country training of the Sudanese police abroad is akin to the multi-national 
training that the international police trainers of peacebuilding missions would deliver 
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in the host countries which can be inconsistent and confusing due to the different 
policing backgrounds of those who deliver it. There is no overall ‘international 
policing training curriculum’ and so what is imposed internationally is itself not at all 
consistent. In Sudan this varied experience is added in a piecemeal way to an 
already ineffective and highly varied approach to police training. 
 
    Community policing  
 
 Community policing originates in democratic countries and often introduced as part 
of a democratisation process. That means the viability of introducing community 
policing in non-democratic countries depends how much progress is made on the 
democratisation process in that specific country.  In such countries mechanism of 
transparency and accountability of police organisations are not effective and ordinary 
citizens are not encouraged to get involved in their policing matters. In these 
countries police forces would often focus on what the state demands rather than 
what the community needs. Even when community policing is introduced within 
emerging democracies there still exists the issue of police organisations’ resistance 
to change the old ways of doing policing. Police officers and police organisations 
generally as seen in Chapter Two and Seven are reluctant to adopt policing styles 
that make them more transparent and accountable. Police officers are also not 
always comfortable to work closely with community members. The crucial point 
comes when police work close to community is, what if the collaboration between the 
two resulted in policing style that does not comply with governments’ interest.  
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Governments of all types in many countries on occasion tend to use the police to 
protect their interests (see Chapter one and Two). Community policing is proposed 
by international peace builders as the right policing approach for post war contexts 
(see Chapter Two and Seven). It is almost always introduced within the wider 
concept of liberal Peacebuilding principles of free market, parliamentary democracy 
and the rule of law. Community policing is meant to produce policing that is based on 
democratic ethos of good governance and accountability. As presented in Chapter 
Seven, a version of community policing is being formally adopted in the Sudan since 
early 1990s. Because it is widely interpreted concept it has been presented 
differently in many countries but has yet to be precisely defined. As explained in 
Chapter Seven the basic idea behind this approach is engaging communities in the 
policing process to secure support for the police, accountability as well as 
transparency.  
 
Sudan has not fully integrated community policing as policing philosophy within the 
whole Sudanese police and its goals remain poorly defined. There is however some 
experience of attempts to introduce this approach, such as in IDP camps in 
Khartoum (see Chapter Four) which features one aspect of Peacebuilding in the 
aftermath of conflict. It is perceived to be relevant in that the context where people 
who fled their homes are more insecure and desperate for policing services. The 
central police system of Sudanese police now seems to be preventing this approach 
from developing, as explained in Chapter Four. In this regard it is interesting to see 
that Wingate’s vision in the first decade of the last century referred to in Chapter 
Three of locally raised and managed police in Sudan is as relevant, and perhaps as 
distant, today as it was then. 
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The efforts of the Sudanese police to develop their community policing model are 
often  hampered by histories of strained relation with their communities, a rigid 
management system, flawed recruiting regime unfocused training which all 
contribute to minimising police ability to undertake more effective Peacebuilding role.  
The problem of police in such situations as that of Sudan is that they are seen as the 
state arm in the counterinsurgency strategy which makes it even more difficult for 
them to present themselves as trustworthy, impartial organisation.   
 
This itself is not particularly an African or Sudanese problem. Before the Good Friday 
Agreement, the Northern Ireland police force was perceived by one side of the 
conflict as being partial police and thus was inconceivable that they could have 
established a close relationship with the wider community. But the fundamental 
reform programme initiated by the Lord Patten Report dramatically transformed the 
force and community policing approach became central  era to suit the peace 
(Ellison and Smyth, 2000).  By achieving that level of reform in relatively short span 
of time, the UK police demonstrated that they had the ability to adapt to embrace 
new policing realities.  
 
Such ability has not been evident in Sudan in the aftermath of the various peace 
agreements, so the Sudanese police did not bring about much change in their 
perceived role.  There is however some hope and, even expectation from the 
international police in the UNAMIS, that the work in the IDP camps in Khartoum 
might constitute a model that could be implemented in future (see Chapter Four).  
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The role of women in peacebuilding 
As stated in Chapter Six women’s role in the peacebuilding process is now seen as a 
vital ingredient. As stressed by the UN resolutions 1325/2000 and 1820/ 2008. They 
called for greater roles for women in peacebuilding missions and the need for 
considering women’s specific needs in conflict zones. As seen in chapters 3 and 6, 
women in the Sudanese police are only small percentage due to organisational 
discrimination in recruitment and cultural issues in Sudanese society. The 
institutional discriminatory policy against Sudanese women also results in them 
being confined to lower ranks and not being promoted to higher ranks where they 
could be effective in decision making.  This is exacerbated by the fact even for the 
small number they tend to choose not work out of the family residence or in conflict 
zones limiting their potential role in peacebuilding.  
Lessons for Policy 
It is evidently clear in the literature on police and policing that the police around the 
world are changing and policing is by no means static. This is due to the rapid 
changing environment of policing not least the changing of societies as a result of 
the easy means of travel and the media revolution which made the world small place 
where hardly anything is remote or unknown. This is coupled with advances in 
technology which is also changing the way the police are doing their job. These 
changes are bringing police around the word closer to each other and making more 
policing issues to be of universal concern. Matters of terrorism and cross border 
crimes, trafficking of humans and drugs are just examples. This means that 
collaboration between different police forces is becoming an inescapable truth 
(Kratcoski and Kratcoski, 2011, Newburn, 2008). It is not possible for any police 
force to opt out of this international trend of semi-universal policing where different 
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forces are interdependent on each other for policing issues that of concern to their 
home citizens. Growing demands for policing entails more resources to provide 
efficient policing service. One way of responding to these issues is to work more 
closely with communities and strengthening of partnership with relevant 
organisations and police forces.  The more democratic the governing system the 
more accountable the police would be. This is particularly relevant when it comes to 
police budget and spending and requires the police to justify their spending and 
become more transparent. As people and governments would want to know where 
the money is being spent and whether there is another way of doing the job with less 
cost. That will help the police to gain more legitimacy and support from the public. 
Police also need to be innovative to think of doing good job within reasonable cost. It 
needs courage and honesty to have an inclusive police force as people may no 
longer believe that recruiting of the police is secret security matter.  In democratic 
society they would scrutinise the process and may want to see it being fair for 
everyone. Sudanese police need to address this point to reflect the composition of 
the Sudanese community and present themselves as national police force open for 
all Sudanese citizens.   
Literature also shows that police and policing is attracting more researchers and the 
subject is developing rapidly as established discipline with the social science and 
criminology. The police should encourage research within the police and in 
partnership with other institutions this may help the police develop evidence based 
plans to support their policies. To achieve this sufficient budget needs to be allocated 
for research purposes. It could as well be useful for the police to encourage officers 
to reflect on their experiences and impart lessons learned to younger generations. 
Incidents like the violence in the aftermath of the death of Garang in 2005 could have 
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been avoided if lessons were learned from previous incidents with similar 
characteristics like the one clement Amboro in 1964 (see Chapter Three). Teaching 
of recent modern history of the force and not treating it as secret past for the serving 
officers could prove useful. Only by studying this past, younger generations will have 
the opportunity for them to understand the mistake of the past and learn lessons for 
future operations.   
This can be built the fact that most of research respondents said that they are proud 
to be part of the Sudanese police. This spirit of belonging and the invaluable 
experience they accumulated together with the resources spent on training them 
throughout their careers make sound to think of innovative way of adopting retention 
policy. In Chapter Six we have seen the rising numbers of police personnel leaving 
the service. Retaining the existing staff could be easier and less expensive than 
recruiting and training new ones.   Perhaps employing of more civil staff is less 
expensive to train, pay to release more police for cure police business. This civil staff 
can enhance the capacity of the police and do valuable job. Many of the jobs 
assigned to police officers can be done by civil staff; this practise is common in many 
police forces. For Sudanese police it would be correcting the mistake of the early 
1990s when almost all civilian staff were trained and incorporated into the police.  
Research respondents reflected on the budget where hardly and one knows about 
the budget how it allocated and how it is spent. Senior Sudanese police managers 
find difficulties to receive fair share of the budget to run their departments. They even 
do not know how much budget is allocated to them.   
The peace process of in the country and the internationally growing role of police in 
peacebuilding entails the Sudanese police reconsider their position and prepare the 
force for potential peace role. This can take place in the form of institutional reform 
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that take into account the various factors affect and enhance the police role in 
peacebuilding. The composition of the force alluded to in this section and training 
system are essential elements of this. The training will need to embrace and focus 
more on the peace related issues of rule of law, vindication of human rights and 
accountability. Finally community policing as the most relevant policing approach to 
peacebuilding may need to developed and institutionalised across the force rather 
being in separate department isolated from mainstream policing and other police 
departments.  
Planning 
It is a fact that the Sudanese police do not have long term strategy or annual plan 
that used as guide to implementing the stated objectives. Linking objectives to 
specific time frame and budget may prove helpful in achieving the long and short 
term programmes. The DFID funded programme in Sudan in collaboration of the 
Sudanese police drafted a five year strategic plan after wide departmental 
consultations and with the support of British consultants with expertise in policing 
and planning. At the final stage of signing and adopting the strategy a change in 
police leadership took place and the new Director General did not approved the plan 
and was abandoned. Planning would include nurturing potential future leadership 
and motivating police officers to towards specific targets and measure their success. 
Furthermore planning set the goals and engage every member of the police 
organisation to clearly defined objectives.  
Future Research 
The current composition of the Sudanese police which encompasses many 
departments that are not part of the police in most countries is making the 
organisation overstretched into too many responsibilities. The integration of the 
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prisons, civil defence, customs and protection of wild life ( see Chapter Three) into 
the police that took place in 1992 does not seem to be helping the organisation to 
focus more core policing issues. These departments have obviously different roles to 
that of the core traditional police work related to crime fighting, crime detecting and 
the protection of life and property. The Sudanese police leadership in 2010 
conducted survey among all police officers asking them whether they think 
Sudanese police is better with these departments or whether it would be better that 
they are separated as was the case before 1992. The result of this survey is 
however not announced and the situation remains. The conducting of this survey 
reflects the Sudanese police leadership unconvinced of the current situation but it 
was political decision that needs political approval. 
Further research focused on the recruitment, selection and training system may be 
needed to critically evaluate the system and suggest future solutions for these 
important issues for successful police force. As previously stated that any police 
force can be judged by how good is their recruitment and selection process. 
Recruitment is particularly important to peacebuilding to enable the police to operate 
in peacebuilding settings. Police should reflect the community in such environment 
so that they are accepted and supported by that community. Future research in this 
regard should focus on how are the various Sudanese communities are represented 
in the police and how can they be represented in the future in more inclusive police 
force. Training is expensive activity and should be targeted towards the needed 
knowledge and skills therefore to meet departmental needs. It must also be relevant 
to the nature of work and the appropriate rank. Its  
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Literature available in English on African police seems to have included little on the 
police in Northern Africa especially former French colonies of Tunisia, Morocco and 
Algeria as well as the Arabic speaking countries of Libya, Egypt and Sudan.   The 
significance of this region comes in the backdrop of the political turmoil and the 
security threats swept through many countries during and after the Arab awakening.  
The potential security gap that arise from the collapse of the political structure and 
inevitable police weakness may entail further study on what relationship police forces 
had with these regimes and what role the police have played during the riots that led 
to the change of regimes in these countries and how police is affected by and 
adapted to the political change.    
Sudanese police can harness their relationship with international regional police 
forces to build local training centre to the international standards which can attract 
regional police forces to be trained in the Sudan. While they will gain the same 
interaction knowledge they seek by sending officers to be trained abroad they can 
also safe a lot of resources they used to spend in training Sudanese police 
personnel abroad. In such training centre Sudanese police can specially share their 
experience in peacebuilding and learn more from other police forces operating in 
similar situations 
Summary of Sudanese police and peacebuilding discussion 
The international trend of increasing police involvement in peacebuilding makes it 
feasible for the Sudanese police to have role in the peacebuilding process taking 
place in the country. Even though literature in this regard often focuses on 
international police within peacebuilding missions the aim of this research has been 
to further explore possible role for domestic police in peacebuilding within that 
growing international police role in peacebuilding. International police role in 
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peacebuilding is undermined by several issues highlighted earlier in this research 
and are connected to the critique of liberal peace explained in chapter two.  Issues 
such as the lack of relevant training; poor understanding of the local setting;  the 
short term rotation of the UN system and most importantly the lack of clear strategy 
to empower local police for durable peace. Domestic police too are hindered by 
problems of corruption; poor relationship with communities due to brutality, 
association with political regimes or being composed mainly of one ethnicity; 
incompetent and under-resourced. Sudanese police are also experiencing problems 
similar to those of domestic police that minimise their role in the peacebuilding 
dilemma. Some of these issues are internal institutional problems around 
recruitment, training, management and corruption. Others are external challenges 
like budgets legal mandates and relation with political regimes which in most times 
adversely affect their relation with Sudanese community. Despite these issues 
coupled with insufficient police role in the peace agreements Sudanese police as this 
research shows are trying to take part in the peacebuilding process in the country. 
Some of the possible Sudanese Police contribution to peacebuilding can be related 
to root causes of conflicts alluded to in chapter two and six by seeking to have more 
inclusive police composition through reforming the recruitment and selection 
process. Other contributions however are related to their role in policing the peace in 
the country through effective policing approaches such as community policing. This 
role can be enhanced through international support and reform to tackle the above 
mentioned issues through effective partnership between international actors and 
Sudanese police. The hope is that this research and the themes it highlighted will 
contribute to the support of Sudanese police role in the peacebuilding process in the 
country. 
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Appendix 
Aim and Objectives of the Research and Research Questions 
 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the peace process in Sudan through the lens 
of examining the Sudanese police roles and capabilities with a view to evaluating 
their effectiveness in the peacebuilding process.  
It will also use Sudan as a case study to consider the role of the domestic police 
(and community policing in particular) in peacebuilding processes in fragile and post-
war states, which is a much under-studied topic. 
Research questions  
Main research question:  
Has the adoption of community policing by the Sudanese Police force been 
successful? In particular, are the management and leadership style; training and 
human resources management systems; and in particular community policing 
approaches suitable for this endeavour? 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
1. What are the main components of the Sudanese Police mandates? 
2. To what extent are contemporary community policing approaches facilitating 
the peacebuilding roles of the Sudanese Police?  
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   3. What does community policing mean within the context of the mandate of the 
Sudanese Police? 
   4. What are the main features of the community policing approaches adopted by 
Sudanese Police? 
    5. Did the community policing approaches adopted by Sudanese Police help 
police in undertaking peacebuilding role? 
     6. What are the challenges faced these approaches which hinder the police in 
Sudan to undertake an effective role in peacebuilding? 
  
294 
 
Questions for interview and Focus Groups 
Senior police officers 
When did they join/ what rank/ department 
How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation? 
Is it difficult job? 
What do you think is the greatest police achievement in (just one example) the last 
decade? 
Do you think police is contributing to the peacebuilding in the country? 
Do you think that include conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace keeping 
Do you know about the official position in this matter? 
Is there any support from international community for the police in relation to 
peacebuilding? 
How do you assess police training? 
Do you think the police have appropriate equipment? 
Do you have enough budgets for your department? 
Was there any cuts to your budget and how much 
People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the 
police 
How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt 
Do you see any reasons for that? 
295 
 
How do you feel about the new challenge of working with community? 
How do you perceive the community policing approach? 
What are the advantages of this approach? 
What are the disadvantages of this approach? 
What can be done to improve it? 
Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country? 
Is it difficult for police to work in such environment? 
Why? 
Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion? 
Do they feel secure in your job?  (Losing career, career development... etc.) 
 
Middle rank police officers 
When did they join/ what rank/ department 
How they feel about belonging to the police organisation 
Is it difficult job?  
Do they feel secure in your job?  (Losing career, career development, etc.) 
How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation? 
Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion? 
How quick do you think police is when they respond to crime? 
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Do you think the police have appropriate equipment? 
Are you able to speak about colleagues and managers misconduct? 
People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the 
police 
How do you feel when working with community? 
How do you perceive the community policing approach? 
What are the advantages of this approach? 
What are the disadvantages of this approach? 
How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt 
Do you see any reasons for that? 
What can be done to improve it? 
Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country? 
Is it difficult for police to work in such environment? 
Why? 
 
Junior police officers 
When did they join/ what rank/ department 
How do you feel about belonging to the police organisation? 
Is it difficult job? 
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Do you feel secure in your job? (Career development, losing career..etc.) 
Do they feel free to make judgements and exercise discretion? 
How do you asses the relation between the police and the community 
How quick do you think police is when they respond to crime? 
Are you able to speak about colleagues and managers misconduct? 
Do you think the police have appropriate equipment? 
People are now more aware of their rights, does that represent any challenge for the 
police 
How do you feel when working with community? 
How do you perceive the community policing approach? 
What are the advantages of this approach? 
What are the disadvantages of this approach? 
How do you respond to allegations that police is corrupt 
Do you see any reasons for that? 
What can be done to improve it? 
Have you ever worked in Darfur or other conflict area in the country? 
Is it difficult for police to work in such environment? 
Why? 
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 Informed consent form 
 
Dear …………….(Research Participants) 
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by me, Mohamed Aldago, as part of my 
doctoral research.  
I would appreciate it, if you would carefully read the information below, plus the 
proposed set of interview questions provided.  
Then, if you are happy with the conditions of the interview, sign and return the form 
to me on the date of our meeting.  
Confidentiality 
Please note that any information you provide during the interview will form part of my 
doctoral submission and, therefore, be in the public domain.  However, should you 
wish to remain anonymous this is perfectly acceptable.  If this is the case, please 
state this prior to our interview and this will be abided by throughout the interview 
process and within my thesis. 
Interview Terms 
If you would like any of the questions I am proposing to ask you during the interview 
to be removed, please do not hesitate to inform me and the questions will be 
removed and replaced by a different question – or set of questions. 
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Moreover, if you are happy to be quoted in my thesis, with the exception of certain 
pieces of information – which you prefer to be from an anonymous source, please do 
state this prior to or within the interview.   
If upon reflection after the interview you decide that there is a certain piece of 
information you wish to be omitted from the transcript, please let me know as soon 
as possible. 
Please sign to confirm that you are happy with the terms outlined above:  
 
Signature: Mohamed Aldago 
Date: August 2013 
  
300 
 
Researcher identity and contacts 
 
Dear research participant 
My name I s Mohamed Ahmed Abaker ALdago I am a Sudanese police officer 
studying for my PhD at Bradford University/ Department of Peace Studies. My 
Supervisor is Professor Fiona Macaulay. My research is focusing on Sudan police 
and peacebuilding and aims to achieve the following objectives: 
  1. Raising the Sudan police awareness of the intrinsic value that they can add to 
the peace process through introducing peace education within police training 
institutions  
  2. Promoting the Sudan police leadership’s commitment to the peace process  
  3. Encouraging Sudan citizens to fully engage in policing themselves, through 
community policing  
  4. Help in building the trust between the police and the community, which will result 
in effective policing that support the peace and stability among communities 
   5. Strengthening the Sudan police efficiency in handling issues that are likely to 
disturb the peace 
I appreciate if you could participate in my research by providing some information 
according to structured questions. I emphasise that all the information provided and 
the identity of each participant will remain anonymous and that participants are free 
to withdraw from the research process at any time before the completion of the 
research.  
301 
 
Here are my contact details  
Mobile in Sudan:00249922204022 
Mobile in the UK:00447447943860 
Email: M.Aldago@student.Bradford.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
